Does Welfare Inhibit Success?

The Effect of Removing Low-Income Youth from the Disability Rolls

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Online Appendix

Characterizing the complier population

The RD design identifies the effect of having an 18th birthday after the August 22nd cutoff for the complier population: the children who would receive an unfavorable age 18 review if they had a birthday after the cutoff, but would not receive an unfavorable age 18 review if they had a birthday before the cutoff. Examining the characteristics of the complier population is important for the external validity of the results. The "Review complier" column in Table 1 presents the complier characteristics analysis based on the procedure outlined in Angrist and Pischke (2008), where compliers are defined using unfavorable age 18 review as the treatment variable.[33] The table gives the proportion of the full sample and the review complier population with a given characteristic (for continuous characteristics, the proportion above the median). The review compliers are representative of the full sample on most characteristics affecting substantial proportions of the population. Mental conditions other than intellectual disability are overrepresented in the review complier population, which is expected since many mental conditions that qualify children for SSI—for example, ADHD and other learning disabilities—are less likely to qualify adults for SSI. Intellectual disability

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[33]The average of characteristic X over the complier population is the term $E(X|D_1 = 1, D_0 = 0)$ in the expression

$$E(X|D_1 = 1) = E(X|D_1 = 1, D_0 = 1)P(D_0 = 1|D_1 = 1) + E(X|D_1 = 1, D_0 = 0)P(D_0 = 0|D_1 = 1)$$

where $D_z = d$ indicates whether the individual was treated ($z = 1$) or not ($z = 0$), and whether the individual was moved by the instrument ($d = 1$) or not ($d = 0$). Intuitively, the average of a characteristic over treatment group members who receive an unfavorable age 18 review is the weighted average over always takers (those who receive an unfavorable age 18 review whether they are treated or not) and compliers (those who receive an unfavorable age 18 review if and only if they are treated), where the weights are the proportion of always takers and compliers in the population, respectively. The average over treatment group members who receive an unfavorable age 18 review is empirically known. The average over always takers is estimated from control group members who receive an unfavorable age 18 review. The proportion of compliers can be estimated by subtracting off the proportion of always takers (control members who receive an unfavorable age 18 review) and never takers (treatment group members who do not receive an unfavorable age 18 review). I estimate that 39% of the sample is in the complier population when defined in terms of an unfavorable age 18 medical review, and 22% of the sample is in the complier population when defined in terms of being on SSI four years after age 18. These proportions are similar to the 23% complier population estimated by Maestas et al. (2013) for adult SSDI recipients defined in terms of the disability examiner instrument.

is slightly underrepresented in the review complier population.[34] The review complier population is representative of the full sample on outcomes prior to the event in 1997, including parental and child earnings and family disability receipt, as well as demographic variables.

I measure changes in the composition of the complier population over time in the final columns of Table 1. The "Off SSI Year 2 compliers" are the group of children who were off the program in year two if assigned to the treatment group and on the program in year two if assigned to the control group, and analogously for "Off SSI Year 16 compliers." Between year 2 and year 16, the complier population becomes poorer and less healthy. Later year compliers enter the program at a younger age, are more likely to have a diagnosis of intellectual disability, and are more likely to come from poor and single-mother-headed households. Recall from Section 3.A that most of the attenuation in the first stage comes from control group members falling out of compliance by leaving the program, either because their health improves or because they violate income and asset rules.

Adjusting for complier composition and probing robustness

Recall from Figure 3 that the first stage effect on SSI enrollment changes considerably over time. If these changes reflect nonrandom entry and exit, then the composition of the compliers—those control group members who stay on SSI and those treatment group members who stay off of SSI—will change over time. In this case, the evolution of the year-by-year IV estimates would reflect not only true changes in the earnings response over time but also changes in the composition of the complier population over time. As I discuss in the complier analysis above, and as shown in the "Off SSI compliers" columns of Table 1, I find that the members of the control group who leave SSI in adulthood are healthier (enter SSI at a later age and are less likely to have intellectual disability) and wealthier (have higher parental earnings) than those who remain on SSI.

I adjust for this selection problem by re-weighting the IV estimates over time to reflect the same reference population, following the methodology in Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010). The basic method is as follows: identify the observable characteristics which differ across the complier populations and have predictive power over reduced form outcomes, divide the sample into cells based on these characteristics, estimate the earnings response

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[34]These results by diagnosis are consistent with findings by Hemmeter and Gilby (2009) that children with intellectual disabilities have relatively low age-18 cessation rates while those with other mental conditions have high cessation rates.

within each cell, and take a weighted average of the IV estimates across the cells, where the weights are the composition of the reference population. Formally, the calculation is

$$\hat{\beta}_{t,reweight} = \sum_c \omega_c \hat{\beta}_{t,c}$$

where $\hat{\beta}_{t,reweight}$ is the re-weighted IV earnings estimate in year t, ω_c is the proportion of the reference population in cell c, and $\hat{\beta}_{t,c}$ is the IV estimate for earnings in year t within cell c. I construct cells based on diagnosis and parental earnings because both change over time in the complier population (as shown in Table 1) and parental earnings are predictive of the youth's earnings response.

The dashed line in Figure 5 gives the complier re-weighted IV estimate for earnings in each year. Overall, re-weighting does not change the IV estimates for mean earnings substantially, nor are the differences statistically significant, but in later years the re-weighted estimates are somewhat larger than the unweighted estimates. This is the expected direction since control group members with high parental earnings have a larger earnings response and are more likely to leave SSI as adults. Of course, an important caveat is that this re-weighting exercise does not correct for unobservable differences across complier populations.

The attenuation of the first stage over time also affects the interpretation of the IV estimates relative to the control group. The percentage changes in Table 3 are calculated relative to the control group mean. However, because many control group members leave SSI at a later date, the control group means understate the SSI income of the control group members who stay on SSI and overstate the earnings of this group. In Appendix Table A.27, I calculate the percentage changes in earnings and income relative to control group members who stay on SSI. As expected, the percentage increase in earnings increases substantially, from 62% relative to the full control group mean to 190% relative to the control group subset that stays on SSI. In addition, the estimated *level* of earnings for removed SSI youth falls substantially, from \$6,860 (= \$2,638 + \$4,222) using the full control group mean to \$4,024 (= \$2,638 + \$1,386) using the control group subset that stays on SSI. However, the nonrandom attrition of the control group from SSI means that the control group members who stay on SSI are a selected sample—as discussed earlier, their earnings capacity is likely to be lower than that of other control group members. The true control "complier" earnings mean is likely somewhere in between the mean of the full control group and the mean of the

control subset that stays on SSI.

Estimating effects on Medicaid enrollment

I do back-of-the-envelope calculations to estimate the Medicaid loss from SSI removal since I do not observe Medicaid enrollment in my data. Using self reports of Medicaid enrollment from the National Survey of SSI Children and Families, Hemmeter (2011) finds that Medicaid enrollment among SSI youth who remain on SSI after an age 18 medical review is 96%, versus 25% for those who are removed. Multiplying the SSI enrollment first stage in each year by 71 (=96-25) percentage points gives an approximate Medicaid enrollment first stage. I multiply this Medicaid enrollment first stage by the value of Medicaid to get the value of the Medicaid loss. Estimates for the value of Medicaid vary widely, and few focus on the specific population of disability recipients. Finkelstein et al. (2015) use estimates from the Oregon health insurance experiment to estimate an annual value of Medicaid of $2,600 for the broader low-income population. The value of Medicaid may be larger for the disabled population if they have higher out-of-pocket expenditures without insurance, or if the covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and the Medicaid transfer is higher for them. Using $2,600 as the value of Medicaid yields a total value of the SSI loss including Medicaid of at least $117,000 in present discounted value, or 30% greater than the value of the cash benefit loss alone.[35]

Recipient welfare calculations

In the standard labor economics problem, the agent faces a tradeoff between consumption and leisure and maximizes utility with respect to those variables subject to a budget constraint:

$$\max_{c,l} u(c,l) \text{ s.t. } pc = w(T - l)$$

where c is consumption, l is leisure, p is the price of the consumption good, w is the wage, T is the total available hours, and $u_c > 0$ and $u_l > 0$. Under various assumptions outlined below, I use my estimates on income to approximate the recipient's consumption (c). The choice of work hours ($T - l$) may be especially pertinent for individuals with disabilities

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[35]The 1997 March Supplement to the Current Population Survey values Medicaid at $6,000 for individuals aged 20-34 who are on SSI. Using this figure, the total value of the SSI loss including Medicaid would be $182,000 in present discounted value, or more than 100% greater than the value of the cash benefit loss alone.

if their disutility of work is high. Unfortunately, I do not observe any measures of the disutility of work in my data. Assuming that the disutility of work is positive, I will likely underestimate the recipient's welfare loss from SSI removal by ignoring the effect of removal on work hours, since I find in Section 3 that removal increases earnings.

I define the "constant equivalent" as the guaranteed consumption amount that makes the recipient indifferent between receiving that amount in each period and receiving his actual, volatile consumption stream. The constant equivalent c_{CE} is implicitly defined as:

$$\frac{1}{T}[u(c_{CE}) + \beta u(c_{CE}) + ... + \beta^{T-1} u(c_{CE})] = \frac{1}{T}[u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2) + ... + \beta^{T-1} u(c_T)] \quad (5)$$

where c_t is actual consumption in year t, and T is the total number of periods (16 years). I use the constant equivalent, which is an analogous concept to the certainty equivalent, as a measure of recipient welfare. I assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

Note that in this utility function, consumption levels work through the c and consumption volatility works through the γ.

I use three measures of consumption that make different assumptions. In the first measure, I take consumption in each year to be the maximum of the recipient's total observed income in that year and a consumption floor $\underline{c}$:

$$c_{1t} = \max(\text{earnings}_t + \text{SSI}_t + \text{DI}_t, \underline{c})$$

The assumption that consumption in each year equals income in that year might be reasonable for this low-income population, for the reasons discussed in the previous subsection. However, I follow the standard method (Brown and Finkelstein (2008); Hoynes and Luttmer (2011); Finkelstein et al. (2015)) of imposing a consumption floor to avoid utility values of negative infinity and to rule out implausibly low consumption levels.[36] Given that a sub-

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[36]To determine a reasonable consumption floor, I estimate the distribution of annual expenditures for the low-education and low-income population from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The 10th percentile of per-capita annual expenditures is between $2,000 and $3,000 for households with heads with a high school education or less and households with income less than $20,000. Therefore I choose consumption floor values

stantial fraction of SSI children live with parents in young adulthood, I use a second measure of consumption in which I attribute one-third of the parent's income in a given year to the recipient's consumption:

$$c_{2t} = \max(\text{earnings}_t + \text{SSI}_t + \text{DI}_t + \frac{\text{parent income}_t}{3}, \underline{c})$$

In the third measure of consumption, I vary the fraction of parental income included in the recipient's consumption based on the recipient's SSI status. As in c_{2t}, the recipient receives one-third of parental income if still on SSI, but now receives one-half of parental income if no longer on SSI:

$$c_{3t} = \begin{cases} max(\text{earnings}_t + \text{SSI}_t + \text{DI}_t + \frac{\text{parent income}_t}{3}, \underline{c}) \text{ if on SSI at time } t \\ max(\text{earnings}_t + \text{SSI}_t + \text{DI}_t + \frac{\text{parent income}_t}{2}, \underline{c}) \text{ if off SSI at time } t \end{cases}$$

This case models a situation in which parents are more likely to contribute (or contribute more), in either in-kind or monetary transfers, when the child is removed from SSI.

For each of the three consumption measures, I calculate the constant equivalent c_{CE} from equation (5) for each individual in the sample and put c_{CE} on the left-hand-side of equation (3), using average annual SSI enrollment over the post-period as the endogenous variable. Table A.29 shows the constant equivalent loss from SSI removal under the three approaches, for different values of the risk aversion parameter γ and different values of the consumption floor ($\underline{c}$). For a risk neutral individual ($\gamma = 0$), who considers only the average consumption loss and not the volatility of consumption, the constant equivalent of the SSI loss when using only recipient income (c_{1t}) ranges from \$3,600 to \$5,900, depending on the consumption floor, from a baseline of around \$9,000. For $\gamma > 0$, the loss is greater in constant equivalent terms because the individual considers both the fall in consumption levels and the increase in consumption volatility after removal. The constant equivalent loss from removal for $\gamma = 2$ ranges between \$3,900 and \$7,800. Including a constant one-third fraction of parental income (c_{2t}) reduces the estimated welfare loss by 20%. Including a fraction of parental income that varies based on SSI status (c_{3t}) reduces the estimated welfare loss by 50%, since the increase in parental transfers partially offsets the loss in SSI

ranging from \$1,000 to \$5,000. The proportion of the sample below \$3000 is 34% for c_{1t}, 20% for c_{2t}, and 17% for c_{3t}.

income.

I use these calculations to approximate the amount of the recipient's welfare loss from SSI removal that is attributable to an increase in consumption volatility rather than to a decrease in consumption levels. For some $\gamma > 0$, the proportion of the welfare loss from consumption volatility is:

$$\frac{(\text{Constant equivalent loss for } \gamma > 0) - (\text{Constant equivalent loss for } \gamma = 0)}{\text{Constant equivalent loss for } \gamma > 0}$$

For $\gamma = 2$ using recipient income only (c_{1t}), these calculations indicate that 8-23% of the welfare loss is attributable to the increase in consumption volatility rather than to the fall in consumption levels, depending on the consumption floor. The proportion of the welfare loss from consumption volatility falls to 4-16% when including a constant fraction of parental income (c_{2t}) since the parent and child income streams smooth each other out to some extent. However, the proportion from volatility approximately doubles, to 20-35% of the welfare loss, using a variable fraction of parental income. This increase is driven by two factors: 1) the smaller consumption loss mechanically increases the proportion of the loss from volatility, and 2) parental income is more positively correlated with recipient income for recipients no longer on SSI. The results suggest that for reasonable values of risk aversion, ignoring the income stabilization benefits of SSI could lead to a substantial underestimate of the recipient's welfare loss from SSI removal.

Three other considerations deserve mention. First, these calculations do not consider the Medicaid loss from SSI removal. Based on estimates from Finkelstein et al. (2015), the Medicaid loss increases the magnitude of the constant equivalent loss by 15-30% for $\gamma = 0$ and 25-50% for $\gamma = 2$. Second, these welfare calculations assume that adult SSI is a guaranteed benefit. As expected, the constant equivalent loss falls when I allow for exit from SSI in adulthood. Finally, these welfare calculations do not consider the variance *across* individuals in the extent of the consumption loss. For a concave utility function, the welfare loss for the representative agent who experiences the average income loss underestimates the welfare loss under heterogeneity. To calculate the welfare change under heterogeneous losses, I calculate the welfare loss for each quantile based on my quantile IV estimates from Section 3 and then calculate the average loss across quantiles assuming rank preservation. Relative to the representative agent, the welfare loss approximately doubles with heterogeneous losses

for $\gamma = 2$.

Considering effects on social welfare

Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) model the social planner's problem when the disutility of work is observable and unobservable. When the disutility of work θ is continuous (with distribution $F(\theta)$) and observable, the social planner sets consumption for workers (c_a), consumption for those on disability insurance (c_d), and the disutility cutoff θ^* above which people are allowed onto disability insurance. Those with disutility below θ^* become workers, and those with disutility above θ^* become non-workers. Workers produce 1 and non-workers produce 0. The social planner maximizes the utility of workers and non-workers subject to a resource constraint R:

$$\max_{c_a, c_d, \theta^*} \int_0^{\theta^*} [u(c_a) - \theta] dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} v(c_d) dF(\theta) \tag{6}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \int_0^{\theta^*} (c_a - 1) dF + \int_{\theta^*}^{\infty} (c_d) dF = R \tag{7}$$

where $u(c_a)$ is the utility from consumption for workers and $v(c_d)$ is the utility from consumption for non-workers. Solving this maximization problem yields two key conditions that characterize the optimum:

$$u'(c_a^*) = v'(c_d^*) \tag{8}$$

$$u(c_a^*) - \theta^* - v(c_d^*) = u'(c_a^*)(c_a^* - 1 - c_d^*) \tag{9}$$

Condition (8) says that consumption levels are set to equalize the marginal utility of consumption for workers and non-workers. When the disutility of work is perfectly observable, there is perfect consumption smoothing across the able and disabled states. In condition (9), the left-hand-side is the utility loss from work for someone with disutility of work θ^*, and the right hand side is the marginal utility of consumption from work. The social planner awards disability insurance to people for whom the social cost of work (in the form of private disutility) outweighs the social benefit of work (in the form of additional consumption).

When the disutility of work is imperfectly observed, the cutoff θ^* is no longer set by the social planner but is endogenously determined by agents who maximize their utility taking

c_a and c_d as given. A higher level of c_d, in addition to smoothing consumption as before, now induces people with a marginal disutility of work to apply for disability insurance and stop working if allowed (i.e., θ^* falls). This tightens the government's resource constraint by lowering the output from work and increasing the expenditures of the disability program. The phenomenon of an endogenous θ^* is commonly referred to as moral hazard. When the disutility of work is imperfectly observed, the social planner does not perfectly smooth consumption across the able and disabled states because of the moral hazard costs of doing so.

In the Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) model, the social planner weighs consumption smoothing and other benefits with moral hazard costs when the disutility of work is imperfectly observed. I consider the empirical inputs needed to estimate both sides of the social planner's problem. I start with the benefits side of the social planner's problem. This paper contributes to the empirical estimation of the consumption smoothing benefits of SSI by estimating (under the assumptions discussed in Section 5) the increase in consumption levels and the decrease in consumption volatility resulting from SSI receipt. However, there are at least two additional parameters needed to estimate consumption smoothing benefits. First, it is necessary to know the magnitude of the consumption drop associated with having a disability, relative to consumption in the able-bodied state. Assuming that utility is not state-dependent, a larger consumption drop from disability means greater consumption smoothing benefits from disability insurance and thus a higher optimal level of disability insurance. My data do not allow me to estimate the consumption drop associated with disability because I do not observe individuals in the able-bodied state.[37] The second input needed to estimate consumption smoothing benefits is knowledge of the form of the utility function in the able-bodied state and the disabled state. Disability might increase the marginal utility of consumption through, for example, higher medical bills that leave the disabled individual starving. On the other hand, disability might decrease the marginal utility of consumption by making it difficult to enjoy types of consumption enjoyed by the able-bodied individual. For a population with near-poverty consumption levels, it may be reasonable to assume that the marginal utility of consumption remains high whether or not the individual is disabled, but there is little empirical evidence on this issue. As a heavily means-tested program, SSI may have redistributive benefits in addition to consumption

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[37]Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Meyer and Mok (2013) estimate that chronic and severe disability in adults is associated with a 24% decline in food and housing consumption ten years after onset.

smoothing benefits, depending on the form of the social welfare function and the weights placed on different individuals. Thus another input into estimating the benefits side of the social planner's problem is the desired amount of redistribution in the social welfare function.

The other side of the social planner's problem reflects the moral hazard costs of disability insurance. These costs could take several forms in the context of SSI. The most obvious is the marginal tax rates on earnings imposed by the program: SSI benefit levels are reduced by \$1 for every \$2 in earnings after a small monthly allowance, which distorts the labor-leisure tradeoff facing the recipient. The \$2,600 increase in earnings that I estimate includes both the effect of SSI's marginal tax rates, which is distortionary, and the effect of the SSI income loss, which is non-distortionary and therefore does not affect social welfare. However, given that earnings response estimate is small, it provides a meaningful upper bound on the substitution effect created by the program's marginal tax rates. Perhaps more importantly, critics of the SSI program have argued that SSI may have other moral hazard effects, especially for children, such as harming health through the effort to demonstrate medical eligibility.[38] My data do not allow me to measure the effects of other types of moral hazard that do not show up in the earnings of SSI youth.

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[38]See, e.g., Patricia Wen, "The Other Welfare," *Boston Globe*, December 12, 2010; U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Supplemental Security Income Benefits for Children, October 27, 2011; and Nicholas Kristof, "Profiting from a Child's Illiteracy," *New York Times*, December 7, 2012.

Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A.1: Covariate Balance Plots for 1995, 1996, 1997: Demographic Covariates

Notes: Graphs plot demographic covariates in the treatment year (1996) and the two neighboring years (1995 and 1997). Each graph plots the average of the covariate across SSI children in each birthweek bin. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in the indicated year.

Figure A.2: Covariate Balance Plots for 1995, 1996, 1997: Diagnosis Covariates

Diagnosis covariates

Notes: Graphs plot diagnosis covariates in the treatment year (1996) and the two neighboring years (1995 and 1997). Each graph plots the proportion of SSI children in each birthweek bin with the indicated primary diagnosis. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in the indicated year.

Figure A.3: Covariate Balance Plots for 1995, 1996, 1997: Pre-treatment Outcomes

Notes: Graphs plot pre-treatment outcomes, which are annual averages taken over the years prior to the given year: 17 years prior for family outcomes (e.g., 1980-1996 for 1996) and 5 years prior for child outcomes (e.g., 1992-1996 for 1996). Each graph plots the average of the pre-treatment outcome across SSI children in each birthweek bin. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in the indicated year.

Figure A.4: Empirical CDFs of Earnings and Income Placebo RD Estimates

Notes: Left (right) panel plots empirical cumulative distribution function of earnings (income) RD placebo estimates, where placebo cutoff dates are all days in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the placebo cutoff.

Figure A.5: First Stage Effect on SSI Enrollment

Notes: Figure plots average SSI enrollment four years after the year of the 18th birthday for each birthweek bin. Solid markers indicate the 1996 cohort, while hollow markers represent comparison cohorts (1994, 1995, and 1997). Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 and in 1994, 1995, and 1997.

Figure A.6: Sources of Attenuation in the First Stage

Proportion enrolled in SSI

Notes: "Control" series plots the proportion of SSI children with an 18th birthday before the cutoff (less likely to get an age 18 review) who are on SSI in a given year. "Treatment with unfavorable age 18" series plots the proportion of SSI children with an 18th birthday after the cutoff and an unfavorable age 18 medical review who are on SSI in a given year.

Figure A.7: Intergenerational SSI Enrollment

Has child on SSI

Notes: Figure plots proportion of females and males from the original sample of 18-year-olds who have a child on SSI by the year 2013, not conditional on having a child. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Figure A.8: IV Estimates of the Effect of One Additional Year Off of SSI on Cumulative Earnings

Notes: Figure plots the parametric IV RD estimate of the effect of being off SSI *for one additional year* on cumulative earnings in each year, using a polynomial order of 2 with covariates. The endogenous regressor is cumulative years off of SSI up to the given year and the dependent variable is cumulative earnings up to that year. Shaded region is 95% confidence interval. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Figure A.9: IV Estimates of the Effect of Being Off SSI on Earnings

Notes: Figure plots parametric IV RD estimates of the effect of being off SSI on SSI income (circles) and earned income (X's) in each year, using a polynomial order of 2 with covariates. The solid earnings line represents unweighted IV estimates; the dashed line represents IV estimates re-weighted by the year 2 complier population (see Appendix for details). Shaded region is 95% confidence interval. Confidence interval widens over time because of attenuation in the first stage (see Figure 3). Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.1: Comparison of Households with SSI Children to All Households with Children Using SIPP

	All households with children	Households with SSI children	Low-education households with children
Household size	3.9	4.1	4.2
Annual earnings	$65,457	$19,221	$39,738
Annual total income	$71,332	$36,001	$45,325
Black	17%	38%	19%
Single mother head	28%	58%	35%
High school dropout head	14%	25%	37%
Received child SSI	3%	100%	4%
Received cash public assistance	13%	100%	20%
Received cash or noncash public assistance	54%	100%	76%
Received free or reduced price lunch	36%	78%	54%
Received housing assistance	8%	28%	12%
Annual SSI income (child or adult)	$375	$3,708	$589
Annual cash transfer income	$750	$8,684	$1,150
N	10,375	277	3,750

Source: Author's calculations from Survey of Income and Program Dynamics 2008 Panel.

Notes: Table presents estimates of household characteristics using longitudinal weights. "Low-education household" indicates a household whose head has a high school education or less. Noncash public assistance includes food stamps, WIC, Medicaid, rent for public housing or government subsidized rent, government energy assistance, free or reduced-price lunches, and free or reduced-price breakfasts. Housing assistance includes public housing, government subsidized rent, and Section 8 vouchers.

Table A.2: Standard RD Covariate Balance Tests at August 22 Using Linear Specification

| | 1996 cohort | | 1995 cohort | | 1997 cohort | |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.
Demographics						
Male	0.0038	(0.0066)	-0.0103	(0.0071)	-0.0062	(0.0062)
Age at entry	-0.3140***	(0.0609)	-0.177**	(0.0694)	-0.135**	(0.0554)
Single mother	0.0066	(0.0068)	0.0079	(0.0073)	0.00089	(0.0065)
No parents	-0.0062	(0.0049)	-0.0051	(0.0055)	-0.0018	(0.0045)
Latest record date	-87.7***	(18.4)	-74.9***	(20.4)	-50.1***	(17.2)
Diagnosis						
Mental	0.0022	(0.0060)	-0.0124*	(0.0067)	0.0046	(0.0058)
None	-0.0035*	(0.0020)	0.0054	(0.0045)	-0.0039	(0.0031)
Nervous	0.0066**	(0.0031)	-0.0033	(0.0030)	-0.00082	(0.0027)
Endocrine	0.0013	(0.0026)	0.0009	(0.0026)	-0.00087	(0.0025)
Sensory	0.0064***	(0.0025)	0.0027	(0.0024)	0.0051**	(0.0022)
Infection	-0.0135***	(0.0026)	-0.0023	(0.0020)	5.69e-05	(0.0018)
Musculoskeletal	0.00066	(0.0015)	0.0007	(0.0016)	-0.0019	(0.0013)
Neoplasm	0.00042	(0.0013)	0.0012	(0.0014)	-0.00094	(0.0014)
Respiratory	0.00074	(0.0014)	0.0025*	(0.0015)	-0.0014	(0.0013)
Pre-treatment outcomes						
Child SSI payment	152.1***	(28.8)	80.4**	(32.8)	71.8***	(25.7)
Child earnings	-34.7***	(9.9)	-31.5***	(10.6)	-25.6***	(7.15)
Family dis. apps	-0.0055	(0.0042)	-0.0048	(0.0049)	0.0040	(0.0036)
Family dis. income	39.7	(73.2)	75.8	(79.6)	45.9	(68.9)
Parent earnings	-574.3***	(182.0)	-351.5*	(196.2)	-429.3**	(172.6)
N	81,800		71,941		90,501	
Joint F test	109.07		51.77		46.82	
p-value	0.0000		0.0041		0.0143	

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents covariate balance tests for the linear standard RD specification. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in the given year (1995, 1996, or 1997). "Pre-treatment" outcomes are annual averages taken over the years prior to the given year: 17 years prior for family outcomes (e.g., 1980-1996 for 1996) and 5 years prior for child outcomes (e.g., 1992-1996 for 1996). Latest record is the date of the most recent SSI record; a new record indicates a change to diagnosis, family structure, or some other variable. Family disability applications/income refers to parent DI and SSI and sibling SSI.

Table A.3: Standard RD Covariate Balance Tests at August 22 Using Quadratic Specification

	1996 cohort		1995 cohort		1997 cohort	
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.
Demographics						
Male	0.0039	(0.0098)	-0.0120	(0.0105)	-0.0093	(0.0092)
Age at entry	-0.0480	(0.0898)	0.054	(0.103)	-0.027	(0.082)
Single mother	-2.37e-05	(0.0101)	-0.0070	(0.0107)	-0.0059	(0.0096)
No parents	0.0015	(0.0072)	0.0104	(0.0082)	0.0040	(0.0067)
Latest record date	0.9350	(27.2)	3.457	(30.1)	-4.93	(25.4)
Diagnosis						
Mental	0.0064	(0.0089)	-0.0160	(0.0099)	0.0016	(0.0085)
None	-0.0015	(0.0029)	-0.00068	(0.0067)	-0.0040	(0.0046)
Nervous	0.0069	(0.0045)	0.0033	(0.0044)	0.0029	(0.0040)
Endocrine	0.00075	(0.0038)	0.0034	(0.0038)	0.0027	(0.0037)
Sensory	-0.0023	(0.0036)	0.0016	(0.0036)	0.0021	(0.0032)
Infection	-0.0118***	(0.0040)	0.0003	(0.0030)	-0.0027	(0.0026)
Musculoskeletal	0.0024	(0.0022)	0.00078	(0.0024)	-0.0013	(0.0018)
Neoplasm	0.00085	(0.0020)	0.00074	(0.0020)	-0.0023	(0.0020)
Respiratory	0.0003	(0.0022)	0.0023	(0.0022)	-0.0021	(0.0020)
Pre-treatment outcomes						
Child SSI payment	11.4	(42.5)	-13.7	(48.5)	-0.439	(37.9)
Child earnings	-0.709	(13.2)	1.25	(15.4)	6.65	(10.5)
Family dis. apps	-0.0088	(0.0062)	-0.0022	(0.0072)	0.0059	(0.0053)
Family dis. income	-45.9	(107.6)	70.4	(120.2)	-49.7	(102.2)
Parent earnings	-421.5	(268.8)	44.4	(292.4)	-119.8	(254.4)
N	81,800		71,941		90,501	
Joint F test	31.79		21.04		17.61	
p-value	0.2833		0.8238		0.9355	

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents covariate balance tests for the quadratic standard RD specification. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in the given year (1995, 1996, or 1997). "Pre-treatment" outcomes are annual averages taken over the years prior to the given year: 17 years prior for family outcomes (e.g., 1980-1996 for 1996) and 5 years prior for child outcomes (e.g., 1992-1996 for 1996). Latest record is the date of the most recent SSI record; a new record indicates a change to diagnosis, family structure, or some other variable. Family disability applications/income refers to parent DI and SSI and sibling SSI.

Table A.4: Covariate Balance Tests at August 22 Using Local Linear Regression with Different Bandwidths

	Bandwidth: 100		Bandwidth: 150		Bandwidth: 200	
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.
Demographics						
Male	0.00960	(0.0105)	0.00501	(0.00872)	0.00256	(0.00766)
Age at entry	-0.0523	(0.0966)	-0.125	(0.0800)	-0.189***	(0.0704)
Single mother	0.000187	(0.0109)	-0.000505	(0.00900)	0.00205	(0.00791)
No parents	0.000129	(0.00770)	-0.00157	(0.00641)	-0.00218	(0.00565)
Latest record date	-11.67	(29.25)	-23.07	(24.22)	-47.90**	(21.27)
Diagnosis						
Mental	-0.00371	(0.00983)	-0.00410	(0.00813)	-0.00490	(0.00714)
None	-0.00203	(0.00319)	-0.00226	(0.00260)	-0.00228	(0.00227)
Nervous	0.00595	(0.00434)	0.00710*	(0.00363)	0.00652**	(0.00319)
Endocrine	0.00224	(0.00411)	-0.000165	(0.00338)	0.000248	(0.00296)
Sensory	0.000389	(0.00363)	0.00110	(0.00298)	0.00189	(0.00260)
Infection	-0.00108	(0.00310)	-0.00125	(0.00254)	-0.00130	(0.00221)
Musculoskeletal	0.00346	(0.00226)	0.00152	(0.00189)	0.000744	(0.00167)
Neoplasm	-0.000233	(0.00211)	0.000431	(0.00175)	0.000881	(0.00154)
Respiratory	0.00115	(0.00246)	0.000236	(0.00197)	0.000447	(0.00170)
Pre-treatment outcomes						
Child SSI payment	28.18	(45.77)	50.42	(37.89)	86.72***	(33.30)
Child earnings	-57.75	(115.6)	-7.459	(96.26)	-11.13	(84.81)
Family dis. apps	-0.0107	(0.00673)	-0.00647	(0.00555)	-0.00710	(0.00489)
Family dis. income	3.346	(14.86)	-2.220	(11.76)	-19.62*	(10.60)
Parent earnings	-516.7*	(289.0)	-401.6*	(239.9)	-481.6**	(211.0)
N	32,808		47,844		63,131	
Joint F test	26.49		29.64		41.05	
p-value	0.4918		0.3304		0.0407	

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents covariate balance tests for local linear regression with the indicated bandwidth measured in days. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within the given bandwidth of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. "Pre-treatment" outcomes are annual averages taken over the years prior to 1997: 17 years prior for family outcomes and 5 years prior for child outcomes. Latest record is the date of the most recent SSI record; a new record indicates a change to diagnosis, family structure, or some other variable. Family disability applications/income refers to parent DI and SSI and sibling SSI.

Table A.5: Covariate Balance Tests for RD-DD and Standard RD Specifications

| | Standard RD | | | | RD-DD | | | |
| | Linear | | Quadratic | | Linear | | Quadratic | |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.
Demographics								
Male	0.0038	(0.0066)	0.0039	(0.0098)	0.0122	(0.0075)	0.0155	(0.0114)
Age at entry	-0.3140***	(0.0609)	-0.0480	(0.0898)	-0.220***	(0.0696)	-0.108	(0.106)
Single mother	0.0066	(0.0068)	-2.37e-05	(0.0101)	-0.00048	(0.0077)	-0.00082	(0.0118)
No parents	-0.0062	(0.0049)	0.0015	(0.0072)	-0.0023	(0.0056)	-0.0043	(0.0085)
Latest record date	-87.7***	(18.4)	0.9350	(27.2)	-40.1*	(21.0)	-8.51	(32.1)
Diagnosis								
Mental	0.0022	(0.0060)	0.0064	(0.0089)	-0.0056	(0.0070)	-0.0025	(0.0107)
None	-0.0035*	(0.0020)	-0.0015	(0.0029)	-0.0045	(0.0043)	-4.41e-05	(0.0065)
Nervous	0.0066**	(0.0031)	0.0069	(0.0045)	0.0085***	(0.0031)	0.0062	(0.0048)
Endocrine	0.0013	(0.0026)	0.00075	(0.0038)	-0.0015	(0.0029)	-0.0036	(0.0044)
Sensory	0.0064***	(0.0025)	-0.0023	(0.0036)	0.0011	(0.0025)	-0.0032	(0.0039)
Infection	-0.0135***	(0.0026)	-0.0118***	(0.0040)	0.0002	(0.0021)	0.00086	(0.0033)
Musculoskeletal	0.00066	(0.0015)	0.0024	(0.0022)	0.00064	(0.0016)	0.0024	(0.0025)
Neoplasm	0.00074	(0.0014)	0.0003	(0.0022)	0.00062	(0.0016)	0.00060	(0.0025)
Respiratory	0.00042	(0.0013)	0.00085	(0.0020)	-1.59e-05	(0.0015)	0.00049	(0.0023)
Pre-treatment outcomes								
Child SSI payment	152.1***	(28.8)	11.4	(42.5)	95.2***	(32.9)	27.4	(50.2)
Child earnings	-34.7***	(9.9)	-0.709	(13.2)	-6.99	(11.2)	-5.19	(15.5)
Family dis. apps	-0.0055	(0.0042)	-0.0088	(0.0062)	-0.0075	(0.0048)	-0.0114	(0.0074)
Family dis. income	39.7	(73.2)	-45.9	(107.6)	-2.35	(82.8)	6.68	(126.5)
Parent earnings	-574.3***	(182.0)	-421.5	(268.8)	-280.3	(205.3)	-338.2	(314.1)
N	81,799		81,799		300,888		300,888	
Joint F test	109.07		31.79		40.32		22.49	
p-value	0.0000		0.2833		0.0619		0.7582	

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents covariate balance tests for the linear and quadratic standard RD specification (equation 1) and the linear and quadratic RD-DD specification (equation 2). Latest record is the date of the most recent SSI record; a new record indicates a change to diagnosis, family structure, or some other variable. Pre-treatment child SSI payment, family disability applications and receipt, and parental earnings are measured over 1980-1996; pre-treatment child earnings over 1992-1996. Family disability applications/income refers to parent DI and SSI and sibling SSI. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 (for standard RD), plus SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1994, 1995, and 1997 (for RD-DD). Standard errors clustered at individual level shown in parentheses.

Table A.6: RD Reduced Form Estimates, Own Outcomes without Covariates

	Poly.		Linear		Quadratic		Cubic		Quartic		Control
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
First stage (N=81,800)											
Age 18 review	1	4	0.866***	(0.0032)	0.866***	(0.0048)	0.865***	(0.0065)	0.867***	(0.0081)	0.0017
Unfavorable age 18	1	1	0.372***	(0.0047)	0.372***	(0.0070)	0.384***	(0.0093)	0.394***	(0.0117)	0.0007
SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.0942***	(0.0053)	-0.0989***	(0.0078)	-0.104***	(0.0103)	-0.110***	(0.0129)	0.5891
Own income (N=81,800)											
SSI income	1	1	-754***	(43.6)	-772***	(64.3)	-841***	(85.1)	-934***	(106)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	1	1	321***	(106)	271*	(160)	325	(213)	201	(267)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	1	1	0.0238***	(0.0048)	0.0233***	(0.0071)	0.0311***	(0.0095)	0.0372***	(0.0118)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	1	1	0.0102***	(0.0030)	0.0112**	(0.0045)	0.0137**	(0.0060)	0.0088	(0.0075)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	2	1	3,949***	(1,182)	3,257*	(1,784)	4,011*	(2,389)	2,624	(2,993)	$48,174
DI applications	1	1	-0.0544***	(0.0118)	-0.0794***	(0.0176)	-0.0424*	(0.0238)	-0.0311	(0.0299)	0.375
DI income	1	1	-32.0	(24.5)	-53.9	(36.6)	-24.6	(49.3)	18.8	(62.0)	$688
Total obs. income	1	1	-492***	(100)	-583***	(152)	-566***	(203)	-743***	(254)	$9,041
Income>$0	1	1	-0.0301***	(0.0036)	-0.0340***	(0.0053)	-0.0309***	(0.0070)	-0.0336***	(0.0087)	0.8349
Income>$15K	1	1	0.0013	(0.0033)	-0.0002	(0.0050)	0.0024	(0.0066)	-0.0004	(0.0083)	0.1416
Income PDV	2	1	-6,627***	(1,122)	-7,803***	(1,694)	-7,457***	(2,271)	-9,588***	(2,847)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)											
Income std. dev.	1	1	120*	(62.7)	76.3	(92.0)	76.1	(125)	-27.4	(156)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1	1	0.167***	(0.0230)	0.171***	(0.0340)	0.180***	(0.0451)	0.212***	(0.0561)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.112***	(0.0106)	0.120***	(0.0156)	0.123***	(0.0206)	0.132***	(0.0256)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1	1	0.154***	(0.0087)	0.151***	(0.0128)	0.148***	(0.0169)	0.165***	(0.0210)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1	1	0.133***	(0.0075)	0.131***	(0.0110)	0.130***	(0.0147)	0.148***	(0.0183)	0.4306
Arc % change income	1	1	0.0480***	(0.0041)	0.0502***	(0.0061)	0.0533***	(0.0082)	0.0618***	(0.0102)	32%

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 1 without covariates. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV.

