This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
  4. July 2015
  5. Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

  • Luc Behaghel
  • Bruno Crépon
  • Thomas Le Barbanchon
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 7, no. 3, July 2015
(pp. 1-27)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)

Citation

Behaghel, Luc, Bruno Crépon, and Thomas Le Barbanchon. 2015. "Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7 (3): 1-27. DOI: 10.1257/app.20140185

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J68 Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
  • J71 Labor Discrimination
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment