

Bringing Peace from Above? State Capacity, Civil War De-Escalation and The Composition of the Stock of Military Equipment Nauro Campos, Martin Gassebner & Tobias Korn



Does Civil War (De)Escalation depend on military capacity? What are the correlates of de-escalation?

This paper:


- Investigate (de)escalation patterns in Dynamic Ordered Probit Setting (following Bluhm et al. 2016)
- Use detailed data on military inventory to measure state capacity more closely
- Look at landscape-effects and indiscriminate violence using disaggregated conflict data (Croicu & Sundberg 2017)

Research so far:

- Conflict Onset & Offset instead of (de)escalation (Blattman & Miguel 2010)
- State Capacity important in Civil Wars. But existing Proxies are limited (Besley & Persson 2014, Acemoglu et al. 2015)
- State Capacity and Landscape determine Civil War Duration & Indiscriminate Violence (Holtmann 2016, Schutte 2017)

Empirical Approach and Main Results

Weapon Categories and Variation




Empirical approach

$$c_{it}^* = x_{it}'\beta + h_{i,t-1}'\rho + (x_{it} \otimes h_{i,t-1})'\gamma + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where c_{it}^* is an ordered conflict measure, $x'_{\{it\}}$ include the model's regressors, and $h'_{\{i,t-1\}}$ incorporates the conflict history. λ_t are year fixed effects and μ_i indicate Mundlak FE.

Landscape and Indiscriminate Violence



The Role of Landscape

For 1SD increase in attack helicopter stock, fighting becomes 8 percentage points more likely to take place in urban area


DV = Main Battle Scene is Urban

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	urban	urban	urban	urban	urban	urban
attack heli	0.000537^{***}					0.000421**
	(0.0000326)					(0.000137)
light tanks		0.0000667				0.000173
		(0.000150)				(0.000264)
apc			0.0000129***			-0.0000268
			(0.00000390)			(0.0000150)
towed				-0.0000278***		-0.0000714
				(0.00000897)		(0.0000414)
self prop					-0.0000408***	-0.0000455
					(0.00000495)	(0.000124)
Observations	2286	2286	2286	2286	2286	2286
Countries	127	127	127	127	127	127

Conflict (De)Escalation

Raw Transition Probabilities of Conflict					
	Peace	Small Conflict	Armed Conflict	Civil War	
Peace	85.99	10.19	2.37	0.15	
Small C.	47.36	47.60	8.86	1.60	
Armed C.	14.86	15.25	62.36	8.11	
Civil War	2.84	5.67	31.21	57.45	

Notes: Raw Transition probabilities between four phases of civil war. Columns represent state in year t, rows represent state in year t-1. The Diagonal represents the probabilities of continuation.



Key Result: Only Attack Helicopters are associated with shorter conflicts

Marginal Effects of Attack Helicopters on Civil War (De)Escalation

From.To	Peace	Small.C.	Armed.C.	War
Peace	0.000211^{**}	-0.00013***	-0.000072^{**}	-0.000009
	(2.572014)	(-2.5998)	(-2.436801)	(-1.575445)
Small C.	0.00028^{**}	-0.000154^{**}	-0.000106**	-0.000021*
	(2.176214)	(-2.169251)	(-2.085058)	(-1.795892)
Armed C.	0.000266^{***}	-0.00009**	-0.000139**	-0.000036***
	(3.08925)	(-2.365337)	(-2.449635)	(-2.701665)
War	0.000457^{***}	0.000161	-0.000449^{***}	-0.000169^{***}
	(4.235745)	(0.827695)	(-4.98835)	(-3.781665)


Notes: The table reports marginal effects from an ordered probit estimation. We control for Military Expenditures, LogGDP, LogPopulation, Ethnic Tensions, Polity2 Score, International Wars, Internationalized Civil Wars, Civil War Threat, and all other Weapon Categories. We also include year fixed effects and country-means for variables following Mundlak (1978). T-Values in Parentheses. Significant at: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Controls: Major Fight Region, Rebel Deaths, Conflict-Dummy, Threat, LogPop, Military Expenditures, LogGDP, Polity2, Ethnic-ICRG, International War, Internationalized Civil War. Year and Country FE

Indiscriminate Violence: Attack Helicopters increase civilian casualties

	DV = Civil Deaths per Rebel + Government Deaths					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
attack heli	0.00272^{*} (0.00151)					0.00366^{*} (0.00205)
light topla		0.000000				0.00226



light tanks		-0.000890 (0.00134)				-0.00336 (0.00392)
apc			0.0000587^{*} (0.0000299)			$\begin{array}{c} 0.000400 \\ (0.000254) \end{array}$
towed				-0.0000697** (0.0000286)		$\begin{array}{c} 0.000495 \\ (0.000485) \end{array}$
self prop					-0.000191^{***} (0.0000550)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.000583 \\ (0.00185) \end{array}$
Observations	2286	2286	2286	2286	2286	2286
Countries	127	127	127	127	127	127
countries						

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