Craigslist's Effect on Violence Against Women

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Prostitute Mortality

Providing sex services illegally is a very risky occupation

- Workplace homicide rate for female prostitutes (204 per 100,000) vs. female liquor store employee (4 per 100,000) (Lowman and Fraser 1995; Castillo and Jenkins 1994)
- Homicide rate more than 13 times higher than the general population (Potterat et al., 2004).

Serial killings

- 65% of serial murders are female and 78% of female victims of serial murderers are prostitutes (Egger, 2003)
- 35% of all prostitute homicides were by serial killers (Brewer et al., 2006)

Matching before and after Craigslist

- Traditional methods for matching included agencies, streets and pimps, word of mouth, reviews, backpages of alternative weeklies, some expensive advertising sites
- Craigslist was a low cost advertising (\$0 10) section of the front page that was used exclusively by prostitutes to advertise themselves to clients
- Erotic services (ERS) matched buyers and sellers on a centralized advertising platform
- Lowered matching costs, thickened the online market, feedback effects, improved matching efficiency

Mitigating risks through Craigslist

"Having the ability to advertise online allows sex workers to more carefully screen potential customers and work indoors. Research shows that when sex workers can't advertise online and screen clients, they are often forced onto the street, where it is more difficult to screen out violent clients and negotiate safe sex (i.e. sex with condoms). They are also more likely to have to depend on exploitative pimps to find customers for them." - Bass (2015)

Overview

- We estimate the effect of Craigslist's ERS on violence against women
- ERS lowered female homicides by between 1 and 17 percent, and imprecise estimates on female rape offenses
- Our evidence suggests that this was caused by lower tier prostitutes (e.g., street), who have the highest homicide risks, moving indoors.

Craigslist ERS

- Craigslist itself is the 15th most popular website in the US, cheap advertising, better matching, more business, low search costs
- ERS was protected by 1996 Communication Decency Act
- But nevertheless continual harassment by district/state/US attorneys and activists
- Craigslist closed ERS in September 2010
 - Village Voice's Backpage was immediately adopted replacement
 - ... closed its ERS in early 2017 (also due to harassment)

Erotic services as a clearinghouse

- Lowers search and solicitation costs
- Easier for buyers and sellers to find one another
- Allegedly moves outdoor prostitution (e.g., streets) indoors
- Allows for more efficient matching
- Thickens the online market

Screening

- Email vs split-second decisions
- Call the John at work
- Background checks
- References and White Lists




Figure: Craigslist ERS in 1995




Figure: April 2003




Figure: January 2004




Figure: January 2005




Figure: January 2006



Figure: End of 2009

FAQ subscriptions

search craigslist



nyc@craigslist.org

1.800.664.0633

about craigslist

artists / musicians (81)
general community (97)
events / entertainment (34)

discussion forums

ridesharing (25)

personals - new
women seeking men (15)

women seeking women (9) men seeking women (34)

men seeking men (8)
missed connections (34)

apartments (50)

apts - broker/fee (102) rooms / shared (87)

<u>sublet / temp / vac</u> (195) <u>swap</u> (138)

apts wanted (118)
room / share wanted (110)

sublet / temp wanted (152)

sale / wanted

general for sale (167) computer / tech stuff (28) tickets (43)

items wanted (52) -;new

accounting / finance (11
business / e-biz / mgmt
computer / engineering
design / media / multime

marketing / advertising office / admin / cust-ser sales / biz-dev (57) writing / editing (12)

et cetera jobs (13)

services

<u>resumes</u> (331) <u>freelance / 1099</u> (130)

small biz ads (179)

all listings are free...... questions/comments? ----> $\underline{nyc@craigslist.org}$



Figure: 14 "services" including ERS

Data

- 1. Wayback Machine (Internet archive)
- 2. Supplemental Homicide Reports 1995-2009 (city/month)
- Summary Uniform Crime Reports, offenses 1995-2009 (city/month)
- 4. The Erotic Review 1999-2009 (city/month)

Underascertainment bias

 Prostitution deaths appear only 49 times out of 31,250 observations caused by underascertainment bias

The monthly reporting schedule for participating agencies "requires agencies to report homicides in the month that they are discovered, even if that is not the month in which they occurred or if the social context of the homicide is not yet known. Prostitute homicides often go undetected for weeks, months, or years, so the SHR procedures have a built-in bias toward under ascertainment of many prostitute homicides"

• We therefore only focus on the total female homicide rate.

Yelp of Prostitution

- The Erotic Review (TER) is a reputation website where clients review prostitutes
- Popular institution; sex workers value their reputation
- Over 1.4 million reviews on hundreds of thousands of unique providers (April 2017)

Poisson Estimation

(Standard and Dynamic) Differences-in-differences

$$E[Y_{mt}|D_{<10,mt},D_{\geq 10,mt},X_{mt}] = exp(\delta_1 D_{<10,mt} + \delta_2 D_{\geq 10,mt} + \beta X_{mt})$$

$$E[Y_{mt}|\sum_{j=2}^{6} L_{mt},\sum_{i=1}^{8},D_{mt},X_{mt}] = exp(\sum_{j=2}^{6} \gamma_j L_{mt} + \sum_{i=1}^{8} \delta_i D_{mt} + \beta X_{mt})$$

 $D_{<10,mt}$ is the first ten months after ERS opens in a city/market by month; $D_{\geq 10,mt}$ is after ten months; X includes calendar date and city/market fixed effects; L_{mt} and D_{mt} are ten month leads and lags. All models adjust for within-city serial correlation.


Alternative OLS specifications

$$\begin{array}{rcl} Y_{mt} & = & \delta_1 D_{<10,mt} + \delta_2 D_{\geq 10,mt} + \beta X_{mt} + \varepsilon_{mt} \\ Y_{mt}^{\frac{1}{4}} & = & \delta_1 D_{<10,mt} + \delta_2 D_{\geq 10,mt} + \beta X_{mt} + \varepsilon_{mt} \\ In(Y_{mt}^2 + (Y_{mt}^2 + 1)^{\frac{1}{2}}) & = & \delta_1 D_{<10,mt} + \delta_2 D_{\geq 10,mt} + \beta X_{mt} + \varepsilon_{mt} \end{array}$$


where the first equation uses the rate, the second the quartic root, the third the inverse hyperbolic sine, and ε_{mt} is the error term. All models adjust for within-city serial correlation.


Robustness

- 6-mo, 9-mo and 12-mo lagged treatment variables: results are always significant on the lag. We use 10-month to correspond with the Craigslist visual
- We also controlled for state-linear trends, and results don't change
- We also conducted randomization inference with 1,000 randomized treatments




Craigslist penetration, measured by email use





Craigslist penetration, Probability Independent



Craigslist penetration, Probability Agency





Table: Poisson and OLS estimates of the effect of erotic services openings on female murders per 100,000

Dep var:		Mι	ırders					
	Poisson	Rate	Quartic root	Sine				
ERS (first 10 months)	-0.015	-0.000	-0.005	-0.002				
	(0.076)	(0.010)	(800.0)	(0.006)				
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.192**	-0.019**	-0.016*	-0.011*				
	(0.077)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)				
N	60,207	60,207	60,207	60,207				
Mean of dependent variable	0.13	0.13	0.19	0.09				
Dep var:	Rapes							
	Poisson	Rate	Quartic root	Sine				
ERS (first 10 months)	-0.013	-0.029	-0.029*	-0.039				
	(0.030)	(0.079)	(0.016)	(0.037)				
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.047	-0.077	-0.060**	-0.109*				
	(0.044)	(0.111)	(0.027)	(0.058)				
N	58,636	58,636	58,636	58,636				
Mean of dependent variable	2.76	2.76	0.97	1.81				

estimates OLS with the quartic root as the outcome. The third model estimates the hyperbolic sine transformation as the outcome. Models control for market and calendar date fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered within city in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Dynamic Diff-in-Diff of ERS on Female Homicides with counts and Poisson



Model estimated with Poisson includes date and city fixed effects

Levels

Quartic root


Hyperbolic sine

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N	58,636	58,636	58,636	58,636				
Mean of dependent variable	2.76	2.76	0.97	1.81				

The first column estimates a poisson maximum likelihood model with the rate as the outcome. The second model estimates OLS with the quartic root as the outcome. The third model estimates the hyperbolic sine transformation as the outcome. Models control for city, year, month fixed effects, city population and city specific linear trends. Robust standard errors clustered within city in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Dynamic Diff-in-Diff of ERS on Female Rapes with counts and Poisson



Model estimated with Poisson includes date and city fixed effects

Levels

Quartic root

Hyperbolic sine

Table: Falsification exercises: the effect of Craigslist's erotic services on females murdered by acquaintances, all male murders and all manslaughters per 100,000

Dep var:	Females by acquaintances	Males	Manslaughters
ERS (first 10 months)	0.159	-0.001	0.057
	(0.178)	(0.034)	(0.224)
ERS (post-10 months)	0.110	-0.020	0.165
	(0.184)	(0.057)	(0.304)
N	60,381	60,381	58,636
Mean of dependent variable	0.02	0.48	0.01

Dependent variables are outcomes per population times 100,000. Models estimated with Poisson. Models control for city and date fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered within city in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Mechanisms: Streets and Screening

