This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement

  • Nabil I. Al-Najjar
  • Robert J. Gary-Bobo
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 15, no. 3, August 2023
(pp. 387-425)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts' disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits underreaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data.

Citation

Al-Najjar, Nabil I., and Robert J. Gary-Bobo. 2023. "Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3): 387-425. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210392

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment