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New Insights on Classic Questions in Matching Theory

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 7, 2018 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM

Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Liberty Ballroom Salon A
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

Piotr Dworczak
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

I introduce a class of algorithms called Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains (DACC). DACC algorithms generalize the DA algorithms by Gale and Shapley (1962) by allowing both sides of the market to make offers. The main result is a characterization of the set of stable matchings: a matching is stable if and only if it is the outcome of a DACC algorithm.

Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms

Jan Christoph Schlegel
,
City, University of London

Abstract

We study conditions for the existence of stable, strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with salaries. Workers and firms want to match and agree on the terms of their match. Firms demand different sets of workers at different salaries. Workers have preferences over different firm-salary combinations. Workers’ preferences are monotone in salaries. We show that for this model, a descending auction mechanism is the only candidate for a stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for workers. Moreover, we identify a maximal domain of demand functions for firms, such that the mechanism is stable and strategy-proof.

In the special case, where demand functions are generated by quasi-linear profit functions, our domain reduces to the domain of demand functions under which workers are gross substitutes for firms. We provide two versions of the results for the quasi-linear case. One for a discrete model, where salaries are restricted to discrete units and one for a continuous model, where salaries can take on arbitrary positive numbers. More generally, we show that several celebrated results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) generalize from the discrete to the continuous model.

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

Ravi Jagadeesan
,
Harvard University
Scott Duke Kominers
,
Harvard University
Ross Rheingans-Yoo
,
Harvard University

Abstract

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the "Lone Wolf Theorem" of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any agent who does not participate in trade in one competitive equilibrium must receive his autarky payoff in every competitive equilibrium. Our results extend to approximate equilibria and to settings in which utility is only approximately transferable.
Discussant(s)
Alexander Teytelboym
,
University of Oxford
JEL Classifications
  • D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
  • C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory