

### Why? Demography matters!

**Collosal** rise in life expectancy (longevity)

- $\uparrow$  % of individuals at peak wealth [transitory]

Wealth inequality ought to rise.

### Scenarios (calibrated to the US)

**Calibration** to match USA economy in 1960. Initial steady state in 1935. Transition with perfect foresight.

Variance of productivity shocks rises for subsequent birth cohorts.

Full model features changes in

- Longevity: historical mortality data + UN projection until 2100.
- Fertility: historical births data + US Census projection until 2060.
- Technology: TFP growth and labor share.
- Fiscal policy: tax rates, progressivity of labor income tax, govt. purchases, debt/GDP.

S1: No growth in life expectancy

- Mortality risk fixed at its 1960 level.
- Consistent (counterfactual) demographic structure.
- S2: Not seeing growth in life expectancy
  - Individuals perceive mortality rate as in 1960.
  - Demographic structure as in the data.

# What shapes the U.S. wealth distribution? Longevity vs income Inequality

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Two objectives:			Gover
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<ul> <li>Quantify the role of rise in LE for wealth inequ- ality in an OLG model.</li> </ul>			Redist
<ul> <li>Horse race between demography and policy.</li> </ul>			> prog > prog
+ Policy experiments.			
In the initial ste	ady st	ate	Mod
Wealth inequality driven k savings.	by income	risk and life-cycle	Indivi
Negiligible role of discount factor shocks and return			They
risk.	Cini	Top 10% share	
Discount factor shocks	0.21%	0.82%	Uncer
Income risk	28.05%	74.01%	> lifet
Datawa	0.000/	0.010/	/

28.63% 48.79% Life-cycle Contribution of various channels for steady state wealth inequality

#### Longevity and wealth inequality



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## del with multiple mechanisms of redistribution

rnment collects taxes and issues debt to finance government purchases, operates PAYG DB social security.

#### tribution via:

gressive labor income tax (as in Benabou, 2002) gressive social security (AIME).

## del with multiple sources of uncertainty

**duals** risk averse, choose consumption and leisure, retire at age 65 and receive pension.

pay Social Security contributions, labor income, capital income, and consumption taxes.

rtainty at all stages of life:

times with stochastic survival. nings due to idiosyncratic productivty shocks.

> capital incomes due to idiosyncratic discount rates. > capital incomes due to idiosyncratic returns.

**Production:** standard Cobb-Douglas function with capital and labor.

#### **Conclusions:** change needed?

Rise in longevity is a big part of the rise in wealth inequality.

Relatively minor role of changes in tax system (not shown here).

These forces will continue to operate.

Work in progress: what kinds of policy can affect wealth inequality?



> taxes on consumption and capital income are flat > govn't purchases do not enter utility