

# Labor Reallocation and Wage Growth: Evidence from East Germany

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**IN PROGRESS**

- Resource misallocation a source of cross-country income gaps
  1. Capital across firms, managers across technologies...
  2. Possibly due to bad policies, market imperfections...
  
- **Can reallocation of inputs lead to convergence across regions?**
  1. Theoretical evidence is obvious
  2. Empirical evidence is scant
  
- **This Paper:** historical evidence from German Reunification
  - \* **Firm-worker reallocation** contributed significantly to **wage catchup**

# Ideal Empirical Setting to Study Labor Reallocation

- Policy change that is
  1. Exogenous, or sudden
  2. Efficient benchmark to compare the evolution of allocations
  3. Related only to the reallocation of a fixed set of firms and workers
  4. Data *before* and *after* to compare the allocations
  
- Most existing counterfactuals are artificial:
  - based on hypothetical reforms, and/or against U.S. as a benchmark


# German Reunification is Quasi-Ideal

1. Quick and largely unexpected
  2. Comparison against West Germans provides natural benchmark
  3. Three treatments: change in labor market + firm entry/exit + mobility  
⇒ follow workers “from” East, decompose each
  4. Scarce data before, but matched employer-employee data afterward  
⇒ quasi-experimental variation (exposure) across cohorts
- ⇒ Separate **between-firm effects** from **within-firm effects**, for **each East cohort, at all ages, relative to West**


# Main Results

- Decompose initial wage gap and ensuing catchup into:
    1. Between-firm: difference in firms East/West workers work
    2. Within-firm: difference in worker productivities, “human capital”?
  
  - ~8 of the 20 ppt catchup up to 2014 happens between-firms
    1. 1992-1997: ~4 ppt due to reallocation of workers across firms in East,
    2. 1997-2014: rest due to reallocation of workers to West firms
- ⇒ **Speed and magnitude points to the possibility of labor market efficiency as a potent policy directive**


# Average Wages, 1992 vs 2014



# Average Wages, 1995 vs 2014




# Average Wages, 2000 vs 2014






# Average Wages, 2007 vs 2014




► Means


# East Share of Population, 1992 vs 2014




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




► Means





1. **Source:** IAB, research center associated with (un)employment agency
  - universe of work histories - civil servants and self-employed ( $\sim 85\%$ )
  - $\sim 50$  million workers followed over their life-cycles **100% sample!**
2. **Sample restriction:** average daily wage of working-age German men\*
  - Years:  $[t, \bar{t}] = [1992, 2014]$  (earlier data used to identify origin)
3. Divide sample into **East/West-“Born”**
  - Berlin treated as West (for now)

\* i.e., non-Germans are dropped. For women, patterns are more distinct in employment, not wages

# E-E Transitions for East/West-Born



# E-E Transitions by Cohort (East in black)






# Baseline Regression


$$\log w_{isrct} = \log \theta_{j(i,t),t} + \underbrace{\tau_{srt} + \kappa_{src} + \alpha_{srct} + \epsilon_{isrct}}_{\log h_{isrct}}$$

- individual  $i$ , skill  $s$ , from  $r$ , birth year  $c$ , working at firm  $j$  at time  $t$
- Firm effects  $\theta$  are not fixed, allowed to vary over time
  1. Cannot include individual worker fixed effects
  2. Fully stratified by skill, region and cohort
- $\alpha_{srct}$ : skill-origin-cohort-specific age effects

# Wage Gap: Firms and Workers



# Wage Convergence: Firms and Workers




- College cannot explain much

# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$


- Extend Olley and Pakes (1996); Melitz and Polanec (2015) to consider worker migration
- X Differences in average firm wage growth (unexplained)
  1. Change in covariance across firms and workers
  2. Firm entry/exit
  3. Migrants and migration
- Then decompose each explainable component further

