Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 4, November 2015
(pp. 233-51)
Abstract
In the two-player electronic mail game (EMG), as is well-known, the probability of collective action is lower the more confirmations and reconfirmations are made available to players. In the multiplayer EMG, however, we show players may coordinate on equilibria where they require only few of the available confirmations from each other to act. In this case, increasing the number of available confirmations may either create equilibria with positive probability of collective action when none existed before, or may increase the probability of collective action, if equilibria with positive probability of collective action already existed for fewer available confirmations. (JEL C70, D71, D82, D83)Citation
De Jaegher, Kris. 2015. "Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (4): 233-51. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140011Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment