Online Appendix for<br>"Testing the Waters: Behavior across Participant Pools" by Erik Snowberg and Leeat Yariv

## A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Demographic Attributes of MTurk Compared to a Representative Sample

|  | Representative | MTurk |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Age |  |  |
| 18-25 | 16\% | 23\% |
| 26-54 | 53\% | 70\% |
| 55-64 | 18\% | $6 \%$ |
| $65+$ | 13\% | 1\% |
| Race / Ethnicity |  |  |
| White | 71\% | 74\% |
| Black | 12\% | 8\% |
| Hispanic | 8\% | 6\% |
| Asian | 5\% | 7\% |
| Education |  |  |
| High School or Less | 20\% | 10\% |
| Some College | 23\% | 30\% |
| Associates Degree | 10\% | 11\% |
| Bachelors Degree | 31\% | 38\% |
| Post Graduate Degree | 16\% | 12\% |
| Employment Status |  |  |
| Employed | 54\% | 67\% |
| Unemployed | 8\% | 10\% |
| Out of Labor Force | 14\% | 11\% |
| Online Worker | $6 \%$ | 10\% |
| Retired | 18\% | $2 \%$ |
| Income |  |  |
| Less than \$20K | 17\% | 32\% |
| Between \$20K and \$30K | 14\% | 16\% |
| Between \$30K and \$50K | 19\% | 23\% |
| Between \$50K and \$70K | 19\% | 13\% |
| Between \$ 70 K and \$ 150 K | 25\% | 14\% |
| More than \$150K | $6 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Marital Status |  |  |
| Single | 32\% | 50\% |
| Partnered | $53 \%$ | 42\% |
| Seperated / Divorced / Widowed | 14\% | 9\% |
| N | 1,000 | 995 |

Table A.2: Attributes of Selected Prior Studies

|  | Study | Tasks | Incentives? | Design | Participant Pool | N | Results |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Arechar, Gchter, and Molleman (2018) | Public Goods | Yes | Within <br> Participant | MTurk; Harvard, and Yale | 320 | Similar behavior across samples, students somewhat less cooperative |
|  | Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) | Demographics; Heuristics and Biases | No | N/A | MTurk | 3,240 | MTurk fairly close to representative, experiments by and large replicate |
|  | Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2013) | Trust Game | Yes | N/A | Zurich, U. of Zurich | 1,296 | Similar behavior across samples, students somewhat less generous |
|  | Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2011) | PD, Priming, and Framing | Yes | N/A | MTurk and Harvard | 567 | Three experimental treatments replicate on Mturk |
|  | Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) | Heuristics and Biases | No | N/A | MTurk, Midwestern Students, Others | 409 | MTurk fairly close to representative, experiments by and large replicate |
| $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & \tilde{\sim} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & . \sharp \\ & . \ddot{0} \\ & .0 \\ & \ddot{U} \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | Cleave, Nikiforakis, and Slonim (2013) | Trust Game and Risk Elicitation | Yes | Within <br> Participant | Int. Micro. Students at U. of Melbourne | 1,173 | Little selection in lab participation |
|  | Harrison, Lau, and Rustrm (2009) | Risk Elicitation | Yes | N/A | Denmark | 253 | Little selection in lab participation, show-up fees $\rightarrow$ more risk-averse |
|  | Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2013) | Charitable Giving | Yes | N/A | U. of Zurich | 16,666 | Participation in lab experiments not associated with donation patterns |
| U0U1000000 | Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998) | Dictator Giving | Yes | Between <br> Participant | Penn State | 110 | Introducing anonymity in Lab does not alter dictator giving |
|  | Hoffman et al. (1994) | Dictator Giving | Yes | Between Participant | U. of Arizona | 269 | Double-blind dictator games yield more selfish behavior |
|  | Laury, Walker, and Williams (1995) | Public Goods | Yes | Between Participant | Indiana U. Students | 64 | Double-blind public good games yield similar deviations from NE |
|  | Current Study | Risk, Cognitive, Dictator Giving, PD, Competition, etc. | Yes | Within and Between Participant | Caltech and UBC Students, MTurk, United States | 4,280 | Differences in response levels, Limited selection into lab, No observer effect. |

Table A.3: Percent of Variance due to Noise in Different Samples.

|  | Spring 2015 CCS |  |  |  | SSEL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Everyone | Participant | Weighted <br> Participant | SSEL <br> Participant | Participant (In Lab) |
| Risky Projects | $\begin{gathered} 43 \% \\ (2.9 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 48 \% \\ (4.6 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 47 \% \\ (6.6 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 41 \% \\ (8.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45 \% \\ (8.6 \%) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risky Urns | $\begin{gathered} 25 \% \\ (2.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21 \% \\ (3.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19 \% \\ (6.5 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24 \% \\ (6.7 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 52 \% \\ (9.0 \%) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator Giving | $\begin{aligned} & 15 \% \\ & (1.8 \%) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15 \% \\ (2.8 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14 \% \\ (4.4 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18 \% \\ (5.9 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23 \% \\ (6.5 \%) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Race | $\begin{aligned} & 42 \% \\ & (2.8 \%) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 41 \% \\ (4.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 46 \% \\ (12.4 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 30 \% \\ (7.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 40 \% \\ (8.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Gender | $\begin{gathered} 39 \% \\ (2.8 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 40 \% \\ (4.3 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 37 \% \\ (10.7 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 54 \% \\ (9.2 \%) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 58 \% \\ (9.4 \%) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 819 | 350 | 350 | 96 | 96 |



Online Appendix-4

Figure A.2: Correlations across the Representative Sample, MTurk, and CCS (5\% level).


Figure A.3: Correlations across the Representative Sample, MTurk, and CCS (1\% level).

|  |  |  | ${ }^{(8)}$ | $20^{200^{00}}$ |  | $00^{00^{\text {cicis }}}$ | $0^{0}$ | $00^{\left(00^{(2)}\right.}$ |  | $y^{0}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Risk Aversion |  | 0+- | 0 | 0 | -0- | 00- | - | 0-- | 0 | 0 | 0-- |
| Discounting ( $\delta$ ) | 0+- |  | 0-0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | +00 |
| Dictator | 0 | 0-0 |  | - | - | 0-0 | 0+0 | 00- | 0 | 0 | 0-0 |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | 0 | 0 | - |  | 0++ | ++0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 00+ |
| Lying | -0- | 0 | - | 0++ |  | 0+0 | +0+ | 0++ | 0 | 0 | 0++ |
| Cognitive | 00- | + | 0-0 | ++0 | 0+0 |  | 0-0 | 00+ | 0 | 0 | + |
| Confidence | - | 0 | $0+0$ | 0 | +0+ | 0-0 |  | 0++ | 0 | 00+ | 0++ |
| Compete | 0-- | 0 | 00- | 0 | 0++ | 00+ | 0++ |  | 0 | 00+ | 0++ |
| IAT Race | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | + | 0 |
| IAT Gender | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 00+ | 00+ | + |  | 00+ |
| Male | 0-- | +00 | 0-0 | 00+ | 0++ | + | 0++ | 0++ | 0 | 00+ |  |



Figure A.5: Correlations across Everyone, Participants, and Weighted Participants (5\% Level)

|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 00^{80} \\ & 00^{20} \\ & 00^{20} \end{aligned}$ |  | $x^{0,0^{3}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Risk Aversion |  | - | +00 | -00 | -00 | -00 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| Discounting ( $\delta$ ) | - |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dictator | +00 | 0 |  | - | - | 0-- | 0-- | -0- | 00+ | 0 | -00 |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | -00 | 0 | - |  | + | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | + |
| Lying | -00 | 0 | - | + |  | +00 | +00 | + | 0 | 0++ | +00 |
| Cognitive | -00 | $+$ | 0-- | 0 | +00 |  | +0+ | +0+ | -00 | 0 | + |
| Confidence | - | 0 | 0-- | $+$ | +00 | +0+ |  | + | 0 | +00 | $+$ |
| Compete | - | 0 | -0- | 0 | $+$ | +0+ | $+$ |  | 0 | +00 | ++0 |
| IAT Race | 0 | 0 | 00+ | 0 | 0 | -00 | 0 | 0 |  | + | 0 |
| IAT Gender | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0++ | 0 | +00 | +00 | + |  | + |
| Male | - | 0 | -00 | $+$ | +00 | + | $+$ | ++0 | 0 | $+$ |  |

Figure A.6: Correlations across Everyone, Participants, and Weighted Participants (1\% Level)


Figure A.7: Correlations on the CCS and in the Lab (10\% Level)


Table A.4: Response Time to CCS Solicitation is not Indicative of Measured Behaviors.

|  | Samples |  |  |  | Differences |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Everyone <br> (E) | One <br> Email | One <br> Week <br> (W) | More Than One Week (M) | E-W | E-M |
| First Risky Project (out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 61 \\ (2.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.74 \\ & (1.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.4 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Risky Project (out of 200) | $\begin{gathered} 143 \\ (2.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 141 \\ (3.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 142 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 145 \\ (3.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.2 \\ (3.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.2 \\ & (4.1) \end{aligned}$ |
| First Risky Urn (20 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (0.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (0.73) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (0.64) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 60 \\ (0.88) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.82) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.56 \\ (1.0) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Risky Urn (30 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (0.73) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (0.89) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.02 \\ & (1.5) \end{aligned}$ |
| Qualitative Risk Aversion | $\begin{gathered} 5.8 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.7 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.7 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.18 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ |
| Monthly Discount Rate ( $\delta$ ) | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.76 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.78 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Dictator Game (given out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (0.84) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.35 \\ & (1.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.65 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Dictator Game (given out of 300) | $\begin{gathered} 38 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 37 \\ (3.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 38 \\ (3.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 38 \\ (3.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.03 \\ & (3.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (4.6) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Doubled | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.75 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.4 \\ (2.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Halved | $\begin{gathered} 9.0 \\ (0.68) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.8 \\ (1.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.8 \\ (0.85) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.3 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.20 \\ & (1.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.36 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prisoner's Dilemma (\% dominant strat.) | $\begin{gathered} 68 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 69 \\ (2.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 69 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 66 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.76 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.39 \\ & (2.9) \end{aligned}$ |
| Reported Heads (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Switches (out of 9) | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.4 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ |
| Raven's Matrices (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ |
| CRT <br> (out of 3) | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.6 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.05 \\ & (0.06) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ |
| Confidence in Guesses | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.2 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ |
| Competition (\% competing) | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 29 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 31 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 37 \\ (2.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.1 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -3.91 \\ (3.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Race | $\begin{gathered} 81 \\ (5.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 83 \\ (8.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 82 \\ (6.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 80 \\ (9.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.91 \\ (8.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (11) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Gender | $\begin{gathered} 95 \\ (5.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 81 \\ (8.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 84 \\ (6.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 115 \\ (10.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11 \\ (9.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -20 \\ & (12) \end{aligned}$ |
| Percent Male | $\begin{gathered} 62 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 60 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 60 \\ (2.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 65 \\ (2.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -3.7 \\ (3.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 819 | 374 | 530 | 289 | - | - |

Notes: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *},{ }^{*}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level, with standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix-11

Table A.5: Those that wait more than a week to participate are less likely to go to the lab.

|  | Samples |  |  |  | Differences |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Everyone <br> (E) | One <br> Email | One <br> Week <br> (W) | More Than One Week (M) | E-W | E-M |
| Percent Lab Participant | $\begin{gathered} 43 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 47 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 47 \\ (2.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 35 \\ (2.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.4 \\ & (2.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 8.1^{* *} \\ & (3.3) \end{aligned}$ |
| Avg. Lab Sessions | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.85 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.24 \\ & (0.15) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.44^{* * *} \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 819 | 374 | 530 | 289 | - | - |

Notes: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *},{ }^{*}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level, with standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix-13

Table A.6: There are few significant differences based on the amount of lab participation.

|  | By Partcipation |  |  | Differences |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All <br> Participants <br> (P) | Below <br> Median <br> (B) | Above <br> Median <br> (A) | $\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{B}$ | $\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{A}$ | B-A |
| First Risky Project (out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 55 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 52 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.9 \\ & (3.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.4 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.4 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Risky Project (out of 200) | $\begin{gathered} 139 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 144 \\ (4.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 132 \\ (4.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.1 \\ & (5.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.4 \\ (5.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.5^{*} \\ & (6.4) \end{aligned}$ |
| First Risky Urn (20 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 58 \\ (0.77) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 58 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 58 \\ (1.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.11 \\ & (1.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Risky Urn (30 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.05 \\ & (2.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.10 \\ (2.2) \end{gathered}$ |
| Qualitative Risk Aversion | $\begin{gathered} 5.7 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.7 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.8 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.09 \\ & (0.22) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.16 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ |
| Monthly Discount Rate ( $\delta$ ) | $\begin{gathered} 0.78 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.78 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Dictator Game (given out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 12 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.4 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.9 \\ & (2.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.3 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4.2^{*} \\ & (2.3) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Dictator Game (given out of 300) | $\begin{gathered} 32 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 36 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (4.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -4.4 \\ (5.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (5.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.8 \\ (6.2) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Doubled | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.35 \\ & (3.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.63 \\ & (3.6) \end{aligned}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Halved | $\begin{gathered} 7.8 \\ (0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.2 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.9 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.5 \\ & (1.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 3.3^{*} \\ & (1.8) \end{aligned}$ |
| Prisoner's Dilemma (\% dominant strat.) | $\begin{aligned} & 67.1 \\ & (2.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 65.9 \\ & (3.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 68.7 \\ & (3.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (3.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.6 \\ & (4.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.8 \\ & (4.7) \end{aligned}$ |
| Reported Heads (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 3.4 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.5 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.11 \\ & (0.11) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Switches (out of 9) | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.4 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.6 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.18) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.13 \\ & (0.20) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.22) \end{gathered}$ |
| Raven's Matrices (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.02 \\ & (0.11) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ |
| CRT <br> (out of 3) | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ |
| Confidence in Guesses | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.03 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ |
| Competition (\% competing) | $\begin{gathered} 34 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 34 \\ (3.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ (3.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.64 \\ (4.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.81 \\ & (4.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (5.1) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Race | $\begin{gathered} 87 \\ (8.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 90 \\ (12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 83 \\ (11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -3.2 \\ (15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.1 \\ (17) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Gender | $\begin{gathered} 85 \\ (8.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 73 \\ (10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100 \\ (14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12 \\ (13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -15 \\ & (17) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -27 \\ & (17) \end{aligned}$ |
| Percent Male | $\begin{gathered} 55 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 54 \\ (4.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.5 \\ & (4.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (4.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.4 \\ (5.4) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 350 | 195 | 155 | - | - | - |

Notes: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *},{ }^{*}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level, with standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix-14

Table A.7: Re-weighting the CCS to be demographically representative does not change conclusions.

|  | Weightings |  |  | Differences |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Re-Weighted |  |  |  |  |
|  | Unweighted <br> (U) | Gender <br> (G) | Race (R) | U-G | U-R |
| First Risky Project (out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 64 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.3 \\ (2.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.5 \\ & (2.8) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Risky Project (out of 200) | $\begin{gathered} 143 \\ (2.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 138 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 155 \\ (4.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.5 \\ (3.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -12^{* *} \\ (4.7) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Risky Urn (20 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (0.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (0.84) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 59 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.46 \\ & (1.2) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Risky Urn (30 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (0.73) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 85 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.17 \\ & (1.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.87 \\ & (1.7) \end{aligned}$ |
| Qualitative Risk Aversion | $\begin{gathered} 5.8 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.7 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.8 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.18) \end{aligned}$ |
| Monthly Discount Rate ( $\delta$ ) | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.76 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.81 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04^{* *} \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Dictator Game (given out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (0.84) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.31 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.5 \\ & (1.9) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Dictator Game (given out of 300) | $\begin{gathered} 38 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 39 \\ (3.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 44 \\ (4.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.80 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.8 \\ & (5.4) \end{aligned}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Doubled | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.08 \\ & (2.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -6.5^{* *} \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Halved | $\begin{gathered} 9.0 \\ (0.68) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.7 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.0 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.73 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prisoner's Dilemma (\% dominant strat.) | $\begin{gathered} 68 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 67 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 66 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.99 \\ & (2.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.3 \\ (3.4) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Heads (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.2 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Switches (out of 9) | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.4 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.4 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ |
| Raven's Matrices (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.04 \\ & (0.10) \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { CRT } \\ & \text { (out of } 3 \text { ) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.6 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ |
| Confidence in Guesses | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ |
| Competition (\% competing) | $\begin{aligned} & 33.46 \\ & (1.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 31 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ (3.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.4 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.34 \\ & (3.8) \end{aligned}$ |
| IAT Race | $\begin{gathered} 81 \\ (5.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 83 \\ (9.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 90 \\ (12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.1 \\ (11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -8.7 \\ (13) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Gender | $\begin{gathered} 95 \\ (5.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 83 \\ (9.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 93 \\ (12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12 \\ (11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (13) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 819 | 819 | 819 | - | - |

Notes: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *},{ }^{*}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level, with standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix-15

## B Low-incentive Mechanical Turk Sample

Due to concerns that the rate of pay for the MTurk sample was two high, we gave our survey, with half the rate of pay, to an additional MTurk sample on August 13, 2019. The survey was identical to that run with our previous MTurk sample, with two exceptions. First, the level of incentives was one half that of the prior survey. This was accomplished by changing the exchange rate between tokens and money to 600 tokens $/ \$ 1$. All token values in each task thus remained the same. Second, we included attention screeners in our survey which were meant to weed out both bots, and inattentive participants. As our survey interface would have been quite difficult for a bot to navigate, there was no indication that bots were able to complete the survey, much less the attention screeners. However, about $20 \%$ of the respondents did not pass all three attention screeners.

We received a total of 1,264 responses, of which 212 failed at least one attention screener. The average payment was $\$ 5.21$, and the median time to complete the survey was 37 minutes. A final difference between this sample and our prior sample was that Amazon had raised the fees on MTurk considerably. Thus, we paid roughly $\$ 2$ per participant in additional fees to Amazon.

Table B. 1 compares the average level of responses between our original MTurk sample, the half-pay sample, and the half-pay sample once those who failed at least one attention screener are removed. The fourth and fifth columns computes the differences in average responses between the two MTurk samples, and finds that, remarkably, there is almost no difference between the two. The differences that do exist are that respondents in the half-pay sample are slightly more dishonest, and have somewhat lower implicit bias towards African Americans. These isolated changes could be due to changes in the sample population over the four year period between the two MTurk surveys, or it could be due to the change in incentives. The former seems somewhat more likely as it is unclear why differences in incentives would affect only these two measures. Either way, the level of incentives seems to
have very little effect on the responses of the MTurk sample. The sixth column compares the difference between the overall sample and only those that passed all three attention screener. Here there is a single, isolated, difference, on the CRT.

Table B. 2 is an analogue of Table 3. There appear to be no substantive differences between the two MTurk samples in these representations of the data. A substantial decrease in incentives has little effect on our behavioral measures, or on measurement error.

Finally, Figure 3 is the analogue of Figure 1, where the three samples are the original MTurk sample, the new MTurk sample, and the MTurk sample with inattentive participants removed. As before, a positive and significant correlation (at the $10 \%$ level) is denoted with a "+", a negative and significant correlation is denoted with a "-", and an insignificant correlation is denoted with a " 0. ." When all three samples agree, we use a single symbol in that cell.

As can be seen, in 39 out of 55 cells there is complete agreement, and in the remainder there is partial agreement. This is very close to what one might expect by chance from the same sample. In particular, we aggregated the two MTurk samples, and then randomly allocated them to the three different subsamples, and computed the corresponding correlation figure. We did this 100 times. Across these 100 simulations, 37.1 of the 55 correlations we consider are, on average, in complete agreement, with 0.3 of 55 in complete disagreement. The remainder show partial agreement. In Figure B. 139 out of 55 correlations are in complete agreement across the three samples. Thus, we see slightly more agreement than due to chance: 39 out of 55 is at the 75 th percentile of our simulation results.

Table B.1: Responses on MTurk are largely the same regardless of incentive level.

|  | Samples |  |  | Differences |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Baseline | Half Pay | Half Pay Screened | 1-2 | 1-3 | 2-3 |
| First Risky Project (out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 44 \\ (0.85) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45 \\ (0.81) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 44 \\ (0.89) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.3 \\ & (1.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.43 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.90 \\ & (1.2) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Risky Project (out of 200) | $\begin{gathered} 98 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 101 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 99 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -3.0 \\ & (2.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.7 \\ & (2.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (2.4) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Risky Urn (20 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 56 \\ (0.63) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56 \\ (0.56) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ (0.59) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.16 \\ & (0.84) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.69 \\ & (0.86) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.52 \\ & (0.81) \end{aligned}$ |
| Second Risky Urn (30 balls) | $\begin{gathered} 78 \\ (0.96) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 77 \\ (0.87) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 78 \\ (0.92) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.52 \\ & (1.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.61 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ |
| Qualitative Risk Aversion | $\begin{gathered} 4.9 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.8 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.6 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31^{* * *} \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ |
| Monthly Discount Rate ( $\delta$ ) | $\begin{gathered} 0.67 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.66 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.66 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |
| First Dictator Game (given out of 100) | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (0.71) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 27 \\ (0.62) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (0.68) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.0 \\ (0.94) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.63 \\ & (0.98) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.37 \\ (0.92) \end{gathered}$ |
| Second Dictator Game (given out of 300) | $\begin{gathered} 74 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 74 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 73 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.27 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.73 \\ & (2.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Doubled | $\begin{gathered} 30 \\ (0.79) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 29 \\ (0.69) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 29 \\ (0.76) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.53 \\ & (1.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.65 \\ & (1.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.12 \\ & (1.0) \end{aligned}$ |
| Dictator, Tokens Given are Halved | $\begin{gathered} 25 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (0.66) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 26 \\ (0.73) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.5 \\ (0.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.1 \\ & (1.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35 \\ (0.98) \end{gathered}$ |
| Prisoner's Dilemma (\% dominant strat.) | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56 \\ (1.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.95 \\ & (1.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.72 \\ & (1.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Heads (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.2 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15^{* * *} \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.12^{* *} \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ |
| Reported Switches (out of 9) | $\begin{gathered} 4.5 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.7 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.6 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.18^{* *} \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.10 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ |
| Raven's Matrices (out of 5) | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.04 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ |
| CRT <br> (out of 3) | $\begin{gathered} 1.4 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.09^{*} \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.10^{* *} \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ |
| Confidence in Guesses | $\begin{gathered} 2.9 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.07 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ |
| Competition (\% competing) | $\begin{gathered} 29 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 34 \\ (1.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 32 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -3.9^{* *} \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.1 \\ & (2.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.8 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ |
| IAT Race | $\begin{gathered} 68 \\ (4.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 44 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 49 \\ (4.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24^{* * *} \\ (6.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 18^{* * *} \\ & (6.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.4 \\ & (6.5) \end{aligned}$ |
| IAT Gender | $\begin{gathered} 90 \\ (4.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 93 \\ (4.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 94 \\ (4.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.4 \\ & (6.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.0 \\ & (6.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.6 \\ & (6.6) \end{aligned}$ |
| Percent Male | $\begin{gathered} 50 \\ (1.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 47 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 45 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.3 \\ (2.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4.6^{* *} \\ & (2.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (2.1) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 995 | 1,264 | 1,052 | - | - | - |

Notes: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *},{ }^{*}$ denote statistical significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$, and $10 \%$ level, with standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.2: Percent of Variation due to Noise

| Sample: | Baseline | Half Pay | Half Pay, Screened |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Risky Projects | $47 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
|  | $(2.7 \%)$ | $(2.3 \%)$ | $(2.5 \%)$ |
| Risky Urns | $32 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
|  | $(2.3 \%)$ | $(2.2 \%)$ | $(2.4 \%)$ |
| Lottery Menu | $33 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $35 \%$ |
|  | $(2.4 \%)$ | $(2.2 \%)$ | $(2.3 \%)$ |
| Ambiguous Urn | $31 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
|  | $(2.3 \%)$ | $(1.8 \%)$ | $(2.0 \%)$ |
| Compound Urn | $26 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $27 \%$ |
|  | $(2.1 \%)$ | $(1.9 \%)$ | $(2.1 \%)$ |
| Dictator Giving | $18 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
|  | $(1.8 \%)$ | $(1.7 \%)$ | $(1.8 \%)$ |
| IAT Race | $46 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $44 \%$ |
|  | $(2.7 \%)$ | $(2.3 \%)$ | $(2.6 \%)$ |
| IAT Gender | $46 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $46 \%$ |
|  | $(2.7 \%)$ | $(2.3 \%)$ | $(2.6 \%)$ |
| N | 995 | 1,264 | 1,052 |

Figure B.1: Correlations across MTurk, MTurk 1/2 pay, and MTurk $1 / 2$ pay and Screened

|  |  |  |  | $2{ }^{\left(3 y^{300}\right.}$ | $0$ |  |  | $0^{0090}$ |  |  | $2^{30}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Risk Aversion |  | +00 | 0-- | -00 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | +00 | - |
| Discounting ( $\delta$ ) | +00 |  | - | 0-- | +00 | + | - | 0 | $0+0$ | 0 | 0++ |
| Dictator | 0-- | - |  | - | - | - | + | 0 | 0 | 0+0 | - |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | -00 | 0-- | - |  | + | + | 0 | +00 | 0-0 | 0 | 00- |
| Lying | 0 | +00 | - | + |  | + | 0 | $+00$ | 0 | 0 | + |
| Cognitive | 0 | + | - | $+$ | + |  | - | 0-0 | 0 | 0 | $+$ |
| Confidence | - | - | + | 0 | 0 | - |  | + | 0 | 0 | + |
| Compete | - | 0 | 0 | +00 | +00 | 0-0 | + |  | +00 | 00- | + |
| IAT Race | 0 | $0+0$ | 0 | 0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $+00$ |  | $+$ | 0 |
| IAT Gender | +00 | 0 | $0+0$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 00- | + |  | 0 |
| Male | - | 0++ | - | 00- | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 |  |

