The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.
Billot, Antoine, and Xiangyu Qu.
"Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Consumer Economics: Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness