

The After Party: Electoral Consequences of Party Bans

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Abstract

Political parties are often banned to suppress their political presence.


We argue that political party bans may have unintended consequences. This is because:

1. Many party bans are incomplete. Parties can come back.
2. Voters continue to vote for similar parties.
3. Other parties shift their platforms to capture these voters.

In equilibrium, this increases the probability that banned factions are represented in government.

Two case studies


An Incomplete Ban: **Belgium 2004**




A Complete Ban: **Lower Saxony, 1952**



The Neo-Nazi SRP is banned in 1952



1951




1955

leads to *only* German Party PM ever.

Data

We construct a comprehensive database of political party bans across the world since 1900. Total: 1,357 bans over 120 countries.




Most party bans are incomplete.

Voter Demand (for similar parties)

$$y_{ct} = \beta \text{ pre-ban votes}_{f(ct)} \times I[t \text{ is post-ban}] + \alpha_c + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

DiD strategy: outcome is voteshare for banned party's faction in country c at time t . Plot β across regime types.



In mature democracies, banning a party has no effect on the faction's performance. Autocrats divert 50% of votes.

Party Supply (of extreme platforms)

$$y_{ptn} = \beta I[p \text{ in banned faction}] \times I[t \text{ is post-ban}] + \alpha_p + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{ptn}$$

DiD strategy: outcome is similarity of n -gram n used by party p at time t to the banned party's manifesto.

	Distinctiveness (1)	TF-IDF (2)
Banned Faction \times Post-Ban	0.1640*** (0.0255)	0.4695*** (0.0855)
R ²	0.06771	0.02215
Observations	59,407	59,407
Ban \times Faction fixed effects	✓	✓
Ban \times Post fixed effects	✓	✓

In Equilibrium (banned factions win)

$$y_{fct} = \beta I[f \text{ is banned faction}] \times I[t \text{ is post-ban}] + \alpha_{fc} + \gamma_{ft} + \varepsilon_{fct}$$

DiD strategy: outcome is whether faction f is in government.

	Leave-Out Vote Share (1)	Represented in Government (2)
Banned Faction \times Post-Ban	7.764*** (1.490)	0.0729** (0.0294)
R ²	0.93845	0.49345
Observations	2,037	2,037
Outcome Mean	11.78	0.0309
Cluster	Ban \times Faction	Ban \times Faction
Ban \times Faction FEs	✓	✓
Ban \times Post FEs	✓	✓

Also ask us about: within party candidate extremeness (Belgium), Nazi language in parliamentary speech (Lower Saxony), structural estimates and counterfactual vote shares (Lower Saxony).