From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9,
no. 1, February 2017
(pp. 152-216)
Abstract
This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm--a mode of behavior followed by many--exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms.Citation
Michaeli, Moti, and Daniel Spiro. 2017. "From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (1): 152-216. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150151Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- Z12 Cultural Economics: Religion
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment