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Development Issues: Bangladesh and Beyond

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 6, 2023 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)

New Orleans Marriott, Preservation Hall Studio 7
Hosted By: Association for Economic and Development Studies on Bangladesh
  • Chairs:
    Reshmaan N. Hussam, Harvard Business School
  • Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, Yale University

Social Norms and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Bangladeshi Knitwear Factories

Laura Boudreau
,
Columbia University
Sakib Mahmood
,
BRAC Institute of Governance and Development

Abstract

In this project, we aim to test whether gender norms, in particular norms around communication between men and women, hinders information transmission inside the firm. Particularly, we argue that in certain settings, men are unwilling to receive productivity improving information from women, that this dynamic is costly to the firm, and that it limits women's career advancement. To test these hypotheses, we collaborate with Bangladeshi knitwear factories to conduct an incentivized survey experiment to examine workers' willingness to participate in information sharing sessions with workers of the same versus the opposite sex (versus an anonymous condition). We also implement a field experiment in which we inject information about productivity-enhancing practices into the firm through selected men and women. We then study how gender affects information diffusion across workers and quantify the downstream effects on trained and untrained workers' productivity. Finally, we explore methods to alleviate the impact of gender norms on information transmission in the factory.

Early Childhood Human Capital Formation at Scale

Johannes M. Bos
,
American Institutes for Research
Akib Khan
,
Uppsala University
Saravana Ravindran
,
National University of Singapore
Abu S. Shonchoy
,
Florida International University

Abstract

Can governments leverage existing service-delivery platforms to scale early childhood development (ECD) programs? We experimentally study a large-scale home-visiting intervention providing materials and counseling --- integrated into Bangladesh's national nutrition program without extra financial incentives for the service providers (SPs). We find SPs partially substituted away from nutritional to ECD counseling. Intent-to-treat estimates show the program improved child's cognitive (0.17 SD), language (0.23 SD), and socio-emotional developments (0.12-0.14 SD). Wasting and underweight rates also declined. Improved maternal agency, complementary parental investments, and higher take-up of the pre-existing nutrition program were important mechanisms. We estimate a sizeable internal rate-of-return of 19.6%.

A Signal to End Child Marriage: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh

Nina Buchmann
,
Stanford University
Erica Field
,
Duke University
Rachel Glennerster
,
University of Chicago
Shahana Nazneen
,
Save The Children-Bangladesh
Xiao Yu Wang
,
Duke University

Abstract

Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We introduce a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but preferred types have lower returns to delaying marriage. We show that in this environment the market might pool on early marriage even when everyone would benefit from delay. In this setting, offering a small incentive can delay marriage of all treated types and untreated non-preferred types, while programs that act directly on norms can unintentionally encourage early marriage. We test these theoretical predictions by experimentally evaluating a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls’ empowerment program designed to shift norms. As predicted, girls eligible for the incentive are 19% less likely to marry underage, as are nonpreferred type women ineligible for the incentive. Meanwhile, the empowerment program was successful in promoting more progressive gender norms but failed to decrease adolescent marriage and increased dowry payments.

Why We Fight

Christopher Blattman
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

Why We Fight draws on decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions to synthesize the root causes and remedies for war. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, there are common dynamics across all these levels. Why We Fight brings together the game theoretic literature with psychological and sociological accounts of prolonged intergroup violence. It argues that every answer to why groups fight is a reason that a society or its leaders ignored the costs of war, and that most of these explanations fit into one of 5 strategic or psychological explanations. Moreover, every successful path to peace rolls back at least one of these 5 reasons that bargaining broke down. The evidence shows that societies are surprisingly good at interrupting and ending violence—bit only when the treatment fits the diagnosis, and solves one of the 5 key logics of warfare.

Discussant(s)
Anik Ashraf
,
University of Munich
Reshmaan N. Hussam
,
Harvard Business School
Zaki Wahhaj
,
University of Kent
Atonu Rabbani
,
University of Dhaka
JEL Classifications
  • O1 - Economic Development
  • O2 - Development Planning and Policy