


Gender Socialization and Stock Market Participation

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Abstract

We examine how childhood gender socialization influences the gender gap in stock market participation. Using sibling fixed effects to exploit within-family variation, we find that individuals raised in more male-dominated households, where fathers have higher income or education than mothers, are more likely to invest in stocks. This relationship is stronger for men than for women, indicating that childhood socialization may constrain girls to traditionally feminine tasks, limiting their opportunities to learn about investing. We provide evidence that the primary mechanism driving this relationship is the internalization of masculine characteristics, rather than financial literacy or risk tolerance.

Results



Hypotheses

- Gender roles and attitudes can be shaped by the environment (Bussey and Bandura, 1999).
- Parents are role models for children to observe, learn, and imitate (Black et al., 2017).
- Parents' modeling of gendered behaviors are predictors of children's gender-role attitudes (Halpern and Perry-Jenkins, 2016).
- Traditional views classify business and finance as male-dominated areas (White et al., 1989).
- H1: Growing up in more male-dominated households, where the father has a higher income or more education than the mother, is positively associated with equity participation and allocation in adulthood.
- Gender differences in the socialization process (e.g., Bussey and Bandura, 1999; Hyde, 2014).
- Parents reinforce gender socialization by rewarding or discouraging behaviors that align with gender norms.
- Gender norms tend to motivate boys to develop masculine behaviors (Leaper and Friedman, 2007).
- Gender norms constrain girls to feminine functions (Leaper, 2005).
- H2: The positive effect of growing up in a male-dominated household on stock market

	(0.0105)	(0.0113)	(0.0104)	(0.0113)	(0.0156)	(0.0173)	(0.0155)	(0.0171)
Married	0.0474***	0.0472***	0.0470***	0.0476***	-0.0473***	-0.0385**	-0.0475***	-0.0391**
	(0.0070)	(0.0078)	(0.0070)	(0.0078)	(0.0148)	(0.0158)	(0.0148)	(0.0157)
Family size	-0.0171***	-0.0132***	-0.0171***	-0.0134***	-0.0134**	-0.0128*	-0.0132**	-0.0125*
	(0.0033)	(0.0038)	(0.0033)	(0.0038)	(0.0062)	(0.0067)	(0.0062)	(0.0068)
Female	-0.0145	-0.0125	-0.0141	-0.0118	-0.0323**	-0.0226	-0.0293**	-0.0217
	(0.0093)	(0.0105)	(0.0094)	(0.0105)	(0.0148)	(0.0139)	(0.0146)	(0.0136)
White	0.0574***	0.0613***	0.0582***	0.0620***	0.0484	0.0893**	0.0496	0.0901**
	(0.0143)	(0.0174)	(0.0143)	(0.0174)	(0.0352)	(0.0444)	(0.0354)	(0.0445)
Black	-0.0440***	-0.0430**	-0.0441***	-0.0422**	0.0023	0.0454	0.0039	0.0453
	(0.0157)	(0.0192)	(0.0156)	(0.0192)	(0.0439)	(0.0531)	(0.0440)	(0.0533)
Log(Income)	0.0250***	0.0238***	0.0247***	0.0237***	-0.0077	-0.0065	-0.0078	-0.0071
	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.0050)	(0.0051)	(0.0050)	(0.0051)
Log(Wealth)	0.0936***	0.0918***	0.0934***	0.0917***	1.252	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000	01200000000	and the second
	(0.0026)	(0.0029)	(0.0026)	(0.0029)				
State-Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sibling fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,914	29,752	33,914	29,752	6,797	6,040	6,797	6,040
R-squared	0.3831	0.3977	0.3846	0.3980	0.4691	0.4813	0.4697	0.4820

> Red rectangles represent the results for H1; Green rectangles represent the results for H2.


Mechanisms

• In this section, we examine several potential mechanisms that may underlie the effect of growing up in a male-dominated household on adult investment behavior, such as financial literacy and risk tolerance. In addition, we test whether learned masculine characteristics may drive our findings.

	Equity Participation			Equity-wealth Ratio			
	Full Sample (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Whole (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	
Direct Path:							
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0570***	0.0729***	0.0167	0.0281***	0.0336***	0.0062	
	(0.0185)	(0.0210)	(0.0249)	(0.0095)	(0.0117)	(0.0188)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0494**	0.0521**	0.0251	0.0332**	0.0304**	-0.0026	
	(0.0216)	(0.0234)	(0.0385)	(0.0135)	(0.0140)	(0.0260)	
Mediated Path:	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow FinLit)$	0.0599	0.0434	0.0100	-0.0301	-0.0322	-0.0207	
	(0.0597)	(0.0664)	(0.0582)	(0.0358)	(0.0362)	(0.0362)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow FinLit)$	0.0321	-0.0089	0.0724	0.0649	0.0723	0.1725*	
	(0.0544)	(0.0634)	(0.0653)	(0.0636)	(0.0682)	(0.0889)	
$Path(FinLit(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0003	-0.0272	-0.0438	-0.0059	-0.0036	-0.0081	
	(0.0111)	(0.0264)	(0.0294)	(0.0174)	(-0.0180)	(-0.0279)	
$Path(FinLit(Edu) \rightarrow Equity$	0.0022	-0.0081	0.0099	-0.0194	-0.0265	0.0007	
	(0.0130)	(0.0261)	(0.0200)	(0.0185)	(0.0205)	(0.035)	
Total Indirect Effect (x 10 ⁻⁴):							
Path(ChildImbal(Inc)→FinLit)× Path(FinLit→Equity)	0.1797	1.7759	4.3800	1.8000	1.2000	1.7000	
	(6.6510)	(2.2000)	(25.6600)	(5.5555)	(6.0000)	(7.0000)	
Path(ChildImbal(Edu)→FinLit)× Path(FinLit→Equity)	0.7062	-0.6370	-7.1676	-12.5906	-2.0000	1.2000	
	(4.341)	(-1.8500)	(-15.8600)	(17.7596)	(24.0000)	(6.0000)	
Controls and fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	8,852	8,852	8,852	2,398	2,398	2,398	

	Equity Participation			Equity-wealth Ratio			
	Full Sample (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Whole (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	
Direct Path:	1000	and a			1.000		
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0570***	0.0741***	0.0170	0.0269***	0.0318***	0.0104	
	(0.0184)	(0.0232)	(0.0270)	(0.0098)	(0.0104)	(0.0176)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0489**	0.0599***	0.0403*	0.0309**	0.0367***	0.0019	
	(0.0244)	(0.0277)	(0.0219)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0238)	
Mediated Path:							
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow RiskTol)$	0.0048	-0.0212	0.0679	-0.0566	-0.0846	0.0690	
	(0.0563)	(0.0629)	(0.0591)	(0.0590)	(0.0572)	(0.0750)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow RiskTol)$	0.0496	0.0108	0.0876	-0.0900*	-0.0828	0.0148	
	(0.0530)	(0.0777)	(0.0743)	(0.0539)	(0.05483)	(0.0779)	
$Path(RiskTol(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0105	0.0229	0.0014	-0.0081	0.0045	0.0105	
	(0.0123)	(0.0165)	(0.0174)	(-0.0791)	(0.0250)	(0.0178)	
Path(RiskTol(Edu)→ Equity	0.0131	0.0201	0.0053	0.0007	0.0144	0.0019	
	(0.0133)	(0.0177)	(0.0180)	(0.0261)	(0.0300)	(0.0238)	
Total Indirect Effect(x 10 ⁻⁴) :							
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow RiskTol) \times Path(RiskTol \rightarrow Equity)$	0.5040	-4.8548	0.9506	1.3400	-3.8070	7.0000	
	(5.9409)	(14.8228)	(1.8435)	(7.0000)	(21.0000)	(14.0000)	
Path(ChildImbal(Edu)→RiskTol)× Path(RiskTol→Equity)	6.4976	2,1708	4.6428	1.10000	1.1900	3.0000	
	(9.5772)	15.7343	(16.2523)	(16.2523)	(26.0000)	(4.000)	
Controls and fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	8,852	8,852	8,852	2,398	2,398	2,398	

participation and allocation is stronger for men than for women.



