Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 2, February 2015
(pp. 747-83)
Abstract
We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative forest outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, and more generally the idiosyncratic but powerful roles that leaders may play, leading to substantial variation in group cooperation outcomes. (JEL C93, D03, O13, Q23)Citation
Kosfeld, Michael, and Devesh Rustagi. 2015. "Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia." American Economic Review, 105 (2): 747-83. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20120700Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
- Q23 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry