Choosing Pension Fund Investment Consultants

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Motivation

Individual and institutional investors rely on investment advisors and investment consultants when making investment decisions and evaluating financial products Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012; Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015; Spatt, 2020.

Investment consultants are important intermediaries in the asset management industry:

- They collectively advise \$19 trillion of U.S. public and private retirement assets .
- 96% of pension funds employ a general investment consultant.
- 44% of pension funds had a specialized consultant in 2020 (compared to 13% in 2001).
- Most investment managers are hired through a consultant.

Evidence shows that consultants' recommendations have a significant effect on flows, but they do not add value.

Why do pension funds increasingly rely on investment consultants?

Contribution and Research Design

- Prior research focused on the impact existing consultants have on allocation policy and performance Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez (2016); Jones and Martinez (2017); Jaiswal (2021); Andonov and Rauh (2022); Begenau, Liang, and Siriwardane (2023).
- We focus instead on consultant turnover, at the extensive margin:
 - What are the factors driving hiring/termination decisions? How are they selected?
 - Does consultant hiring lead to different allocations, improved performance, more access?

• Contribution:

- Discuss the disciplining mechanism for under-performing consultants;
- Show that the increased reliance on consultants may increase overall investment costs, may expose pension funds to more agency conflicts, and may increase flow correlation.

What is the Role of Investment Consultants?

O Specialized financial intermediaries that provide expertise:

- Intermediaries with informational advantage (Allen, 2001; Garleanu and Pedersen, 2018).
 - Board members have low financial skills (Andonov, Hochberg, and Rauh, 2018).
 - PFs face compensation constraints to attract talented managers (Dyck, Manoel, and Morse, 2022).

② Powerful gatekeepers to certain investments products and asset managers:

- Provide access to well-established network with asset managers (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Rossi et al, 2018). Especially important in alternatives (Sensoy, Wang and Weisbach, 2014).

Shield against headline risk:

- Money doctors (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2015).
- Shift of responsability (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Goyal and Wahal, 2008).

- Protection against public criticism and legal consequences (Sharpe, 1981; Van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen, 2008).

- Institutional Setting: Pension Funds and Investment Consultants.
- General Consultants.
- Specialized Consultants.
- Implications for expenses and flows.

Sample: U.S. Public Pension Funds, 2001–2020

Pension fund data:

- 173 pension funds (138 from PPD and 35 hand-collected).
- Pension plans aggregated at the retirement system level.
- Preqin data on investments in private funds.

Investment consultants data:

- Hand-collection: CAFRs, newswire, and RFPs.
- Separate consultants into general and specialized.
- 129 unique consultants after M&A adjustments.
- SEC Form ADV for consultant characteristics.

	Obs	iviean	StDev	
Panel A: Pension Fu	nd Chara	cteristic	S	
Assets (\$ bil)	3,135	18.799	34.219	
Return	3,135	0.064	0.103	
3Y Return	2,660	0.065	0.053	
%Equity	2,850	0.513	0.105	
%Fixed Income	2,850	0.261	0.072	
%Real Assets	2,850	0.091	0.060	
%Private Equity	2,850	0.063	0.055	
%Hedge Funds	2,850	0.048	0.067	
%Other Alternatives	2,850	0.019	0.055	
%Cash	2,850	0.004	0.023	

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Panel B: Governance and Internal Investing

Internal Mandate	3,135	0.035	0.105
%State Political	3,085	0.269	0.226
%Elected Participants	3,085	0.345	0.255
Investment Board	3,091	0.117	0.322

Classification of Investment Consultants

General investment consultant hired by almost all pension funds:


- Asset allocation, asset manager searches.
- Benchmarking and performance evaluation.
- Risk control, macroeconomic outlook.
- Security lending agents / custodian bank searches.
- Board and staff education, etc.


Specialized investment consultants hired usually in alternative assets:


- Asset managers (general partner) searches.
- Benchmarking and performance evaluation.

Investme	nt Consulta	ants
	#Unique	Obs Cons
All Consultants	129	6,085
General	52	2,978
Real Assets	35	1,162
Private Equity	40	1,150
Hedge Funds	16	386
Other	35	406


Target Asset Allocation and Hired Consultants







Concentration of General Consultants



- Institutional Setting: Pension Funds and Investment Consultants.
- General Consultants.
 - Turnover and Replacement.
 - Implications for Asset Allocation and Performance.
- Specialized Consultants.
- Implications for expenses and flows.