► Formulae

# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$ : Within-Region




# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$ : Firm Entry/Exit



# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$ : Migrants



# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$ : Migration





# Sum Up in Numbers

Decomposition		Contribution to Catchup	
		First 5 years: <b>13 ppt</b>	All years: <b>19 ppt</b>
I	w/i firms	0 ppt	1.5 ppt
	b/w firms	<b>13 ppt</b>	<b>17.5 ppt</b>
II	unexplained	8 ppt	9.5 ppt
	explained	<b>5 ppt</b>	<b>8 ppt</b>
III	w/i region	<b>4 ppt</b>	2 ppt
	entry/exit	0 ppt	1 ppt
	migrants	0.5 ppt	1.5 ppt
	migration	0.5 ppt	<b>3.5 ppt</b>

- **Within region in first 5 years, then across region**

▶ Details

▶ short

# Decomposition by Cohort

- Old cohorts are initially allocated worse, catchup faster
- Can similarly decompose reallocation effects by cohort
- Shuffling effect in first years dominant
- Out-migration strong for post-RU cohorts

▶ figures

# Lessons Learned So Far

1. Firm-worker reallocation effects can be large and quick
  - Explains about a quarter of East-West wage convergence
  - Most **within-region** reallocation occurs in first 5 years
  
2. Migration plays persistent, growing role
  - Need to understand intensive/extensive margins (*in progress*)
  - East-West effects are opposite (*in progress*)
  
3. Almost no difference/catchup from human capital firm entry/exit

# Understanding Shuffling Effects




- Workers moving across firms (**gross flows** of hiring, firing, job-to-job)
- Changes the size distribution over  $\theta_j$ 's, **but also the  $\theta_j$ 's**:  
 $\theta_j$ 's are not fixed **but change over time**
- Wage growth from change in  $\theta$ -size correlation (**Olley and Pakes, 1996**):

► Evidence

$$S_r \equiv \underbrace{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{S}'_r) / \bar{\theta}(\mathbf{S}_r)}_{\text{change in mean } \theta \text{ across workers}} \bigg/ \underbrace{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}_{\text{change in mean } \theta \text{ across firms}}$$
$$= \eta'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r) / \eta(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r) \quad \text{where}$$
$$\eta(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r) \equiv 1 + \text{Corr} \left[ \frac{\theta_j}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}, \frac{s_j}{\bar{s}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)} \right] \cdot \text{StD} \left[ \frac{\theta_j}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)} \right] \cdot \text{StD} \left[ \frac{s_j}{\bar{s}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)} \right]$$

- First verify **correlation** vs. dispersion effect

# Reallocation Comes from Change in Correlation



# Size or $\theta$ ?


- We can think of the following types of counterfactual correlations:
- Keep  $\theta$  distribution constant, change size distribution:

$$\text{Corr} \left[ \frac{\theta_j}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}, \frac{s'_j}{\bar{s}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)} \right]$$





- Keep size distribution constant, change  $\theta$  distribution:

$$\text{Corr} \left[ \frac{\theta'_j}{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}, \frac{s_j}{\bar{s}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)} \right]$$

# Size and $\theta$



# $\Delta\text{Rank}(\theta)$ – $\Delta\text{Size}$ Correlation



- East in black
- On average,  $\theta$ -growth firms are shrinking



# Understanding Plows and Flows I

- We view a firm as a **collection of workers**
- Abstract from skill-origin-cohort-age for illustration
- Suppose individual  $i$ 's wage is determined by

$$w_i = \underbrace{\zeta_{j(i)}(\omega_i)}_{\text{match quality}} \cdot \underbrace{\psi_{j(i)}\left(\{\omega_n\}_{n \in \mathcal{I}_{j(i)}}; \lambda_j, s_j\right)}_{\text{worker complementarities}}$$

where  $\mathcal{I}_j$  are the set of workers in firm  $j$  and

$\omega_i$ : vector of individual-specific components (partially observable)