- We do not have reliable or comprehensive data on street walkers, but we can test the hypothesis using the data from TER
 - Examine characteristics of provider (prices, appearance, performance, incall/outcall) to see if there's evidence of entry coming from lower tiers
- Classifiers and additional scraping were built to determine whether screening or signaling was used by the service provider
 - Search engines (google, yahoo, bing!, etc.)
 - Call at client's place of employment
 - Background checks
 - White Lists and informal letters of reference Cunningham & DeAngelo (2017)

Incumbents vs. Entrants

$$Y_{imt} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{6} \delta_{t+\tau} E_{i,t+\tau} + \sum_{\tau=1}^{6} \gamma_{t+\tau} D_{m,t+\tau} + \beta X_{mt} + \varepsilon_{imt}$$

where Y_{imt} are provider and review-specific characteristics, D_{mt} is an indicator equalling one if the market has ERS yet, E_{it} is an indicator equalling one if the respondent had entered t months after ERS (i.e., entrant) compared to people who had entered before ERS, X_{mt} are market and calendar date fixed effects, and ε_{imt} is the error term. The model is estimated with OLS, and standard errors are adjusted for within-market correlation.

					Panel A	4			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel E	3			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

					Panel A	4			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel I	3			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(800.0)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
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					Panel A	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
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,	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel E	3			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
•	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
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Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(800.0)	(6.888)
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					Panel A	A			
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					Panel I	В			
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	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

					Panel A	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
,	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel E	3			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
•	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
·	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
·	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

					Panel A	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
,	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel I	В			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
•	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
•	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

					Panel /	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel I	В			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

					Panel .	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel	В			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
•	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
•	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

 $Models \ control \ for \ city \ and \ date \ fixed \ effects. \ Robust \ standard \ errors \ clustered \ within \ city \ in \ parenthesis. \ ^*p < 0.10, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{***}p < 0.01$

					Panel	A			
Dep var:	Screen	Repeat	Looks	Performance	Street	As promised	Real photo	Incall	Price
ERS (first 10 months)	0.000	0.020**	-0.053*	-0.066*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.009	0.049***	-6.624*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(3.555)
ERS (post-10 months)	-0.005	0.027**	-0.131***	-0.110*	-0.003*	0.004	-0.022	0.087***	-14.823**
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(6.246)
					Panel I	В			
Entrant 0-10mo post ERS	-0.002	0.004	-0.122***	-0.489***	0.000	-0.051***	-0.099***	-0.038***	-17.226***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(5.100)
Entrant 11-20mo post ERS	-0.006**	0.011**	-0.074**	-0.430***	0.004***	-0.049***	-0.065***	-0.006	-11.016**
•	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(5.410)
Entrant 21-30mo post ERS	-0.002	0.005	-0.170***	-0.469***	0.001	-0.054***	-0.039***	-0.007	-21.764***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(6.888)
Entrant 31-40mo post ERS	-0.012***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.547***	0.002	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.011	-13.644**
•	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(5.684)
Entrant 41-50mo post ERS	-0.022***	0.002	-0.252***	-0.667***	0.002	-0.079***	-0.072***	-0.024**	-18.207***
•	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(6.673)
Entrant 50mo post ERS	-0.039***	0.009**	-0.522***	-1.073***	0.006***	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.046***	-10.312
•	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(6.353)
N	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	344,561	68,450	68,450	68,450	344,339
Mean of dependent variable	0.05	0.15	7.46	7.32	0.02	0.87	0.79	0.84	294.33

 $Models \ control\ for\ city\ and\ date\ fixed\ effects.\ Robust\ standard\ errors\ clustered\ within\ city\ in\ parenthesis.\ ^*\ p<0.10,\ ^{**}\ p<0.05,\ ^{***}\ p<0.01,\ ^{**}\ p<0.01,\ ^{***}\ p<0.01,\ ^{**}\ p<0.01,\ ^{$

Discussion

ERS saved lives

- We calculate that ERS saved between 136 and 2,144 females from murder for 2002-2010 (hyperbolic sine and Poisson bounds)
- Between 13,045 and 207,713 additional police officers needed to achieve equivalent effect
 - Reduction in female homicides of 1.1% (hyerbolic sine) to 17.4% (poisson)
 - Police murder elasticity, ϵ = -0.84 (Evans & Owens, 2007)
 - Total police in 2001 (LEOKA): 1,003,441

Discussion

Policy Implications

- Client violence (including serial killing?) can be disrupted by technology that moves prostitutes indoors
- ERS appears to have made prostitution markets safer maybe safest in history
- Potentially unintended consequence of closing down internet institutions: increased risks to vulnerable participants, namely female prostitutes.
- Tradeoffs:
 - reduce the sex trade (including trafficking) vs.
 - reduce harm associated with prohibition
- Movement off the street should be one of the main goals to keep in mind when designing optimal policy