Table A.7: RD Reduced Form Estimates, Household Outcomes without Covariates

| | Poly. | | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Household income (N=72,274)											
Parental earnings	1	1	-603**	(235)	-124	(346)	-238	(458)	-423	(567)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	1	4	-0.0027	(0.0021)	-0.0064**	(0.0032)	-0.0022	(0.0042)	-0.0049	(0.0053)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	1	1	-40.8	(94.1)	-90.0	(139)	-57.9	(185)	-210	(232)	$4,812
Total HH income	1	1	-1,172***	(261)	-755*	(386)	-722	(511)	-1,367**	(634)	$25,917
HH income>$0	1	1	-0.0056***	(0.0019)	-0.0061**	(0.0028)	-0.0037	(0.0036)	-0.0009	(0.0045)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	1	1	-0.0208***	(0.0052)	-0.0173**	(0.0076)	-0.0184*	(0.0100)	-0.0248**	(0.0124)	0.6535
HH income PDV	1	1	-14,840***	(3,107)	-10,199**	(4,588)	-9,561	(6,084)	-17,971**	(7,544)	$314,240
HH income variability (N=72,274)											
HH income std. dev.	1	1	-267***	(94.5)	-257*	(139)	-337*	(188)	-685***	(235)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	1	1	0.0459***	(0.0178)	0.0461*	(0.0262)	0.0179	(0.0347)	0.0024	(0.0430)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.0202***	(0.0058)	0.0226***	(0.0084)	0.0127	(0.0109)	0.0084	(0.0134)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	1	1	0.0154***	(0.0030)	0.0159***	(0.0044)	0.0110*	(0.0058)	0.0165**	(0.0072)	26%
Sibling outcomes (N=22,070)											
Avg. earnings	1	1	-367**	(176)	-527**	(260)	-385.5	(344)	-645	(427)	$3,817
Earnings>$0	1	1	-0.0182*	(0.0101)	-0.0294**	(0.0146)	-0.0237	(0.0190)	-0.0226	(0.0233)	0.4275
Earnings>$5K	1	1	-0.0195**	(0.0081)	-0.0331***	(0.0117)	-0.0322**	(0.0153)	-0.0384**	(0.0186)	0.2187
Earnings>$10K	1	1	-0.0138**	(0.0066)	-0.0259***	(0.0096)	-0.0256**	(0.0125)	-0.0334**	(0.0152)	0.1430
Earnings>$15K	1	1	-0.0123**	(0.0052)	-0.0157**	(0.0076)	-0.00886	(0.0100)	-0.0165	(0.0123)	0.0865
Sibling SSI enrollment	1	1	0.0061	(0.0118)	0.0110	(0.0171)	0.0141	(0.0226)	0.0256	(0.0279)	0.4837

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 1 without covariates. Household sample is households of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff; sibling sample is younger siblings who are themselves on SSI. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI. Household income PDV is present discounted value over 16 years following removal.

Table A.8: RD Reduced Form Estimates, Own Outcomes with Covariates

	Poly.		Linear		Quadratic		Cubic		Quartic		Control
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
First stage (N=81,800)											
Age 18 review	1	4	0.864***	(0.0032)	0.866***	(0.0048)	0.865***	(0.0064)	0.867***	(0.0081)	0.0017
Unfavorable age 18	1	1	0.375***	(0.0045)	0.377***	(0.0068)	0.387***	(0.0090)	0.394***	(0.0113)	0.0007
SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.099***	(0.0049)	-0.104***	(0.0072)	-0.104***	(0.0096)	-0.106***	(0.0119)	0.5891
Own income (N=81,800)											
SSI income	1	1	-786***	(40.5)	-818***	(59.6)	-862***	(78.9)	-889***	(98.1)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	1	1	377***	(102)	311**	(155)	318	(207)	152	(260)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	1	1	0.0281***	(0.0046)	0.0272***	(0.0069)	0.0327***	(0.0091)	0.0363***	(0.0114)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	1	1	0.0116***	(0.0029)	0.0124***	(0.0043)	0.0134**	(0.0058)	0.0074	(0.0073)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	2	1	4,613***	(1,145)	3,732**	(1,731)	3,941*	(2,319)	2,062	(2,907)	$48,174
DI applications	1	1	-0.0489***	(0.0117)	-0.0727***	(0.0174)	-0.0396*	(0.0235)	-0.0305	(0.0296)	0.375
DI income	1	1	-27.3	(24.3)	-57.2	(36.2)	-28.3	(48.7)	17.7	(61.3)	$688
Total obs. income	1	1	-464***	(98.6)	-592***	(149)	-599***	(200)	-749***	(250)	$9,041
Income>$0	1	1	-0.0306***	(0.0035)	-0.0346***	(0.0052)	-0.0304***	(0.0069)	-0.0312***	(0.0085)	0.8349
Income>$15K	1	1	0.0028	(0.0032)	0.0009	(0.0048)	0.0019	(0.0065)	-0.0013	(0.0081)	0.1416
Income PDV	2	1	-6,313***	(1,103)	-7,927***	(1,666)	-7,854***	(2,235)	-9,636***	(2,804)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)											
Income std. dev.	1	1	154**	(60.4)	91.7	(88.8)	61.7	(120)	-55.4	(151)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1	1	0.176***	(0.0224)	0.183***	(0.0331)	0.180***	(0.0439)	0.200***	(0.0546)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.115***	(0.0103)	0.124***	(0.0152)	0.122***	(0.0200)	0.125***	(0.0249)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1	1	0.158***	(0.0084)	0.155***	(0.0124)	0.149***	(0.0164)	0.162***	(0.0205)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1	1	0.138***	(0.0073)	0.135***	(0.0107)	0.130***	(0.0143)	0.145***	(0.0178)	0.4306
Arc % change income	1	1	0.0511***	(0.00389)	0.0539***	(0.0058)	0.0542***	(0.0077)	0.0600***	(0.0096)	32%

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 1 with covariates. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV.

Table A.9: RD Reduced Form Estimates, Household Outcomes with Covariates

| | Poly. | | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Household income (N=72,274)											
Parental earnings	1	1	-97.7	(177)	181	(260)	55.6	(344)	296	(426)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	1	4	-0.0032	(0.0021)	-0.0057*	(0.0031)	-0.0020	(0.0041)	-0.0061	(0.0051)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	1	1	-63.6	(92.2)	-63.0	(136)	-70.0	(181)	-228	(228)	$4,812
Total HH income	1	1	-660***	(213)	-441	(314)	-499	(416)	-676	(517)	$25,917
HH income>$0	1	1	-0.0049***	(0.0019)	-0.0055**	(0.0027)	-0.0033	(0.0036)	0.0004	(0.0044)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	1	1	-0.0137***	(0.0048)	-0.0121*	(0.0070)	-0.0152	(0.0093)	-0.0153	(0.0115)	0.6535
HH income PDV	1	1	-8,535***	(2,489)	-6,291*	(3,671)	-6,780	(4,864)	-9,497	(6,043)	$314,240
HH income variability (N=72,274)											
HH income std. dev.	1	1	-117	(84)	-173	(123)	-282*	(167)	-521**	(209)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	1	1	0.0415**	(0.0176)	0.0432*	(0.0260)	0.0144	(0.0343)	-0.0102	(0.0426)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.0182***	(0.0057)	0.0215***	(0.0083)	0.0116	(0.0108)	0.0040	(0.0133)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	1	1	0.0153***	(0.0029)	0.0166***	(0.0043)	0.0108*	(0.0056)	0.0143**	(0.0070)	26%
Sibling outcomes (N=21,676)											
Avg. earnings	1	1	-315*	(171)	-576**	(254)	-439	(336)	-594	(420)	$3,817
Earnings>$0	1	1	-0.0133	(0.0095)	-0.0250*	(0.0138)	-0.0178	(0.0180)	-0.0093	(0.0221)	0.4275
Earnings>$5K	1	1	-0.0167**	(0.0078)	-0.0328***	(0.0113)	-0.0326**	(0.0147)	-0.0324*	(0.0180)	0.2187
Earnings>$10K	1	1	-0.0118*	(0.0065)	-0.0268***	(0.0093)	-0.0264**	(0.0121)	-0.0298**	(0.0148)	0.1430
Earnings>$15K	1	1	-0.0107**	(0.0051)	-0.0169**	(0.0074)	-0.0097	(0.0098)	-0.0147	(0.0120)	0.0865
Sibling SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.0006	(0.0098)	-0.0001	(0.0143)	0.0069	(0.0189)	0.0047	(0.0233)	0.4837

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 1 with covariates. Household sample is households of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff; sibling sample is younger siblings who are themselves on SSI. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI. Household income PDV is present discounted value over 16 years following removal.

Table A.10: RD-DD Reduced Form Estimates, Own Outcomes without Covariates

	Poly.		Linear		Quadratic		Cubic		Quartic		Control
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
First stage (N=300,899)											
Age 18 review	1	4	0.902***	(0.0037)	0.863***	(0.0056)	0.830***	(0.0076)	0.833***	(0.0094)	0.0017
Unfavorable age 18	1	1	0.405***	(0.0051)	0.383***	(0.0080)	0.378***	(0.0109)	0.381***	(0.0132)	0.0007
SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.111***	(0.0060)	-0.109***	(0.0091)	-0.119***	(0.0123)	-0.121***	(0.0149)	0.5891
Own income (N=300,899)											
SSI income	1	1	-867***	(49.4)	-846***	(75.4)	-955***	(102)	-1,002***	(123)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	1	1	431***	(119)	275	(184)	350	(249)	202	(304)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	1	1	0.0311***	(0.0054)	0.0238***	(0.0083)	0.0296***	(0.0112)	0.0322**	(0.0136)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	1	1	0.0139***	(0.0033)	0.0120**	(0.0052)	0.0160**	(0.0070)	0.0097	(0.0085)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	2	1	5,354***	(1,323)	3,331	(2,052)	4,260	(2,779)	2,498	(3,397)	$48,174
DI applications	1	1	-0.0536***	(0.0133)	-0.0849***	(0.0205)	-0.0407	(0.0281)	-0.0485	(0.0345)	0.375
DI income	1	1	-39.9	(27.8)	-80.6*	(42.8)	-46.1	(58.2)	-11.1	(71.3)	$688
Total obs. income	1	1	-504***	(113)	-680***	(175)	-677***	(237)	-842***	(290)	$9,041
Income>$0	1	1	-0.0348***	(0.0040)	-0.0397***	(0.0061)	-0.0403***	(0.0083)	-0.0426***	(0.0100)	0.8349
Income>$15K	1	1	0.0044	(0.0037)	-0.0006	(0.0057)	0.0019	(0.0077)	-0.0025	(0.0095)	0.1416
Income PDV	1	1	-6,720***	(1,259)	-8,873***	(1,950)	-8,710***	(2,644)	-10,854***	(3,233)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=300,899)											
Income std. dev.	1	1	170**	(69.7)	48.6	(107)	103	(145)	-6.20	(176)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1	1	0.200***	(0.0259)	0.193***	(0.0397)	0.222***	(0.0534)	0.247***	(0.0648)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.126***	(0.0119)	0.128***	(0.0181)	0.139***	(0.0243)	0.148***	(0.0296)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1	1	0.160***	(0.0099)	0.152***	(0.0150)	0.154***	(0.0201)	0.166***	(0.0245)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1	1	0.142***	(0.0085)	0.131***	(0.0129)	0.132***	(0.0174)	0.142***	(0.0213)	0.4306
Arc % change income	1	1	0.0521***	(0.0046)	0.0492***	(0.0071)	0.0538***	(0.0097)	0.0606***	(0.0117)	32%

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents parametric RD-DD reduced form estimates using equation 2 without covariates. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 and in the comparison years (1994, 1995, and 1997). "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV.

