Common Ownership along the Supply Chain and Supplier Innovations

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Overview

- Suppliers' innovation performances are improved when financial institutions are holding both the suppliers and their customers.
- In particular, institutional common ownership increases suppliers' investment in innovation by mitigating hold-up issues between suppliers and customers, and enhances their innovation output by improving technological spillovers between suppliers and customers.
- I provide plausible evidence for causality using a difference-in-differences approach based on a quasi-natural experiment in the form of financial institution mergers and acquisitions.

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Motivation

Separate Ownership vs. Common Ownership

· A basic assumption in financial economics is that the ultimate goal of firm management is to maximize

Separate Ownership



e.g., lowering cost, developing new products, and acquiring higher market share.

Horizontal Common Ownership vs. Vertical Common Ownership

· Horizontal Common Ownership: competitors are held in the same portfolio



- Horizontal common ownership in airline industry will lead to higher prices of the airline tickets.
- More evidence for anticompetitive effect due to horizontal common ownership (e.g., He and Huang 2017,
- Azar et al. 2018). Regulatory Implication: Potential anti-trust scrutiny on the institutional investors (e.g., Elhauge 2015, Bebchuk and Hirst 2019).

When shareholders are holding multiple firms, the shareholders will aim to maximize the portfolio value instead of a single firm's value.

Common Ownership hareholders Maximize Shareholders value

mitigating conflicts of the firms in the same portfolio: (1) Reduce the competitions between

the firms,

(2) Enhance the collaborations between the firms



· Vertical Common Ownership: suppliers and their customers are held in the same portfolio



- Vertical common ownership can in prove the relationship between suppliers
- and their customers in the portfolio (Freeman 2019).

 My paper is the first to examine the impact of vertical common ownership on innovation activities.

Hypotheses Development

Hypothesis: Vertical common ownership could improve the suppliers' innovation through two potential channels:

1) Hold-up Mitigation Channel

- Hold-up problems happen when suppliers invest to produce relation-specific products to a customer:
- It could weaken the bargaining power of the supplier.
- The customer may act opportunistically to the supplier (e.g., push down the price, threaten to cancel the order).
- Potential hold-up issues lead to underinvestment in relation-specific investment/innovation by the supplier
- Joint asset ownership attenuates hold-up problems under conditions of asset specificity and ex-ante incomplete contracting. (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990).

2) Technological Spillover Channel

- Innovation information exchange can improve corporate innovation performance:
- · Manso (2011)'s principal-agent model
- · Timely feedback from customers to suppliers is one of the potential channels that improve suppliers' innovation performance(Chu et al. 2018).
- Common ownership of suppliers and customers can improve innovation information exchange between
- Common ownership increases cross citations between the patents assigned to held firms (Kostovetsky and Manconi 2020, Freeman 2019).

Data

Data Source

- Compustat Segments Customer: suppliers and their principal customers;
- Thomson Reuters 13F: institutional holdings;
- Kogan et al. (2017): patent application, patent market value,
- Capital IQ: mergers and acquisition of financial institutions:
- Compustat Segments: operating segments of each firm;
- Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) I/O Table: upstream and downstream industries.

Measure of Vertical Common Ownership: VCO

Step 2: Supplier level VCO Step 1: Firm-pair level VCO



Pairwise VCO: $\beta_{1i} \cdot \beta_{1c} + \cdots + \beta_{fi} \cdot \beta_{fc}$ $+ \cdots + \beta_{Fi} \cdot \beta_{Fc} = \sum_{f=1}^{F} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc}$



 $VCO: w_1 \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_{f1} + \dots + w_c \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc} + \dots + w_c \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc} + \dots + w_c \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc} + \dots + w_c \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fi} + \dots + w_c \cdot \sum_{f=1}^F \beta_{fi} \beta_$ $\cdots + w_{\mathbf{C}} \cdot \sum_{f=1}^{F} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc} = \sum_{c=1}^{C} w_{c} \sum_{f=1}^{F} \beta_{fi} \beta_{fc}$

Measure of Innovation Activities

- · Investment in innovation/Innovation input: R&D Intensity (R&D/sales)
- Quantity of innovation output: The number of patent applications at firm-year level
- Quality of innovation output: The average market value of patents at firm-year level


Results of Empirical Analyses

Baseline Regression

Vertical common ownership are positively associated with suppliers' investment in innovation, quantity and quality of innovation output

Identification

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of institutional investors as plausibly exogenous positive shocks:



- Exclusion Restriction: M&As of institutional investors are not mainly driven by the purpose to affect corporate
- I collect 51 events from year 1980 to 2010.

Channel Tests

- Hold-up Mitigation Channel
- The impact of vertical common ownership on suppliers' investment in innovation is less pronounced when the intensity of hold-up issues for suppliers is weak in the first place, in particular when:
 - suppliers are more vertically integrated, i.e., have more operating segments in the downstream industries
 - suppliers have relatively stronger bargaining power than customers
- · the input to customers has less asset specificity.
- · Technological Spillover Channel
 - The impact of vertical common ownership on suppliers' innovation output is stronger when technological spaces of suppliers and customers are close

Other Tests

- The impact of vertical common ownership on innovation input and quality of innovation output is stronger and more robust than that of horizontal common ownership.
- Firm-pair level analyses suggest that vertical common ownership can increase suppliers' relation-specific innovation.



Conclusion

- Institutional common ownership enhances suppliers' innovation performance by improving the relationship between suppliers and their customers.
- Regulators may need to think about the welfare-increasing effect resulting from common ownership before considering potential anti-trust scrutiny on common ownership