Data and Methodology

✤ Data:

The data we used to test our hypotheses is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).

- Allows us to measure parental gender imbalance when sample respondents are children (1969-1997).
- Allows observation of investment behavior as well as other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics when those children become adults (1999-2021). **Variables:**
- **Dependent variables:**

Equity participation: equals 1 if an individual directly invests in stocks, and 0 otherwise

Equity-wealth ratio: value of equity divided by total wealth

Panel C: Masculine Characteristics

	Equity Participation			Equity-Wealth Ratio			
	Full Sample (1)	Men (2)	Women (3)	Full Sample (4)	Men (5)	Women (6)	
Direct Path:							
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0475***	0.0652***	0.0115	0.0195*	0.0434***	0.0126	
	(0.0174)	(0.0205)	(0.0248)	(0.0114)	(0.0161)	(0.0175)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0557**	0.0559**	0.0214	0.0382**	0.0324*	0.0053	
	(0.0226)	(0.0256)	(0.0259)	(0.0150)	(0.0170)	(0.0265)	
Mediated Path:	10000	182110000	10000000000000000000000000000000000000	1.000000000	180900000	N 3005600 00230	
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow Masc)$	0.2921***	0.2933^{***}	0.2891***	0.4578***	0.4801***	0.3584**	
	(0.0734)	(0.0746)	(0.0881)	(0.1330)	(0.1376)	(0.1493)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow Masc)$	0.1936**	0.1966**	0.0944	0.2479**	0.2749***	-0.094***	
	(0.0950)	(0.0953)	(0.1210)	(0.1087)	(0.0965)	(0.0194)	
$Path(Masc(Inc) \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0324**	0.0539***	0.0046	0.0200*	0.0348*	-0.0224	
	(0.0137)	(0.0150)	(0.0174)	(0.0121)	(0.0180)	(0.0243)	
$Path(Masc(Edu) \rightarrow Equity$	0.0451***	0.0638***	0.0209	0.0252*	0.0264*	0.0114	
	(0.0172)	(0.0236)	(0.0170)	(0.0142)	(0.0160)	(0.0237)	
Total Indirect Effect:					11 C		
$Path(ChildImbal(Inc) \rightarrow Masc) \times Path(Masc \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0095**	0.0158**	0.0013	0.0092	0.0167	-0.0080	
	(0.0046)	(0.0078)	(0.0050)	(0.0069)	(0.0099)	(0.0093)	
$Path(ChildImbal(Edu) \rightarrow Masc) \times Path(Masc \rightarrow Equity)$	0.0087*	0.0125*	0.0020	0.0062	0.0073	-0.0010	
	(0.0052)	(0.0074)	(0.0030)	(0.0044)	(0.0051)	(0.0017)	
Controls and fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	8,832	8,832	8,832	2,398	2,398	2,398	

> We find that childhood gender imbalance is significantly related only to learned masculine characteristics, which, in turn, impacts men's and women's equity participation and allocation to different degrees.

Contributions

• Independent variables (Duchin et al., 2021): Parental income imbalance and parental education imbalance ***** Methodology:

Yit = β1ChildImbal_i + γControls_{it} + ζ_{st} + δ_c + η_a + θ_f + ϵ_{it} (1)Yit = β 1ChildImbali + β 2Femalei + β 3(Femalei ×ChildImbali)+ γ Controlsit+ ζ st + δ c + η a + $\theta_{f} + \epsilon_{it}$ (2)

β1 + β3 gives the net effect of gender imbalance on investment behavior for women

- In addition to financial literacy and risk tolerance, we provide a novel explanation for the gender gap in stock market participation: the difference in learned masculine characteristics.
- We provide evidence that gender socialization influences children's stock market participation later in life, highlighting the impact of family gender role attitudes on children's financial behaviors.

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