Table A.11: RD-DD Reduced Form Estimates, Household Outcomes without Covariates

| | Poly. | | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Household income (N=265,086)											
Parental earnings	1	1	-46.7	(264)	142	(404)	125	(543)	407	(656)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	1	4	-0.0055**	(0.0024)	-0.0083**	(0.0037)	-0.0025	(0.0050)	-0.0053	(0.0060)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	1	1	-65.4	(106)	-19.0	(162)	-61.0	(219)	-394	(268)	$4,812
Total HH income	1	1	-664**	(295)	-530	(451)	-420	(607)	-739	(735)	$25,917
HH income>$0	1	1	-0.0069***	(0.0022)	-0.0067**	(0.0033)	-0.0071	(0.0044)	-0.0033	(0.0053)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	1	1	-0.0176***	(0.0059)	-0.0090	(0.0089)	-0.0096	(0.0120)	-0.0120	(0.0145)	0.6535
HH income PDV	2	1	-8,768**	(3,512)	-7,620	(5,368)	-6,086	(7,230)	-10,901	(8,747)	$314,240
HH income variability (N=265,086)											
HH income std. dev.	1	1	-126	(106)	-264	(162)	-234	(220)	-410	(268)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	1	1	0.0582***	(0.0201)	0.0561*	(0.0307)	0.0472	(0.0412)	0.0406	(0.0499)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.0241***	(0.0066)	0.0204**	(0.0100)	0.0152	(0.0132)	0.0090	(0.0159)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	1	1	0.0162***	(0.0034)	0.0142***	(0.0052)	0.0095	(0.0069)	0.0181**	(0.0084)	26%
Sibling outcomes (N=80,943)											
Avg. earnings	1	1	-446.3**	(198.7)	-672.6**	(302.1)	-377.1	(405.4)	-624.3	(494.6)	$3,817
Earnings>$0	2	1	-0.0148	(0.0114)	-0.0298*	(0.0171)	-0.0140	(0.0228)	-0.0166	(0.0274)	0.4275
Earnings>$5K	2	1	-0.0197**	(0.00920)	-0.0345**	(0.0138)	-0.0267	(0.0183)	-0.0338	(0.0220)	0.2187
Earnings>$10K	2	1	-0.0149**	(0.00748)	-0.0281**	(0.0113)	-0.0246	(0.0150)	-0.0332*	(0.0179)	0.1430
Earnings>$15K	2	1	-0.0138**	(0.00590)	-0.0197**	(0.00891)	-0.0119	(0.0119)	-0.0167	(0.0143)	0.0865
Sibling SSI enrollment	1	1	0.00768	(0.0133)	0.0285	(0.0201)	0.0182	(0.0269)	0.0227	(0.0325)	0.4837

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 2 without covariates. Household sample is households of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 and in the comparison years (1994, 1995, and 1997); sibling sample is younger siblings who are themselves on SSI. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI. Household income PDV is present discounted value over 16 years following removal.

Table A.12: RD-DD Reduced Form Estimates, Own Outcomes with Covariates

| | Poly. | | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
First stage (N=300,877)											
Age 18 review	1	4	0.903***	(0.0037)	0.864***	(0.0056)	0.832***	(0.0076)	0.836***	(0.0093)	0.0017
Unfavorable age 18	1	1	0.409***	(0.0049)	0.386***	(0.0077)	0.380***	(0.0106)	0.380***	(0.0128)	0.0007
SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.115***	(0.0055)	-0.110***	(0.0085)	-0.116***	(0.0114)	-0.112***	(0.0138)	0.5891
Own income (N=300,877)											
SSI income	1	1	-897***	(45.9)	-848***	(70.1)	-939***	(94.3)	-917***	(114)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	1	1	472***	(115)	290	(179)	284	(242)	71.8	(295)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	1	1	0.0349***	(0.0052)	0.0264***	(0.0080)	0.0294***	(0.0107)	0.0280**	(0.0131)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	1	1	0.0148***	(0.0033)	0.0124**	(0.0050)	0.0143**	(0.0068)	0.0061	(0.0083)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	2	1	5,838***	(1,282)	3,515*	(1,990)	3,564	(2,696)	1,028	(3,298)	$48,174
DI applications	1	1	-0.0484***	(0.0131)	-0.0801***	(0.0203)	-0.0399	(0.0278)	-0.0500	(0.0342)	0.375
DI income	1	1	-38.8	(27.5)	-80.8*	(42.4)	-49.4	(57.6)	-18.3	(70.6)	$688
Total obs. income	1	1	-492***	(111)	-666***	(172)	-729***	(233)	-894***	(285)	$9,041
Income>$0	1	1	-0.0349***	(0.0039)	-0.0392***	(0.0060)	-0.0385***	(0.0081)	-0.0388***	(0.0098)	0.8349
Income>$15K	1	1	0.0053	(0.0036)	-3.16e-05	(0.0056)	2.13e-05	(0.0076)	-0.0058	(0.0092)	0.1416
Income PDV	1	1	-6,603***	(1,237)	-8,701***	(1,918)	-9,280***	(2,601)	-11,394***	(3,183)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=300,877)											
Income std. dev.	1	1	191***	(67.2)	58.5	(103)	52.1	(140)	-80.0	(170)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1	1	0.207***	(0.0252)	0.198***	(0.0386)	0.212***	(0.0520)	0.226***	(0.0631)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.128***	(0.0116)	0.128***	(0.0177)	0.134***	(0.0237)	0.136***	(0.0288)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1	1	0.165***	(0.0096)	0.153***	(0.0146)	0.151***	(0.0195)	0.158***	(0.0239)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1	1	0.147***	(0.0083)	0.132***	(0.0126)	0.129***	(0.0169)	0.136***	(0.0207)	0.4306
Arc % change income	1	1	0.0552***	(0.0044)	0.0511***	(0.0067)	0.0522***	(0.0091)	0.0561***	(0.0111)	32%

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents parametric RD-DD reduced form estimates using equation 2 with covariates. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 and in the comparison years (1994, 1995, and 1997). "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV.

Table A.13: RD-DD Reduced Form Estimates, Household Outcomes with Covariates

| | Poly. | | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	AIC	Bins	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Household income (N=265,078)											
Parental earnings	1	1	169	(199)	401	(303)	227	(407)	733	(492)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	1	4	-0.0050**	(0.0023)	-0.0078**	(0.0036)	-0.0021	(0.0048)	-0.0056	(0.0059)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	1	1	-68.4	(104)	-1.325	(159)	-53.9	(215)	-380	(263)	$4,812
Total HH income	1	1	-435*	(240)	-242	(366)	-381	(493)	-454	(597)	$25,917
HH income>$0	1	1	-0.0062***	(0.0021)	-0.0060*	(0.0033)	-0.0067	(0.0043)	-0.0021	(0.0052)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	1	1	-0.0133**	(0.0054)	-0.0041	(0.0083)	-0.0083	(0.0111)	-0.0066	(0.0134)	0.6535
HH income PDV	2	1	-5,974**	(2,807)	-4,006	(4,284)	-5,459	(5,764)	-7,260	(6,981)	$314,240
HH income variability (N=265,078)											
HH income std. dev.	1	1	-61.6	(93.9)	-186	(144)	-240	(195)	-370	(238)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	1	1	0.0548***	(0.0199)	0.0513*	(0.0303)	0.0414	(0.0408)	0.0274	(0.0494)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	1	1	0.0224***	(0.0065)	0.0185*	(0.0099)	0.0136	(0.0131)	0.0046	(0.0158)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	1	1	0.0165***	(0.0033)	0.0143***	(0.0050)	0.0083	(0.0067)	0.0150*	(0.0081)	26%
Sibling outcomes (N=79,497)											
Avg. earnings	1	1	-390**	(193)	-612**	(295)	-372	(395.7)	-466	(483.6)	$3,817
Earnings>$0	2	1	-0.0119	(0.0108)	-0.0201	(0.0162)	-0.0101	(0.0216)	-0.0028	(0.0260)	0.4275
Earnings>$5K	2	1	-0.0168*	(0.0089)	-0.0298**	(0.0134)	-0.0270	(0.0177)	-0.0244	(0.0213)	0.2187
Earnings>$10K	2	1	-0.0129*	(0.0073)	-0.0253**	(0.0110)	-0.0238	(0.0146)	-0.0262	(0.0175)	0.1430
Earnings>$15K	2	1	-0.0122**	(0.0058)	-0.0179**	(0.0087)	-0.0104	(0.0116)	-0.0118	(0.0141)	0.0865
Sibling SSI enrollment	1	1	-0.0021	(0.0111)	0.0085	(0.0168)	0.0163	(0.0225)	-0.0024	(0.0272)	0.4837

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD reduced form estimates using equation 2 with covariates. Household sample is households of SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22 cutoff in 1996 and in the comparison years (1994, 1995, and 1997); sibling sample is younger siblings who are themselves on SSI. "AIC" indicates the Akaike Information Criterion goodness-of-fit method for selecting the optimal polynomial order; "Bins" indicates the bin selection method outlined in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI. Household income PDV is present discounted value over 16 years following removal.

Table A.14: RD IV Estimates of the Effect of Age 18 Removal, without Covariates

	Linear		Quadratic		Cubic		Quartic		Control
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Own income (N=81,800)									
SSI income	-2,024***	(110)	-2,075***	(163)	-2,189***	(208)	-2,370***	(252)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	860***	(282)	728*	(426)	845	(552)	510	(675)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	0.0638***	(0.0127)	0.0626***	(0.0189)	0.0811***	(0.0242)	0.0945***	(0.0294)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	0.0274***	(0.0080)	0.0301**	(0.0119)	0.0357**	(0.0154)	0.0222	(0.0188)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	10,603***	(3,147)	8,752*	(4,762)	10,438*	(6,170)	6,660	(7,558)	$48,174
DI applications	-0.146***	(0.0318)	-0.213***	(0.0479)	-0.110*	(0.0622)	-0.0790	(0.0763)	0.375
DI income	-85.8	(65.8)	-145	(98.1)	-63.9	(128)	47.8	(157)	$688
Total obs. income	-1,321***	(271)	-1,566***	(409)	-1,474***	(531)	-1,886***	(649)	$9,041
Income>$0	-0.0808***	(0.0095)	-0.0913***	(0.0141)	-0.0805***	(0.0181)	-0.0852***	(0.0219)	0.8349
Income>$15K	0.0036	(0.0089)	-0.0004	(0.0133)	0.0062	(0.0172)	-0.0010	(0.0210)	0.1416
Income PDV	-17,793***	(3,027)	-20,966***	(4,575)	-19,407***	(5,939)	-24,337***	(7,278)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)									
Income std. dev.	323*	(168)	205	(247)	198	(324)	-69.5	(396)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	0.449***	(0.0605)	0.459***	(0.0896)	0.469***	(0.115)	0.539***	(0.139)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	0.302***	(0.0278)	0.322***	(0.0410)	0.319***	(0.0524)	0.334***	(0.0636)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	0.413***	(0.0225)	0.406***	(0.0333)	0.386***	(0.0427)	0.420***	(0.0518)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	0.358***	(0.0193)	0.352***	(0.0287)	0.337***	(0.0369)	0.374***	(0.0448)	0.4306
Arc % change income	0.129***	(0.0106)	0.135***	(0.0157)	0.139***	(0.0202)	0.157***	(0.0244)	32%
Household income (N=72,274)									
Parental earnings	-1,590**	(619)	-327	(915)	-612	(1,175)	-1,056	(1,414)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	-0.0071	(0.0056)	-0.0169**	(0.0084)	-0.0056	(0.0108)	-0.0122	(0.0132)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	-107	(248)	-238	(367)	-149	(475)	-523	(581)	$4,812
Total HH income	-3,089***	(689)	-1,995*	(1,019)	-1,853	(1,313)	-3,412**	(1,586)	$25,917
HH income>$0	-0.0148***	(0.0049)	-0.0161**	(0.0073)	-0.0094	(0.0092)	-0.0022	(0.0111)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	-0.0548***	(0.0136)	-0.0458**	(0.0201)	-0.0471*	(0.0258)	-0.0620**	(0.0311)	0.6535
HH income PDV	-39,100***	(8,198)	-26,936**	(12,125)	-24,542	(15,623)	-44,861**	(18,867)	$314,240
HH income std. dev.	-704***	(250)	-678*	(369)	-864*	(484)	-1,711***	(592)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	0.121***	(0.0467)	0.122*	(0.0691)	0.0459	(0.0890)	0.0061	(0.107)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	0.0532***	(0.0151)	0.0597***	(0.0221)	0.0325	(0.0279)	0.0210	(0.0334)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	0.0407***	(0.0077)	0.0421***	(0.0114)	0.0282*	(0.0147)	0.0412**	(0.0176)	26%

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric IV RD reduced form estimates without covariates using age 18 removal as the endogenous variable. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV. Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI.

Table A.15: RD IV Estimates of the Effect of Age 18 Removal, with Covariates

| | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Own income (N=81,800)									
SSI income	-2,098***	(103)	-2,167***	(150)	-2,229***	(193)	-2,255***	(235)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	1,006***	(271)	825**	(408)	822	(533)	385	(656)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	0.0751***	(0.0122)	0.0722***	(0.0179)	0.0845***	(0.0231)	0.0921***	(0.0282)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	0.0309***	(0.0077)	0.0328***	(0.0115)	0.0347**	(0.0149)	0.0187	(0.0183)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	12,311***	(3,030)	9,889**	(4,557)	10,189*	(5,954)	5,228	(7,339)	$48,174
DI applications	-0.130***	(0.0313)	-0.193***	(0.0466)	-0.102*	(0.0611)	-0.0773	(0.0754)	0.375
DI income	-73.0	(64.8)	-152	(95.7)	-73.0	(126)	45.0	(156)	$688
Total obs. income	-1,239***	(264)	-1,569***	(397)	-1,548***	(519)	-1,898***	(638)	$9,041
Income>$0	-0.0816***	(0.0093)	-0.0916***	(0.0137)	-0.0786***	(0.0176)	-0.0791***	(0.0215)	0.8349
Income>$15K	0.0075	(0.0086)	0.0023	(0.0128)	0.0049	(0.0167)	-0.0034	(0.0205)	0.1416
Income PDV	-16,847***	(2,952)	-21,006***	(4,434)	-20,307***	(5,803)	-24,429***	(7,153)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)									
Income std. dev.	412**	(160)	243	(234)	160	(310)	-141	(382)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	0.469***	(0.0588)	0.485***	(0.0863)	0.465***	(0.112)	0.506***	(0.136)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	0.307***	(0.0271)	0.328***	(0.0396)	0.314***	(0.0510)	0.316***	(0.0623)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	0.422***	(0.0220)	0.411***	(0.0322)	0.385***	(0.0416)	0.411***	(0.0509)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	0.367***	(0.0189)	0.358***	(0.0277)	0.337***	(0.0360)	0.368***	(0.0440)	0.4306
Arc % change income	0.136***	(0.0100)	0.143***	(0.0147)	0.140***	(0.0191)	0.152***	(0.0232)	32%
Household income (N=72,274)									
Parental earnings	-257	(464)	474	(679)	142	(878)	737	(1,062)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	-0.0085	(0.0055)	-0.0148*	(0.0080)	-0.0051	(0.0104)	-0.0152	(0.0127)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	-167	(242)	-164	(354)	-179	(461)	-568	(568)	$4,812
Total HH income	-1,732***	(558)	-1,150	(818)	-1,273	(1,062)	-1,686	(1,290)	$25,917
HH income>$0	-0.0127***	(0.0049)	-0.0144**	(0.0071)	-0.0085	(0.0091)	0.0011	(0.0110)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	-0.0359***	(0.0125)	-0.0316*	(0.0183)	-0.0387	(0.0237)	-0.0382	(0.0288)	0.6535
HH income PDV	-22,389***	(6,537)	-16,395*	(9,572)	-17,301	(12,421)	-23,693	(15,099)	$314,240
HH income std. dev.	-308	(221)	-450	(322)	-720*	(427)	-1,301**	(526)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	0.109**	(0.0462)	0.113*	(0.0675)	0.0368	(0.0875)	-0.0255	(0.106)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	0.0477***	(0.0149)	0.0561***	(0.0216)	0.0297	(0.0275)	0.0099	(0.0331)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	0.0401***	(0.0075)	0.0432***	(0.0110)	0.0276*	(0.0142)	0.0356**	(0.0172)	26%

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric IV RD reduced form estimates with covariates using age 18 removal as the endogenous variable. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV. Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI.

Table A.16: RD IV Estimates of the Effect of Being Off SSI, without Covariates

| | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Own income (N=81,800)									
SSI income	-7,998***	(218)	-7,813***	(303)	-8,113***	(388)	-8,453***	(465)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	3,401***	(1,050)	2,741*	(1,530)	3,132	(1,940)	1,819	(2,331)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	0.252***	(0.046)	0.236***	(0.0654)	0.301***	(0.0814)	0.337***	(0.0943)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	0.108***	(0.0297)	0.113***	(0.0422)	0.132**	(0.0532)	0.0793	(0.0641)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	41,910***	(11,663)	32,946*	(17,026)	38,693*	(21,570)	23,753	(25,952)	$48,174
DI applications	-0.578***	(0.135)	-0.803***	(0.200)	-0.409*	(0.240)	-0.282	(0.279)	0.375
DI income	-339	(261)	-546	(372)	-237	(475)	171	(562)	$688
Total obs. income	-5,223***	(1,126)	-5,896***	(1,639)	-5,463***	(2,079)	-6,725***	(2,498)	$9,041
Income>$0	-0.319***	(0.0320)	-0.344***	(0.0451)	-0.298***	(0.0574)	-0.304***	(0.0670)	0.8349
Income>$15K	0.0142	(0.0349)	-0.0015	(0.0502)	0.0229	(0.0630)	-0.0035	(0.0752)	0.1416
Income PDV	-70,333***	(12,781)	-78,927***	(18,642)	-71,939***	(23,580)	-86,799***	(28,451)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)									
Income std. dev.	1,277**	(638)	771	(906)	734	(1,174)	-248	(1,422)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1.776***	(0.208)	1.727***	(0.294)	1.739***	(0.373)	1.924***	(0.433)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1.192***	(0.0935)	1.213***	(0.132)	1.182***	(0.166)	1.192***	(0.194)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1.633***	(0.0957)	1.528***	(0.131)	1.431***	(0.161)	1.497***	(0.192)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1.415***	(0.0832)	1.326***	(0.114)	1.250***	(0.141)	1.335***	(0.170)	0.4306
Arc % change income	0.509***	(0.0358)	0.507***	(0.0507)	0.515***	(0.0644)	0.560***	(0.0760)	32%
Household income (N=72,274)									
Parental earnings	-6,065**	(2,398)	-1,204	(3,375)	-2,234	(4,308)	-3,761	(5,079)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	-0.0272	(0.0216)	-0.0622**	(0.0313)	-0.0203	(0.0396)	-0.0437	(0.0475)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	-409	(944)	-874	(1,346)	-544	(1,734)	-1,874	(2,081)	$4,812
Total HH income	-11,767***	(2,736)	-7,331*	(3,826)	-6,779	(4,898)	-12,223**	(5,961)	$25,917
HH income>$0	-0.0562***	(0.0183)	-0.0593**	(0.0259)	-0.0344	(0.0331)	-0.0080	(0.0396)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	-0.209***	(0.0527)	-0.168**	(0.0746)	-0.172*	(0.0954)	-0.222*	(0.114)	0.6535
HH income PDV	-148,964***	(32,685)	-98,983**	(45,712)	-89,764	(58,437)	-160,727**	(71,416)	$314,240
HH income std. dev.	-2,682***	(991)	-2,492*	(1,408)	-3,159*	(1,860)	-6,130***	(2,373)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	0.461***	(0.173)	0.448*	(0.246)	0.168	(0.321)	0.0219	(0.383)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	0.203***	(0.0556)	0.220***	(0.0783)	0.119	(0.0995)	0.0753	(0.118)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	0.155***	(0.0276)	0.155***	(0.0394)	0.103**	(0.0511)	0.147**	(0.0594)	26%

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric IV RD reduced form estimates without covariates using being off SSI as the endogenous variable. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV. Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI.

Table A.17: RD IV Estimates of the Effect of Being Off SSI, with Covariates

| | Linear | | Quadratic | | Cubic | | Quartic | | Control |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	mean
Own income (N=81,800)									
SSI income	-7,967***	(198)	-7,886***	(276)	-8,255***	(371)	-8,366***	(460)	$4,055
Avg. earnings	3,819***	(975)	3,001**	(1,421)	3,044	(1,888)	1,427	(2,380)	$4,222
Earnings>$0	0.285***	(0.0427)	0.263***	(0.0603)	0.313***	(0.0787)	0.342***	(0.0959)	0.4056
Earnings>$15K	0.117***	(0.0278)	0.119***	(0.0395)	0.129**	(0.0520)	0.0694	(0.0656)	0.1026
Earnings PDV	46,739***	(10,834)	35,982**	(15,806)	37,727*	(20,979)	19,395	(26,488)	$48,174
DI applications	-0.495***	(0.124)	-0.701***	(0.182)	-0.379	(0.233)	-0.287	(0.286)	0.375
DI income	-277	(246)	-551	(350)	-270	(466)	167	(577)	$688
Total obs. income	-4,703***	(1,038)	-5,709***	(1,515)	-5,733***	(2,018)	-7,042***	(2,538)	$9,041
Income>$0	-0.310***	(0.0304)	-0.333***	(0.0426)	-0.291***	(0.0565)	-0.293***	(0.0691)	0.8349
Income>$15K	0.0285	(0.0323)	0.0083	(0.0464)	0.0181	(0.0612)	-0.0125	(0.0765)	0.1416
Income PDV	-63,962***	(11,743)	-76,432***	(17,175)	-75,192***	(22,850)	-90,633***	(28,856)	$107,525
Own income variability (N=81,800)									
Income std. dev.	1,562***	(587)	884	(834)	590	(1,131)	-521	(1,438)	$4,155
Log income std. dev.	1.782***	(0.197)	1.764***	(0.278)	1.722***	(0.368)	1.878***	(0.448)	1.6258
Income coeff. of var.	1.164***	(0.0888)	1.193***	(0.125)	1.164***	(0.164)	1.173***	(0.200)	0.6823
Income CV (detrend)	1.603***	(0.0895)	1.496***	(0.122)	1.426***	(0.158)	1.525***	(0.199)	0.4578
Income CV (bounded)	1.393***	(0.0780)	1.302***	(0.107)	1.247***	(0.139)	1.364***	(0.176)	0.4306
Arc % change income	0.517***	(0.0338)	0.520***	(0.0479)	0.519***	(0.0632)	0.564***	(0.0783)	32%
Household income (N=72,274)									
Parental earnings	-950	(1,720)	1,673	(2,397)	515	(3,184)	2,699	(3,892)	$11,974
Family dis. apps	-0.0313	(0.0203)	-0.0522*	(0.0285)	-0.0185	(0.0379)	-0.0559	(0.0473)	0.089
Family dis. receipt	-617	(893)	-579	(1,247)	-649	(1,674)	-2,087	(2,090)	$4,812
Total HH income	-6,406***	(2,095)	-4,055	(2,907)	-4,622	(3,895)	-6,198	(4,823)	$25,917
HH income>$0	-0.0471***	(0.0176)	-0.0508**	(0.0243)	-0.0308	(0.0324)	0.0039	(0.0407)	0.9567
HH income>$15K	-0.133***	(0.0464)	-0.111*	(0.0646)	-0.141	(0.0863)	-0.140	(0.106)	0.6535
HH income PDV	-82,817***	(24,592)	-57,829*	(34,114)	-62,839	(45,682)	-87,116	(56,735)	$314,240
HH income std. dev.	-1,139	(828)	-1,589	(1,160)	-2,616	(1,612)	-4,783**	(2,100)	$8,908
Log HH income std. dev.	0.403**	(0.166)	0.397*	(0.232)	0.134	(0.315)	-0.0937	(0.393)	0.8754
HH income coeff. of var.	0.176***	(0.0535)	0.198***	(0.0736)	0.108	(0.0976)	0.0365	(0.121)	0.4503
Arc % Δ HH income	0.149***	(0.0264)	0.152***	(0.0368)	0.100**	(0.0496)	0.131**	(0.0602)	26%

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric IV RD reduced form estimates with covariates using being off SSI as the endogenous variable. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff. Earnings/income PDV is present discounted value over the 16 years following age 18 removal. Total observed income equals earnings plus SSI income plus DI income. De-trended coefficient of variation calculated using de-trended income; bounded coefficient of variation calculated using lower bound for CV. Family disability applications/receipt are parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI. Total household income sums youth earnings, SSI, and DI; parental earnings, SSI, and DI; and sibling SSI.

Table A.18: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: First Stage

h (days)	Age 18 review		Unfavorable age 18		SSI enrollment		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	0.862***	(0.0074)	0.382***	(0.0104)	-0.108***	(0.0109)	17,202
60	0.863***	(0.0068)	0.387***	(0.0095)	-0.102***	(0.0100)	20,328
70	0.869***	(0.0063)	0.390***	(0.0087)	-0.104***	(0.0092)	23,588
80	0.866***	(0.0058)	0.386***	(0.0082)	-0.101***	(0.0087)	26,702
90	0.869***	(0.0055)	0.387***	(0.0077)	-0.101***	(0.0082)	29,715
100	0.868***	(0.0052)	0.383***	(0.0073)	-0.102***	(0.0078)	32,809
110	0.865***	(0.0050)	0.382***	(0.0070)	-0.102***	(0.0074)	35,799
120	0.864***	(0.0047)	0.381***	(0.0067)	-0.105***	(0.0071)	38,956
130	0.865***	(0.0046)	0.379***	(0.0064)	-0.104***	(0.0069)	41,820
140	0.865***	(0.0044)	0.379***	(0.0062)	-0.103***	(0.0067)	44,879
150	0.865***	(0.0043)	0.376***	(0.0060)	-0.101***	(0.0064)	47,845
160	0.865***	(0.0041)	0.375***	(0.0058)	-0.101***	(0.0063)	50,959
170	0.865***	(0.0040)	0.376***	(0.0057)	-0.103***	(0.0061)	54,058
180	0.865***	(0.0039)	0.376***	(0.0055)	**-0.103*** **	**(0.0059)**	56,926
190	0.865***	(0.0038)	0.376***	(0.0054)	-0.102***	(0.0058)	60,051
200	0.865***	(0.0038)	0.376***	(0.0053)	-0.101***	(0.0057)	63,132
210	0.865***	(0.0037)	0.375***	(0.0052)	-0.101***	(0.0056)	66,050
220	0.864***	(0.0036)	0.375***	(0.0051)	-0.101***	(0.0055)	69,033
230	0.865***	(0.0035)	0.376***	(0.0050)	-0.101***	(0.0054)	72,045
240	0.865***	(0.0035)	0.375***	(0.0049)	-0.101***	(0.0053)	75,030
250	0.865***	(0.0034)	0.375***	(0.0049)	-0.101***	(0.0052)	77,903
260	**0.865*** **	**(0.0034)**	**0.375*** **	**(0.0048)**	-0.100***	(0.0051)	80,805

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents LLR estimates for the first stage. Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.19: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Own SSI and DI income

h (days)	SSI income		DI applications		DI income		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	-908***	(89.3)	-0.0374	(0.0269)	-19.7	(55.6)	17,202
60	-859***	(82.0)	-0.0467*	(0.0247)	-29.1	(50.6)	20,328
70	-863***	(75.9)	-0.0413*	(0.0227)	7.02	(46.9)	23,588
80	-825***	(71.3)	-0.0562***	(0.0212)	2.49	(43.9)	26,702
90	-819***	(67.5)	**-0.0524*** **	**(0.0200)**	-12.8	(41.3)	29,715
100	-813***	(64.2)	-0.0498***	(0.0190)	-39.6	(39.2)	32,809
110	-814***	(61.3)	-0.0500***	(0.0181)	-48.0	(37.4)	35,799
120	-828***	(58.8)	-0.0531***	(0.0173)	-46.6	(35.9)	38,956
130	-823***	(56.8)	-0.0525***	(0.0167)	-43.5	(34.5)	41,820
140	-822***	(54.8)	-0.0567***	(0.0160)	**-40.1**	**(33.3)**	44,879
150	-806***	(53.2)	-0.0611***	(0.0155)	-38.3	(32.2)	47,845
160	-807***	(51.6)	-0.0616***	(0.0150)	-38.9	(31.3)	50,959
170	-822***	(50.2)	-0.0609***	(0.0146)	-45.3	(30.4)	54,058
180	**-819*** **	**(49.0)**	-0.0623***	(0.0143)	-49.9*	(29.6)	56,926
190	-811***	(47.8)	-0.0623***	(0.0139)	-50.9*	(28.9)	60,051
200	-800***	(46.8)	-0.0622***	(0.0136)	-46.7*	(28.3)	63,132
210	-800***	(45.9)	-0.0614***	(0.0133)	-49.2*	(27.7)	66,050
220	-800***	(45.0)	-0.0610***	(0.0131)	-48.0*	(27.2)	69,033
230	-799***	(44.3)	-0.0597***	(0.0129)	-40.2	(26.7)	72,045
240	-798***	(43.6)	-0.0586***	(0.0127)	-37.0	(26.3)	75,030
250	-798***	(43.0)	-0.0567***	(0.0125)	-36.8	(26.0)	77,903
260	-797***	(42.5)	-0.0557***	(0.0123)	-36.2	(25.6)	80,805

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents LLR estimates for own SSI income, DI applications, and DI income. Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.20: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Own Earnings

h (days)	Earnings Pt. Est.	Earnings Std. Err.	Earnings>$0 Pt. Est.	Earnings>$0 Std. Err.	Earnings>$15K Pt. Est.	Earnings>$15K Std. Err.	N
50	239	(237)	0.0350***	(0.0103)	0.0114*	(0.0066)	17,202
60	198	(217)	0.0303***	(0.0095)	0.0101*	(0.0060)	20,328
70	264	(201)	0.0332***	(0.0088)	0.0109*	(0.0056)	23,588
80	196	(188)	0.0268***	(0.0082)	0.0085	(0.0053)	26,702
90	227	(178)	0.0289***	(0.0078)	0.0088*	(0.0050)	29,715
100	256	(169)	0.0277***	(0.0074)	0.0102**	(0.0047)	32,809
110	301*	(161)	0.0281***	(0.0071)	0.0118***	(0.0045)	35,799
120	361**	(155)	0.0303***	(0.0068)	0.0136***	(0.0043)	38,956
130	357**	(149)	0.0304***	(0.0065)	0.0136***	(0.0042)	41,820
140	369**	(143)	0.0298***	(0.0063)	0.0138***	(0.0040)	44,879
150	358***	(139)	0.0285***	(0.0061)	0.0132***	(0.0039)	47,845
160	367***	(134)	0.0287***	(0.0059)	0.0135***	(0.0038)	50,959
170	379***	(131)	0.0289***	(0.0058)	0.0137***	(0.0037)	54,058
180	**355***	**(127)**	**0.0279***	**(0.0056)**	**0.0128***	**(0.0036)**	56,926
190	357***	(124)	0.0280***	(0.0055)	0.0126***	(0.0035)	60,051
200	349***	(121)	0.0273***	(0.0054)	0.0122***	(0.0034)	63,132
210	345***	(119)	0.0268***	(0.0053)	0.0119***	(0.0033)	66,050
220	341***	(117)	0.0271***	(0.0052)	0.0119***	(0.0033)	69,033
230	340***	(115)	0.0268***	(0.0051)	0.0115***	(0.0032)	72,045
240	358***	(113)	0.0280***	(0.0050)	0.0120***	(0.0032)	75,030
250	362***	(111)	0.0279***	(0.0049)	0.0119***	(0.0031)	77,903
260	359***	(110)	0.0279***	(0.0049)	0.0118***	(0.0031)	80,805

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents LLR estimates for own earnings. Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.21: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Own Income

h (days)	Total income Pt. Est.	Total income Std. Err.	Income>$0 Pt. Est.	Income>$0 Std. Err.	Income>$15K Pt. Est.	Income>$15K Std. Err.	N
50	-714***	(229)	-0.0329***	(0.0078)	-0.0003	(0.0073)	17,202
60	-719***	(209)	-0.0320***	(0.0071)	-0.000295	(0.0067)	20,328
70	-620***	(193)	-0.0310***	(0.0066)	0.0021	(0.0062)	23,588
80	-655***	(181)	-0.0319***	(0.0062)	-0.0011	(0.0059)	26,702
90	-632***	(171)	-0.0311***	(0.0059)	-0.0005	(0.0055)	29,715
100	-624***	(163)	-0.0328***	(0.0056)	-5.04e-05	(0.0052)	32,809
110	-589***	(155)	-0.0327***	(0.0053)	0.0008	(0.0050)	35,799
120	-540***	(149)	-0.0327***	(0.0051)	0.0026	(0.0048)	38,956
130	-536***	(143)	-0.0320***	(0.0049)	0.0025	(0.0046)	41,820
140	-520***	(138)	-0.0313***	(0.0048)	0.0031	(0.0045)	44,879
150	-514***	(134)	-0.0313***	(0.0046)	0.0026	(0.0043)	47,845
160	-506***	(129)	-0.0314***	(0.0045)	0.0029	(0.0042)	50,959
170	-516***	(126)	-0.0325***	(0.0044)	0.0028	(0.0041)	54,058
180	**-542***	**(123)**	**-0.0335***	**(0.0043)**	**0.0019**	**(0.0040)**	56,926
190	-533***	(120)	-0.0330***	(0.0042)	0.0018	(0.0039)	60,051
200	-525***	(117)	-0.0328***	(0.0041)	0.0017	(0.0038)	63,132
210	-533***	(114)	-0.0331***	(0.0040)	0.0015	(0.0037)	66,050
220	-534***	(112)	-0.0330***	(0.0039)	0.0016	(0.0036)	69,033
230	-527***	(110)	-0.0326***	(0.0039)	0.0017	(0.0036)	72,045
240	-505***	(108)	-0.0320***	(0.0038)	0.0024	(0.0035)	75,030
250	-500***	(107)	-0.0320***	(0.0037)	0.0023	(0.0035)	77,903
260	-502***	(106)	-0.0319***	(0.0037)	0.0022	(0.0034)	80,805

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents LLR estimates for own income (=earnings+SSI+DI). Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.22: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Own Income Variability

h (days)	Income std dev		Income coeff of var		Arc % change income		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	19.3	(135)	0.122***	(0.0228)	0.0574***	(0.0088)	17,202
60	8.61	(124)	0.125***	(0.0209)	0.0574***	(0.0081)	20,328
70	43.5	(115)	0.129***	(0.0194)	0.0560***	(0.0074)	23,588
80	42.9	(107)	0.127***	(0.0182)	0.0541***	(0.0070)	26,702
90	29.7	(102)	0.123***	(0.0172)	0.0529***	(0.0066)	29,715
100	34.7	(96.9)	0.126***	(0.0163)	0.0523***	(0.0063)	32,809
110	54.2	(92.3)	0.122***	(0.0156)	0.0531***	(0.0060)	35,799
120	91.6	(88.5)	0.119***	(0.0150)	0.0527***	(0.0057)	38,956
130	106	(85.2)	0.117***	(0.0145)	0.0535***	(0.0055)	41,820
140	121	(82.2)	0.117***	(0.0140)	0.0530***	(0.0053)	44,879
150	121	(79.5)	0.116***	(0.0136)	0.0516***	(0.0052)	47,845
160	125	(77.0)	**0.115***	(0.0132)**	**0.0513***	(0.0050)**	50,959
170	133*	(74.8)	0.118***	(0.0128)	0.0527***	(0.0049)	54,058
180	**123***	**(73.0)**	0.121***	(0.0125)	0.0529***	(0.0048)	56,926
190	132*	(71.2)	0.122***	(0.0122)	0.0530***	(0.0046)	60,051
200	126*	(69.6)	0.120***	(0.0119)	0.0520***	(0.0045)	63,132
210	132*	(68.2)	0.121***	(0.0117)	0.0526***	(0.0044)	66,050
220	121*	(68.5)	0.120***	(0.0115)	0.0527***	(0.0044)	69,033
230	126*	(67.0)	0.119***	(0.0113)	0.0523***	(0.0043)	72,045
240	133**	(65.8)	0.118***	(0.0111)	0.0524***	(0.0042)	75,030
250	137**	(64.8)	0.118***	(0.0110)	0.0520***	(0.0042)	77,903
260	133**	(63.9)	0.117***	(0.0108)	0.0518***	(0.0041)	80,805

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents LLR estimates for own income variability (income=earnings+SSI+DI). Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday around August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.23: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Household Outcomes

h (days)	Parental earnings		Family dis apps		Family dis inc		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	-145	(388)	-0.0050	(0.0046)	-58.1	(207)	15,271
60	161	(357)	-0.0029	(0.0043)	-119	(189)	18,029
70	85.1	(331)	-0.0058	(0.0040)	-130	(175)	20,892
80	43.5	(312)	-0.0065*	(0.0037)	-187	(164)	23,681
90	185	(295)	-0.0043	(0.0035)	-220	(155)	26,304
100	168	(280)	-0.0028	(0.0033)	-165	(147)	29,045
110	115	(268)	-0.0031	(0.0032)	-76.5	(140)	31,662
120	160	(257)	-0.0029	(0.0030)	-50.1	(135)	34,461
130	178	(248)	-0.0024	(0.0029)	-71.2	(130)	36,984
140	131	(239)	-0.0028	(0.0028)	-70.1	(125)	39,681
150	**110**	**(232)**	**-0.0036**	**(0.0028)**	-53.1	(122)	42,307
160	44.6	(225)	-0.0036	(0.0027)	-48.3	(118)	45,060
170	30.1	(219)	-0.0047*	(0.0026)	-51.1	(115)	47,799
180	-15.4	(214)	-0.0045*	(0.0025)	-53.2	(112)	50,344
190	-15.1	(209)	-0.0043*	(0.0025)	**-45.2**	**(109)**	53,085
200	25.3	(204)	-0.0046*	(0.0024)	-61.3	(107)	55,786
210	6.81	(200)	-0.0043*	(0.0024)	-62.2	(105)	58,367
220	19.1	(197)	-0.0042*	(0.0023)	-63.6	(103)	61,000
230	4.03	(193)	-0.0039*	(0.0023)	-56.3	(101)	63,656
240	37.2	(190)	-0.0044**	(0.0022)	-74.4	(99.7)	66,284
250	13.8	(188)	-0.0042*	(0.0022)	-68.8	(98.4)	68,801
260	-10.4	(186)	-0.0040*	(0.0022)	-66.7	(97.2)	71,386