Replacement of General Consultants

A drop in the 5-year performance ranking from the 75th to 25th percentile leads to a 3.4 pp higher probability of hiring a new GC.

	Hiri (1)	ng New Gene (2)	ral Consultar (3)	nts (Unconditi (4)	onal Prob. = (5)	6%) (6)
3Y Return	-1.067*** [0.336]	(-/	(-)		(-)	(-)
5Y Return		-1.511*** [0.308]				
3Y Rank			-0.064*** [0.021]			
5Y Rank				-0.068*** [0.017]		
Low 3Y Rank					-0.131*** [0.033]	
High 3Y Rank					0.012 [0.038]	
Low 5Y Rank						-0.116** [0.040]
High 5Y Rank						-0.012 [0.042]
PF and board characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged Target Allocation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged Gap Allocation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year × Reporting Month FE Observations	Yes 2,306	Yes 2,058	Yes 2,306	Yes 2,058	Yes 2,306	Yes 2,058

New General Consultants: Impact on Asset Allocation

- Larger than average changes in asset allocation policy in the first two years of the mandate;
- Changes concentrated in equity and alternatives.



New General Consultants: Impact on Performance

Pre-hiring period: Significantly lower relative performance and ranking. **Post-hiring period:** Weak improvement in performance; possibly mean reversion.

	Pre-Hiring Period				Post-Hiring Period		
	-3 to 0	-2 to 0	-1 to 0	0	0 to 1	0 to 2	0 to 3
Relative Return	-1.033**	-0.522*	0.083	-0.021	-0.073	0.093	0.092
	[0.438]	[0.301]	[0.208]	[0.170]	[0.219]	[0.290]	[0.312]
Difference					-0.156	0.615	1.125**
					[0.290]	[0.372]	[0.525]
Rank	0.421	0.452	0.498	0.512	0.519	0.514	0.509
	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.023]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Difference					0.021	0.061**	0.088***
					[0.031]	[0.030]	[0.033]
Observations	137	148	166	171	166	148	137

- Institutional Setting: Pension Funds and Investment Consultants.
- General Consultants.
- Specialized Consultants.
 - First-time Hiring Decisions.
 - Scalability and Access.
 - Implications for Performance.
- Implications for expenses and flows.

Specialized Consultants: First-time Hiring Decisions

- PFs hire specialized consultants to access and scale up investments, they already have some expertise.
- 10 pp higher gap allocation \Rightarrow 1.8 percentage points higher probability to hire a specialized consultant in asset class j in year t.

	(1) Mean Dep	(2) endent Varia	(3)able = 0.022
$\text{\%Target}_{t-1} - \text{\%Actual}_{t-1}$	0.172***	0.180***	0.140**
$Actual_{t-1}$	[0.057]	[0.053] 0.039*	[0.061]
0/Torget		[0.021]	0.039*
$%$ Target $_{t-1}$			[0.021]
PF characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Board characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year $ imes$ Reporting Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,259	4,259	4,259

Specialized Consultants: Enable Access Through Their Networks

- A pension fund is 4 times more likely to invest in a PE fund if another pension fund using the same GC or PE consultant also invests in the PE fund
 - Opportunity set for each private fund and expand dataset (Goyal, Wahal, and Yavuz, 2022)
 - Flag those that are in the consultant network
 - Dep variable: 1 if the PF invest into the private fund

Network:	GC con	sultants	PE cons	ultants
Mean Dep.Variable	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005
Same consultant	0.014***	0.015***	0.020***	0.021***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
PE Fund Size	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Internal Mandate	-0.002*		-0.001	, ,
	(0.001)		(0.004)	
Investment Board	-0.002**		-0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
State-political	-0.002**		0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.002)	
Participant-elected	-0.001		0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.002)	
Public-appointed	-0.000		0.002	
	(0.001)		(0.002)	
PE-Fund FE	Yes		Yes	
Pension-Fund FE		Yes		Yes
Observations	3,299,868	3,308,198	1,820,739	1,822,742

Specialized Consultants: Scalability and Access to Rationed Funds

Scalability: \checkmark

 \sim 3 (2) more investments with a PE (RA) consultant

Access: X/√

- PFs are not able to avoid 1st time private funds
- PFs are able to invest into oversubscribed PE funds
- PFs are not able to be part of co-investments or separate accounts

Performance: X

SC have no impact on performance

	#Investments in Funds (1)	Overall First Time Fund (2)	Private Fund Size / Target Size (3)	Coinv Funds & Sep Accounts (4)
Mean Dep Var	8.091	0.082	1.131	0.050
PE Consultant	3.690***	0.003	0.018**	-0.006
	[0.813]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.010]
RA Consultant	1.628*	0.004	0.001	-0.002
	[0.804]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.008]
PF & board characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Target Asset Allocation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Board Members	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vintage-Year FE	Yes			
Fund-Type \times Vintage-Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes
Pension-Fund FE				
Observations	2,811	21,556	18,674	19,410

- Institutional Setting: Pension Funds and Investment Consultants.
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- Specialized Consultants.
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Selection of New General Consultants: SEC ADV Form

	Selection of a General Consultant (Unconditional Prob. $= 2.22\%$)				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Clients	0.003*** [0.000]	0.003*** [0.000]	0.003*** [0.000]	0.003*** [0.000]
Opportunity set: 48 unique	Discretionary AUM	0.008* [0.005]	0.014*** [0.005]	0.010** [0.005]	0.007* [0.004]
general consultants.	%PF Clients Same Size	0.023*** [0.003]			0.019*** [0.003]
Peer measures: Size,	%PF Clients Same State	0.039*** [0.006]			0.034*** [0.006]
geography, PFs focus.	Legal Issues		-0.010** [0.005]		-0.001 [0.004]
Results: PFs select large	PF Clients 11-25%			0.005 [0.009]	0.002 [0.008]
consultants that engage in asset management and advise	PF Clients 26-50%			0.018*** [0.006]	0.013** [0.006]
peers.	PF Clients 51-75%			0.025*** [0.006]	0.020*** [0.005]
	PF Clients >75%			0.004 [0.009]	0.003 [0.008]
	Year FE Pension Fund FE	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
	Observations	4,023	4,023	4,023	4,023

Compensation of General Consultants

• Pension funds do not substitute GC services by hiring SCs, but rather extend the range of contracted consulting services

• If location to PE up by 10 pp, the compensation of the GC up by \$0.157 million or 38% relative to the baseline compensation of \$0.411 million.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Mean Dep.	Var.=0.411	
#All Consultants	0.009			
	[0.023]			
#RA Consultants		0.059	0.060	0.059
		[0.046]	[0.043]	[0.042]
#PE Consultants		-0.065	-0.071	-0.071
		[0.045]	[0.049]	[0.048]
#HF Consultants		-0.017	-0.033	-0.033
		[0.041]	[0.033]	[0.033]
Fund Size	0.346*	0.332*	0.206	0.205
	[0.186]	[0.186]	[0.138]	[0.135]
%Equity	0.821	0.795	0.661	0.661
	[0.582]	[0.572]	[0.476]	[0.474]
%Real Assets	0.837**	0.814**	0.622*	0.626*
	[0.377]	[0.348]	[0.318]	[0.314]
%Private Equity	1.565**	1.636**	1.300**	1.294**
	[0.709]	[0.724]	[0.573]	[0.562]
%Hedge Funds	2.129*	2.122*	1.533*	1.547*
	[1.042]	[1.034]	[0.740]	[0.763]
%Other Alternatives	1.342**	1.362**	1.180**	1.183**
	[0.571]	[0.580]	[0.466]	[0.467]
3Y Return			-0.613	
			[1.072]	
3Y Rank				-0.017
				[0.038]
Pension Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year \times Reporting Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	965	965	864	864

Summary

What is the role of investment consultants in PFs?

- GC terminated in case of low peer-adjusted performance \implies disciplining mechanism.
- PFs with existing allocation hire SC to implement asset allocation changes in private markets \implies **no evidence of limited experience**.
- No evidence that investment consultants are informed intermediaries.
- Results are more consistent with limited access and scalability in alternative assets, and shield against headline risk reasons.

Implications for asset flows and expenses:

- Increasing reliance and concentration of investment consultants.
- Consultants affect asset allocation but can provide similar recommendations across PFs.
- PFs favor consultants that advise peers and combine advisory and asset management services
- Consultant expenditure grows with the sophistication of the allocation policy.