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  3. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
  4. July 2010
  5. Teacher Incentives

Teacher Incentives

  • Paul Glewwe
  • Nauman Ilias
  • Michael Kremer
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 2, no. 3, July 2010
(pp. 205-27)
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Abstract

We analyze a randomized trial of a program that rewarded Kenyan primary school teachers based on student test scores, with penalties for students not taking the exams. Scores increased on the formula used to reward teachers, and program school students scored higher on the exams linked to teacher incentives. Yet most of the gains were focused on the teacher reward formula. The dropout rate was unchanged. Instead, exam participation increased among enrolled students. Test scores increased on exams linked to the incentives, but not on other, unrelated exams. Teacher attendance and homework assignment were unaffected, but test preparation sessions increased. (JEL I21, I28, J13, O15)

Citation

Glewwe, Paul, Nauman Ilias, and Michael Kremer. 2010. "Teacher Incentives." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (3): 205-27. DOI: 10.1257/app.2.3.205

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • I21 Analysis of Education
  • I28 Education: Government Policy
  • J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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