The Impact of Internal Oversight on Arrest and Use of Force



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Research question

- What is the effect of **internal oversight** on **police behavior**?
- **Internal oversight** = internal affairs investigations of complaints against police officers.

Motivation

- Only **51%** of civilians report having confidence in the police (*Brenan, 2021*).
- Significant interest in holding police officers accountable for misconduct, especially excessive use of force.
- Evidence that increased police reduce crime (e.g., Levitt, 1997) \rightarrow desire to find accountability methods that do not generate unintended consequences such as de-policing.
- Most common accountability method: internal affairs investigations.
- Scarce evidence on the impact of internal affairs investigations (Rozema & Schanzenbach, 2020).

Methodology

• **Regression discontinuity design:** compare the behavior of investigated

Results: Regression discontinuity design

Do investigated officers change their arrest and use of force behavior?

officers right before and after a complaint was filed.

 $Y_{cit} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \times 1(After_{cit}) + \alpha_2 \times Diff_{cit} + \alpha_3 \times 1(After_{cit}) \times$ $Diff_{cit} + u_{cit}$


<u>Note</u>: Diff = Call date – Complaint filing date; After = 1 if Diff ≥ 0 .

Identifying assumption: All other determinants of the outcome variables vary smoothly across the threshold.

• Difference-in-differences design: compare investigated officers to uninvestigated officers, before and after a complaint.

 $Y_{cit} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \times PostTreat_{cit} + Officer_i + MonthYear_t + u_{cit}$

Identifying assumption: Absent complaint, the behavior of officers who were investigated would have changed similarly to other officers who had never investigated.



• An internal affair investigation of a complaint *does not have a statistically significant effect* on arrest or use of force. The estimated effects are 0.6% and 5.5%, respectively.

Validity threats

Does their assignment change as a result of an investigation?

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Dispatched	Predicted Arrest	Predicted UOF
After Complaint	-0.00658	0.000228	-0.0000686
	(0.00571)	(0.00104)	(0.000105)
Ν	153324	168835	148354
Control Mean	0.245	0.0569	0.00200
Bandwidth	147.9	129.1	110.5

Standard errors in parentheses

<u>Table 2:</u> Effect of internal oversight on officer assignment

The results are not driven by an incapacitation effect nor a change in the types of

<u>Data</u>

Police data from one of the 30 largest US cities, by population:


- Internal affairs: complaints filed between 2014-2021, including officer names, allegation type, date filed, finding (sustained or not), disciplinary action.
- 911 calls for service: officer names, call description, priority, location.
- Outcome variables: arrest, use of force.

	(1)	(2) Sustained	(3) Not Sustained
	All Allegations	Sustained	Not Sustained
Unlawful Arrest/Detention	0.0361	0.00988	0.0647
	(0.187)	(0.0990)	(0.246)
Unlawful Search/Entry	0.128	0.106	0.151
	(0.334)	(0.308)	(0.358)
Excessive Use of Force	0.198	0.0123	0.402
	(0.399)	(0.111)	(0.491)
Discrimination	0.0129	0	0.0270
	(0.113)	(0)	(0.162)
Unprofessional/Verbal	0.0451	0.0148	0.0782
	(0.208)	(0.121)	(0.269)
Non-civilian Allegation	0.744	0.862	0.615
	(0.437)	(0.346)	(0.487)
Disciplined	0.518	0.985	0.00809
	(0.500)	(0.121)	(0.0897)
Observations	776	405	371


calls that the officers are dispatched to.


Heterogeneity

Do the results depend on the allegation type or punishment?



The results do not vary by allegation type nor by the disciplinary action taken. Ο **Results:** Difference-in-differences design





<u>Table 1</u>: Summary statistics (allegation types)

Conclusion

- Internal oversight *does not improve* officer behavior when dispatched to a call.
 - Can reject a reduction in the probability of use of force of more than 26%.
- Internal oversight does not have unintended consequences with respect to de-policing.
 - Can reject a reduction in the probability of arrest of more than 4% and an increase of more than 6%.

Want to know more? Email me or check out my website!

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References

- Levitt, Steven D, "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, June 1997, 87 (3), 270–290.
- Rozema, Kyle, and Max M. Schanzenbach. "Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations." Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations (August 7, 2020) (2020).