American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
American Economic Review
vol. 100,
no. 5, December 2010
(pp. 2205–29)
Abstract
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g., those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions. (JEL C91, D02, D12, D72)Citation
Dal Bó, Pedro, Andrew Foster, and Louis Putterman. 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy." American Economic Review 100 (5): 2205–29. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2205Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior