Robust Social Decisions
American Economic Review
vol. 106,
no. 9, September 2016
(pp. 2407-25)
Abstract
We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so, we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.Citation
Danan, Eric, Thibault Gajdos, Brian Hill, and Jean-Marc Tallon. 2016. "Robust Social Decisions." American Economic Review, 106 (9): 2407-25. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150678Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty