Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14,
no. 3, August 2022
(pp. 321-52)
Abstract
We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could "learn itself." Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff. This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is known to be "nice." It also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizability, iterated admissibility, or minimal CURB sets.Citation
Schipper, Burkhard C. 2022. "Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (3): 321-52. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170139Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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