$\zeta_j$ : firm-specific function that depends only on  $\omega_i$

$\psi_j$ : firm-specific wage function that depends on all workers'  $\omega_n$

$\lambda_j$ : firm-specific inputs

# Understanding Plows and Flows II

- Our  $\log \theta_j$ 's are basically mean firm log wages:

$$\epsilon_i = \log \zeta_{j(i)}(\omega_i) - \overline{\log \zeta_j(i)(\omega_n)}^{n \in \mathcal{I}_j(i)}$$
$$\theta_j = \exp \left[ \overline{\log \zeta_j(\omega_i)}^{i \in \mathcal{I}_j} \right] \cdot \psi_j \left( \{\omega_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}_j}; \lambda_j, s_j \right)$$

- Suppose  $\zeta_j, \psi_j$  are increasing in  $\omega_i$ 's
- So  $\theta_j$ 's may rise from swapping  $\omega_i$ 's due to
  1. Rise in average match quality
  2. Rise in worker complementarities
- Negative growth correlation can be understood as letting go of low  $\omega_i$  workers (firms are too large...*in progress*)

# Conclusion

1. Use German micro-level employment data to study East German wage convergence from 1992-2014
2. Labor market efficiency potentially an important source of income gaps and development
  - Misallocation of workers across firms explains bulk of initial East-West wage gap
  - Evidence that older cohorts were more misallocated due to longer communist exposure
3. Firm-Worker reallocation plays major role in catchup
  - More misallocated older East German cohorts reallocate faster
  - Younger cohorts persistently migrate with larger gains

# Way Ahead





- Individual firm-worker understanding of size and  $\theta$  effects
  1. Firm wages grow by relieving low-wage movers
    - ⇔ Stayers gain more than movers by staying in high-growth firms
  2. High-growth firms are NOT those with initially high wage!
- Cohort effects for migrants
- Control for further observables (industries, unions, etc.)
  - Occupation composition and premia may also be changing
- Tractable model that explains negative growth correlation

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



**THANK YOU!**

# East-West German Wages









--◆-- East    --●-- West

# Wage Growth by Cohort



# Raw Profiles in the Data





# Definitions and Level Decomposition

- For any period  $t$ , drop time subscripts to ease notation
- Define  $\mathbf{R}_r$ : set of workers from  $r$
- For any set  $\mathbf{A}$  of workers,  $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$ : set of firms with at least worker in  $\mathbf{A}$   
For any set  $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$  of firms,  $\mathbf{A}$ : set of all workers working in  $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$
- $\bar{x}(\mathbf{A}) \equiv \mathbb{E}[x_i | i \in \mathbf{A}]$  : mean of  $x$  over workers in set  $\mathbf{A}$   
 $\bar{x}(\tilde{\mathbf{A}}) \equiv \mathbb{E}[x_j | j \in \tilde{\mathbf{A}}]$  : mean of  $x$  over firms in set  $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}$
- At any time  $t$ , E-W wage gap is

$$\frac{\bar{w}(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\bar{w}(\mathbf{R}_W)} = \underbrace{\frac{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_W)}}_{\text{between-firm gap}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\bar{h}(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\bar{h}(\mathbf{R}_W)}}_{\text{within-firm gap}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\rho(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\rho(\mathbf{R}_W)}}_{\text{type-correlation}}$$

# Wage Growth Decomposition





- Change in E-W wage gap ( $\equiv$  growth rate gap)

$$\Delta \log \frac{\bar{w}(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\bar{w}(\mathbf{R}_W)} \approx \Delta \log \frac{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_E \cap \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_E)}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_W \cap \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_W)} : \text{unexplained firm wage growth}$$
$$+ \Delta \log \frac{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_E) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_E \cap \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_E)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_W) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_W \cap \tilde{\mathbf{R}}_W)} + \Delta \log \frac{\bar{h}(\mathbf{R}_E)}{\bar{h}(\mathbf{R}_W)}$$

where  $\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r$ : set of surviving firms in  $r \in E, W$


- Cannot explain why East firms grow faster ( $\sim$ “TFP shocks”)
- But can extract allocative gain

# Firm Survival




--◆-- East    --●-- West










# College Attainment by Year



# Cohort Share of College by Year












# College Attainment by Cohort











---◆--- East    ---●--- West

# College Attainment by Cohort



---◆--- East    ---●--- West










# College Attainment by Cohort



---◆--- East    ---●--- West




# College Attainment by Cohort












--◆-- East    --●-- West

# College Attainment by Cohort



# College Attainment by Cohort



# Growth Decomposition Formula

- For any time  $t$ , define the sets
  - $\tilde{\mathbf{T}}_r$ : all firms in  $r \in \{\text{East, West}\}$
  - $\mathbf{M}_r$ : set of workers who migrate out, or only appear in  $t + 1$
- Decompose firm component as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r)} = & \underbrace{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}_{Y_r: \text{ year effect}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_r \cap \tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_r \cap \tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}}_{\text{extensive}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{S}'_r) / \bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{S}_r) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}_{\text{regional shuffling}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \cap \mathbf{S}'_r) / \bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}'_r \cap \tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \cap \mathbf{S}_r) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_r \cap \tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{S}'_r) / \bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{S}_r) / \bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{S}}_r)}}}_{S_r: \text{ domestic shuffling}} \\
 & \times \underbrace{\frac{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \cap \mathbf{T}'_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \cap \mathbf{T}_r)}}{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \cap \mathbf{S}'_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \cap \mathbf{S}_r)}}}_{\text{firm entry/exit}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \setminus \mathbf{M}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \setminus \mathbf{M}_r)}}{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \cap \mathbf{T}'_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \cap \mathbf{T}_r)}}}_{\text{migrants}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r)}}{\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{R}'_r \setminus \mathbf{M}_r)}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{R}_r \setminus \mathbf{M}_r)}}}_{\text{migration}}
 \end{aligned}$$

# Component Decomposition

- For shuffling, note that for any set of workers  $\mathbf{A}$ ,

$$\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{A}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}}')}{\bar{\theta}(\mathbf{A})/\bar{\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{A}})} = \frac{\eta'(\mathbf{A}')}{\eta(\mathbf{A})}$$

captures  $\theta$ -size correlation







- Each component can be split into firm extensive and sub-shuffling gains, since for sets  $\mathbf{A} \subset \mathbf{B}$ :

$$\frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{B}')}{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{A}')} = \frac{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{B}})}{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}})} \cdot \frac{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{B}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{B}})}{\bar{\theta}'(\mathbf{A}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}})} = \frac{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{B}})}{\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}}')/\bar{\theta}'(\tilde{\mathbf{A}})} \cdot \frac{\eta'(\mathbf{B}')/\eta(\mathbf{B})}{\eta'(\mathbf{A}')/\eta(\mathbf{A})}$$

extensive gain                      shuffling gain



- Shuffling: domestic, firm entry/exit, foreign
- Not considered across borders: all soaked into migration

# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$





--◆-- East    --●-- West

# Growth Decomposition of $\theta$ : Levels



— Year Effect — +Shuffling — +Entry/Exit — +Foreign





# Intensive and Extensive Margins







- Migrants move to high  $\theta$  firms, but shuffling effect is negative







# Cohort Shuffling







# Cohort Seeding N' Weeding







# Migrants by Cohort



# Migration by Cohort







# Size and $\theta$ moments



---◆--- East    ---●--- West

# $\Delta\theta$ – Relative Gross Flows Correlation



- East in black
- No  $\theta$  (firm wage) change for firms with no flows

**Melitz, Marc J. and Sašo Polanec**, “Dynamic Olley-Pakes productivity decomposition with entry and exit,” *RAND Journal of Economics*, June 2015, 46 (2), 362–375.

**Olley, G. Steven and Ariel Pakes**, “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry,” *Econometrica*, 1996, 64 (6), 1263–1297.