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Gender Differences in Skills and Effects on Educational and Labor Market Outcomes

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 6, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Atlanta Marriott Marquis, International 7
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Ragan Petrie, Texas A&M University

Understanding Gender Differences in Leadership

Sule Alan
,
University of Essex
Ipek Mumcu
,
University of Essex

Abstract

Using data from a large-scale field experiment, we show that while there is no gender
difference in the willingness to make risky decisions on behalf of a group in a sample of
children, a large gap emerges in a sample of adolescents. The proportion of girls who
exhibit leadership willingness drops by 39% going from childhood to adolescence. We
explore the possible factors behind this drop and find that it is largely associated with
a dramatic decline in “social confidence”, measured by the willingness to perform a real
effort task in public.

Gender Differences in Intrinsic Motivation to Exert Effort on Standardized Tests

Sally Sadoff
,
University of California-San Diego
Uri Gneezy
,
University of California-San Diego
John A. List
,
University of Chicago
Jeff Livingston
,
Bentley University

Abstract

In a series of experiments, we offer students incentives to put forth effort on low stakes tests. We find that incentives have a larger impact on the test scores of male students than female students. Our results suggest that at baseline, in the absences of extrinsic incentives, girls are more intrinsically motivated than boys to put forth effort. Gender differences in intrinsic motivation can help explain why gender gaps in education vary in both magnitude and direction, depending on the measure used.

Brave Boys and Play-it-Safe Girls: Gender Differences in Willingness to Guess in a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment

Nagore Iriberri
,
University of the Basque Country
Pedro Rey-Biel
,
Autonomous University of Barcelona

Abstract

We study gender differences in willingness to guess in a multiple-choice math test with
about 10,000 participants, where in half of the questions both wrong answers and omitted
questions score 0, and in the other half wrong answers score 0 but omitted questions score
+1. Using a within-participant regression analysis, we find that female participants leave
more omitted questions than males under both types of scoring rules, but when there is a
reward for omitted questions, the gender difference gets even larger. This gender
difference, which is stronger among high ability and older participants, has negative
consequences for females in the final score and ranking. In a subsequent survey, female
participants show lower levels of confidence and higher risk aversion, which could
potentially explain this differential behavior. When both are considered, risk aversion
shows to be the main factor in explaining the gender differential in the willingness to
guess. A scoring rule that is gender neutral begs for non-differential scoring between
wrong answers and omitted questions.

Workplace Competition and Labor Supply: A Field Experiment

Ragan Petrie
,
Texas A&M University
Amalia Miller
,
University of Virginia
Carmit Segal
,
University of Zurich

Abstract

Professional careers with the highest compensation levels and growth rates tend to require both long work hours and competition among co-workers for pay and promotion. Previous studies have examined the effects of tournaments on effort, but the focus has been on the intensive margin of effort. This paper presents a novel field experiment design in which workers are allowed to determine both the levels of effort and time they invest on a computer task. This enables us to investigate the effects of tournament competition among co-workers on labor supply, which can shed light on the non-technological factors that contribute to the prevalence of long work hours in certain occupations. We find that workers randomly assigned to a bonus scheme with a $30 tournament prize for the person with the highest output in their group work substantially harder and longer than those not offered a bonus. Although men and women both increased their effort in response to the $30 tournament, the male reaction was substantially larger. Women tended to react similarly to any bonus scheme offered. These results indicate that workplace competition produces gender gaps in outcomes both through direct effects on labor supply and indirectly by increasing the work hours needed to succeed.
Discussant(s)
Sule Alan
,
University of Essex
Elif Kubilay
,
University of Essex
JEL Classifications
  • J1 - Demographic Economics
  • I2 - Education and Research Institutions