Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching
- (pp. 225-29)
Abstract
Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.Citation
Rees-Jones, Alex. 2017. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 225-29. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171028Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D47 Market Design
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I21 Analysis of Education