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Table presents LLR estimates for parental earnings and family disability applications and receipt (parent SSI and DI and sibling SSI). Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.24: Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Household Income

h (days)	Total HH income		Total HH income>$0		Total HH income>$15K		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	-874*	(469)	-0.0045	(0.0040)	-0.0190*	(0.0105)	15,271
60	-653	(431)	-0.0035	(0.0037)	-0.0157	(0.0097)	18,029
70	-610	(400)	-0.0009	(0.0034)	-0.0125	(0.0090)	20,892
80	-749**	(377)	-0.0022	(0.0032)	-0.0157*	(0.0084)	23,681
90	-617*	(356)	-0.0037	(0.0030)	-0.0149*	(0.0080)	26,304
100	-568*	(338)	-0.0039	(0.0029)	-0.0147*	(0.0076)	29,045
110	-483	(324)	-0.0041	(0.0028)	-0.0138*	(0.0073)	31,662
120	-375	(310)	-0.0049*	(0.0027)	-0.0126*	(0.0070)	34,461
130	-379	(299)	-0.0045*	(0.0026)	-0.0125*	(0.0067)	36,984
140	-411	(289)	-0.0052**	(0.0025)	-0.0129**	(0.0065)	39,681
150	-402	(280)	-0.0045*	(0.0024)	-0.0119*	(0.0063)	42,307
160	-467*	(272)	-0.0051**	(0.0024)	-0.0119**	(0.0061)	45,060
170	-516*	(264)	-0.0056**	(0.0023)	-0.0121**	(0.0059)	47,799
180	-601**	(258)	-0.0059***	(0.0022)	-0.0138**	(0.0058)	50,344
190	-583**	(252)	-0.0054**	(0.0022)	-0.0134**	(0.0057)	53,085
200	**-555****	**(246)**	**-0.0055****	**(0.0021)**	**-0.0132****	**(0.0055)**	55,786
210	-592**	(241)	-0.0056***	(0.0021)	-0.0136**	(0.0054)	58,367
220	-583**	(237)	-0.0056***	(0.0021)	-0.0132**	(0.0053)	61,000
230	-591**	(233)	-0.0052**	(0.0020)	-0.0131**	(0.0052)	63,656
240	-558**	(229)	-0.0050**	(0.0020)	-0.0128**	(0.0052)	66,284
250	-571**	(226)	-0.0050**	(0.0020)	-0.0130**	(0.0051)	68,801
260	-596***	(224)	-0.0050***	(0.0019)	-0.0132***	(0.0050)	71,386

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents LLR estimates for household income (=youth earnings, SSI, and DI + parental earnings, SSI, and DI + sibling SSI). Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.25: RD Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: HH Income Variability

h (days)	HH income std dev		HH income coeff of var		Arc % change HH income		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	-409**	(188)	0.0155	(0.0122)	0.0146**	(0.0064)	15,271
60	-324*	(172)	0.0186*	(0.0112)	0.0173***	(0.0058)	18,029
70	-298*	(159)	0.0098	(0.0103)	0.0141***	(0.0054)	20,892
80	-345**	(149)	0.0128	(0.0098)	0.0151***	(0.0051)	23,681
90	-323**	(141)	0.0144	(0.0093)	0.0147***	(0.0048)	26,304
100	-285**	(134)	0.0134	(0.0089)	0.0140***	(0.0046)	29,045
110	-233*	(128)	0.0144*	(0.0085)	0.0141***	(0.0044)	31,662
120	-210*	(122)	0.0147*	(0.0082)	0.0138***	(0.0042)	34,461
130	-185	(118)	0.0163**	(0.0079)	0.0146***	(0.0041)	36,984
140	-144	(114)	0.0183**	(0.0077)	0.0143***	(0.0039)	39,681
150	-129	(110)	0.0181**	(0.0074)	0.0134***	(0.0038)	42,307
160	-123	(107)	0.0193***	(0.0072)	0.0147***	(0.0037)	45,060
170	-136	(104)	0.0214***	(0.0070)	0.0154***	(0.0036)	47,799
180	-156	(101)	0.0212***	(0.0068)	0.0159***	(0.0035)	50,344
190	-144	(98.5)	0.0203***	(0.0067)	0.0158***	(0.0034)	53,085
200	-126	(96.4)	0.0208***	(0.0065)	0.0161***	(0.0034)	55,786
210	-137	(94.5)	0.0215***	(0.0064)	0.0166***	(0.0033)	58,367
220	-146	(94.1)	0.0209***	(0.0063)	0.0166***	(0.0032)	61,000
230	-144	(92.3)	0.0195***	(0.0062)	0.0162***	(0.0032)	63,656
240	-135	(90.7)	0.0191***	(0.0061)	0.0160***	(0.0031)	66,284
250	-132	(89.4)	0.0193***	(0.0060)	0.0159***	(0.0031)	68,801
260	**-136**	**(88.2)**	**0.0192****	**(0.0060)**	**0.0158****	**(0.0030)**	71,386

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents LLR estimates for household income variability (household income=youth earnings, SSI, and DI + parental earnings, SSI, and DI + sibling SSI). Sample is SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.26: RD Local Linear Regression Reduced Form Estimates: Sibling Adult Earnings

h (days)	Sibling earnings		Sib earnings>$0		Sib earnings>$5K		Sib earnings>$10K		Sib earnings>$15K		N
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	
50	-637*	(381)	-0.0258	(0.0194)	-0.0410**	(0.0162)	-0.0342**	(0.0135)	-0.0165	(0.0110)	4,597
60	-382	(344)	-0.0131	(0.0177)	-0.0289**	(0.0147)	-0.0245**	(0.0122)	-0.0105	(0.0100)	5,457
70	-331	(318)	-0.0112	(0.0165)	-0.0261*	(0.0137)	-0.0209*	(0.0114)	-0.0078	(0.0093)	6,295
80	-456	(296)	-0.0164	(0.0155)	-0.0301**	(0.0129)	-0.0251**	(0.0107)	-0.0114	(0.0087)	7,140
90	-496*	(281)	-0.0161	(0.0147)	-0.0306**	(0.0122)	-0.0259**	(0.0102)	-0.0127	(0.0083)	7,878
100	-472*	(268)	-0.0165	(0.0140)	-0.0293**	(0.0117)	-0.0243**	(0.0097)	-0.0124	(0.0079)	8,656
110	-417	(255)	-0.0190	(0.0134)	-0.0286**	(0.0111)	-0.0224**	(0.0093)	-0.0119	(0.0075)	9,493
120	-411*	(244)	-0.0176	(0.0128)	-0.0259**	(0.0107)	-0.0205**	(0.0089)	-0.0116	(0.0072)	10,311
130	-410*	(236)	-0.0170	(0.0124)	-0.0265**	(0.0104)	-0.0213**	(0.0086)	-0.0119*	(0.0069)	11,041
140	-370	(227)	-0.0145	(0.0120)	-0.0240**	(0.0100)	-0.0189**	(0.0083)	-0.0103	(0.0067)	11,867
150	-385*	(220)	-0.0180	(0.0116)	-0.0249**	(0.0097)	-0.0189**	(0.0081)	-0.0108*	(0.0065)	12,634
160	-464**	(214)	-0.0194*	(0.0113)	-0.0263***	(0.0094)	-0.0210***	(0.0078)	-0.0138**	(0.0063)	13,477
170	-460**	(208)	-0.0201*	(0.0110)	-0.0270***	(0.0092)	-0.0213***	(0.0076)	-0.0138**	(0.0061)	14,329
180	-439**	(203)	-0.0208*	(0.0107)	-0.0267***	(0.0089)	-0.0209***	(0.0074)	-0.0132**	(0.0060)	15,112
190	-428**	(198)	-0.0207**	(0.0105)	-0.0259***	(0.0087)	-0.0199***	(0.0073)	-0.0128**	(0.0058)	15,928
200	-439**	(193)	-0.0211**	(0.0102)	-0.0257***	(0.0085)	-0.0199***	(0.0071)	-0.0135**	(0.0057)	16,764
210	-452**	(189)	-0.0215**	(0.0100)	-0.0258***	(0.0084)	-0.0197***	(0.0070)	-0.0140**	(0.0056)	17,520
220	**-450****	**(185)**	**-0.0207****	**(0.0099)**	**-0.0253****	**(0.0082)**	**-0.0191****	**(0.0069)**	**-0.0138****	**(0.0055)**	18,296
230	-428**	(182)	-0.0189*	(0.0097)	-0.0236***	(0.0081)	-0.0182***	(0.0067)	-0.0135**	(0.0054)	19,104
240	-403**	(179)	-0.0174*	(0.0095)	-0.0219***	(0.0080)	-0.0169**	(0.0066)	-0.0130**	(0.0053)	19,921
250	-405**	(177)	-0.0165*	(0.0094)	-0.0219***	(0.0079)	-0.0169**	(0.0066)	-0.0130**	(0.0052)	20,652
260	-386**	(175)	-0.0164*	(0.0093)	-0.0212***	(0.0078)	-0.0160**	(0.0065)	-0.0123**	(0.0052)	21,398

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents LLR estimates for sibling earnings in adulthood. Sample is younger siblings (who are on SSI) of SSI children with 18th birthday within given bandwidth of August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.27: IV Estimates Using Off SSI, Relative to Control Group On SSI

| | IV estimate | | Full control group | | Control on SSI | |
	Pt. Est.	Std. Err.	Mean	%Δ	Mean	%Δ
SSI income	-7,886***	(276)	$4,055	-194%	$6,835	-115%
DI income	-551	(350)	$688	-80%	$618	-89%
Earnings	3,001**	(1,421)	$4,222	71%	$1,386	217%
Earnings thresholds						
> $0	0.263***	(0.0603)	0.406	65%	0.287	91%
> $15K	0.119***	(0.0395)	0.103	116%	0.022	533%
Total income	-5,709***	(1,515)	$9,041	-63%	$8,839	-65%
N	81,800					

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents parametric RD IV estimates of the effect of being off SSI, using a polynomial order of 2. Estimates are given as average annual measures. "Full control group" gives the mean for all sample members with an 18th birthday before August 22, 1996; "control on SSI" gives the mean for those control group members who stay on SSI in a given year, averaged over all 16 post-treatment years. Sample is SSI children with an 18th birthday within 37 weeks of the August 22, 1996 cutoff.

Table A.28: Descriptive Survey Statistics for Former SSI Children Ages 22 to 24 Years

	Full sample			Living apart from parents		
	All	Still On	Off SSI	All	Still On	Off SSI
Living arrangements						
Lives with parents	54%	60%	45%			
Lives with own child	18%	15%	24%			
Health insurance						
Any	77%	96%	52%			
Medicaid	63%	90%	23%			
Financial assistance						
Non-SSI cash welfare	10%	11%	8%	15%	19%	10%
Food Stamps	27%	26%	28%	39%	44%	34%
Any public assistance	30%	29%	31%	43%	50%	35%
Transfers from family outside HH	9%	6%	16%	19%	13%	27%
N	989	616	373	421	238	183

Source: Author's calculations from National Survey of SSI Children and Families (NSCF). Notes: Table reports proportions for all individuals in the NSCF between the ages of 22 and 24 years who were on SSI as children, and for the subsample of these individuals who live apart from parents. "Still On" means the former SSI child is still on SSI at the time of the survey. "Off SSI" means the fomer SSI child is no longer on SSI at the time of the survey.

Table A.29: Constant Equivalent Loss from SSI Removal

| | Constant equivalent loss | | | | % loss from volatility | | | |
| | Relative risk aversion (γ) | | | | Relative risk aversion (γ) | | | |
Floor	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
				Recipient income only (c_{1t})				
$1,000	$5,940	$6,942	$7,758	$7,891	0%	14%	23%	25%
$2,000	$5,437	$6,109	$6,701	$6,837	0%	11%	19%	20%
$3,000	$4,879	$5,316	$5,748	$5,859	0%	8%	15%	17%
$4,000	$4,262	$4,514	$4,826	$4,912	0%	6%	12%	13%
$5,000	$3,603	$3,702	$3,917	$3,983	0%	3%	8%	10%
				Recipient income plus 1/3 parental income (c_{2t})				
$1,000	$5,273	$5,674	$6,294	$6,473	0%	7%	16%	19%
$2,000	$5,154	$5,453	$5,945	$6,121	0%	5%	13%	16%
$3,000	$4,982	$5,179	$5,545	$5,689	0%	4%	10%	12%
$4,000	$4,710	$4,806	$5,072	$5,184	0%	2%	7%	9%
$5,000	$4,374	$4,370	$4,534	$4,598	0%	0%	4%	5%
				Recipient income plus variable parental income (c_{3t})				
$1,000	$2,394	$2,854	$3,703	$4,122	0%	16%	35%	42%
$2,000	$2,285	$2,641	$3,377	$3,807	0%	13%	32%	40%
$3,000	$2,146	$2,405	$3,002	$3,388	0%	11%	29%	37%
$4,000	$1,963	$2,127	$2,611	$2,943	0%	8%	25%	33%
$5,000	$1,701	$1,761	$2,129	$2,399	0%	3%	20%	29%

Notes: Table presents estimates of the constant equivalent loss from SSI removal, where constant equivalent is defined in equation (5). The constant equivalent loss is the estimate of β in the RD IV equation (3), where the dependent variable is the individual's constant equivalent over the entire 16-year post-period and the endogenous regressor is average annual SSI enrollment over the same post-period. First panel gives the constant equivalent loss where consumption is measured as the maximum of a consumption floor and total observed recipient income. Second panel gives the constant equivalent loss where consumption is measured as the maximum of a consumption floor and total observed recipient income plus one-third of parental income. Third panel gives the constant equivalent loss where consumption is measured as the maximum of a consumption floor and total observed recipient income plus a variable fraction of parental income. See Appendix for details.