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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching

Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching

  • Alex Rees-Jones
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 225-29)
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Abstract

Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.

Citation

Rees-Jones, Alex. 2017. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 225-29. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171028

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
  • D47 Market Design
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • I21 Analysis of Education