Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data
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Abstract
We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with date and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations.Citation
Lusher, Lester, Geoffrey C. Schnorr, and Rebecca L.C. Taylor. 2022. "Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 14 (2): 285-319. DOI: 10.1257/app.20190007Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J65 Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
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