American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 1, January 2015
(pp. 322–53)
Abstract
In a large-scale controlled trial in collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian incumbent mayor, we administered (randomized) messages about the candidate's valence or ideology. Informational treatments affected both actual votes in the precincts and individual vote declarations. Campaigning on valence brought more votes to the incumbent, but both messages affected voters' beliefs. Cross-learning occurred, as voters who received information about the incumbent also updated their beliefs on the opponent. With a novel protocol of beliefs elicitation and structural estimation, we assess the weights voters place upon politicians' valence and ideology, and simulate counterfactual campaigns. (JEL D12, D72, D83)Citation
Kendall, Chad, Tommaso Nannicini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign." American Economic Review 105 (1): 322–53. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131063Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness