Online Appendix

Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the U.S.

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A   Online Appendix

County Moves

A.1 Additional Details on the Catalist Data

The information Catalist shares with its clients usually stems from a cross-sectional "live file," containing the present-day location and the full voter turnout history of every individual who ever appeared in its database. However, Catalist has also been saving "historical files": snapshots of its live file as of the date of each biennial federal election.

We received six historical files, corresponding to the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 nationwide elections, and matched them with the current live file. The historical files constitute our source of longitudinal information on voter residence and the live file our source of longitudinal information on voter behavior.

For each election, the historical files we received from Catalist, LLC (2019) report voter's state and county of residence at that time, a flag for whether they were deceased, registration status,[1] party affiliation (for voters registered in states with party registration), an indicator for permanent absentee status, and a flag for "best state."[2]

From the Catalist live file, we received the following variables: full turnout history, the state where the voter cast her ballot in each general election in our sample, if any, age, race, source of race information, and gender.

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[1]Voter registration features five possible values: A, I, D, M, or U. "A" and "I" denote voters appearing on a state registration file with "active" or "inactive" registration status, respectively. "D" flags "dropped" individuals who appeared on past state voter files, but not in the most recent one. "M" indicates "moved, unregistered" voters who, according to NCOA or commercial data, have moved into the state, but did not re-register in that state. "U" are voters whose status is "unregistered": they do not appear on current or past voter files but are known to reside in the state.

[2]When a voter is observed moving across states, Catalist creates a new record, and updates the original record (e.g., recoding the voter's registration status from "active" to "dropped") instead of erasing it. Consequently, the Catalist database is uniquely identified by voter ID *and* state. After using voter ID and state to match the historical files with the live file, we use the "best-state" flag to deduplicate on voter ID. Specifically, we deduplicate the matched historical files using the following lexicographic rules: we privilege the record corresponding to the state where a voter voted, if any; followed by records flagged as "best state"; then we use voter registration, privileging voter registration statuses in this order: "A", "M", "U", "I", and "D"; then the record with the oldest registration date; finally, among residual duplicates, we keep a reproducibly random record. All results are virtually identical when we deduplicate ignoring the voter turnout criterion.

A.2 Details on the Correlates of Place and Voter Effects

Here we describe the data sources and construction of the correlates of place and voter effects used in Sections III.C and IV.C.

The share of 2008–2018 general elections in which same-day voter registration, automatic voter registration, early voting, and no-excuse absentee voting were available to voters in each state, as well as the share of elections covered by strict voter ID laws and different types of state primary elections, come from the National Conference of State Legislatures.[3]

Same-day registration means that eligible voters can register to vote and cast a ballot on Election Day, and automatic registration that eligible voters who interact with the Department of Motor Vehicles and/or with other public agencies are automatically registered, with the possibility to opt out. Early (in-person) voting means that any eligible voter may cast a ballot in person during a designated period before Election Day, without providing an excuse. No-excuse absentee voting means that the state will mail an absentee ballot to all registered voters who request one. The voter, who does not need to offer an excuse (e.g., being out of town on Election Day), may return the ballot by mail or in person. In states with strict voter ID laws, voters are required to present an accepted form of identification document before voting. Voters who fail to do so can cast a provisional ballot, but they must present a proper ID within the next few days for their vote to be counted. Finally, states with closed primaries allow only registered party members to cast a ballot in a given party's state primary election. By contrast, a voter in an open-primary state is free to choose in which primary election to vote and this decision does not register the voter with that party.

In every state-general election, NCSL-based variables are binary. That is, they indicate whether a certain election policy was enforced in a given state-year, but not the details of that policy's implementation (e.g., we know whether early voting was offered in a given state-year, but not the number of early voting days or weekends). The chronology of state election policies is included in Cantoni and Pons (2021).

Electoral competitiveness is defined as the average margin of victory of the presidential candidate who carried the state in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential elections. To define this variable, we use election results from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2017*b*,*a*,*c*).

2008Q1-to-2018Q4 state GDP compound annual growth rates come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2021).

Concurrent governor and Senate elections denote the state-level share of 2008–2018 general elections featuring a gubernatorial and U.S. Senate election, respectively. "Republican governor"

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[3]See https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-laws-and-procedures-overview.aspx and https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx, last accessed May 5, 2021.

denotes the share of 2008–2018 elections with a sitting Republican governor.

Population density comes from combining 2015 5-year ACS data (Bureau of the Census, 2015), table DP05, with land area information from the Bureau of the Census (2017). The incarceration rate (per 100,000 adults) comes from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2014), 2013 correctional population figures.

Median age, the share of non-White or Hispanic population, the share of population in owner-occupied housing units, median household income, and the percentage of foreign-born population come from 2015 5-year ACS data (from tables S0101, DP05, B25008, B19013, and S0501). Average education is the share of the state population 25 or older with a high-school degree as computed from 2015 5-year ACS data (table B15003).

County-level data on the relative importance of universalist versus communal moral values come from Enke (2020a), which are the main data used in Enke (2020b); we take state averages weighting counties by total headcounts according to 2015 5-year ACS data.

All covariates are standardized across the 50 states plus DC to have mean 0 and unitary standard deviation.

A.3 Additional Details on the Study of Conditional Party Affiliation

The procedure we use to estimate the influence of the context on conditional party affiliation includes two steps, described in Section IV.B.

In the second step, we arrive at equation [10] (used to derive bounds on the impact of trajectory one relatively to trajectory zero on average conditional Democratic Party affiliation after the move) as follows. Under the assumption that there are no defiers (meaning that all movers who follow trajectory zero and affiliate would also have affiliated after trajectory one), we have that $A_1 \geq A_0$ and we can write the impact on unconditional Democratic Party affiliation as the sum of the impact on unconditional major-party affiliation, multiplied by the likelihood that compliers would affiliate with the Democrats if they got affiliated after following trajectory zero; and the impact on conditional Democratic Party affiliation (for compliers and always takers), multiplied by the probability of getting affiliated of movers following trajectory one:

$$\underbrace{E(D_1A_1 - D_0A_0)}_{\text{Effect on } D} = \underbrace{Prob(A_1 > A_0)}_{\text{Effect on } A} \cdot \underbrace{E(D_0|A_1 > A_0)}_{\text{Unobservable}}$$

$$+ \quad \overbrace{E[D_1 - D_0|A_1 = 1]}^{\text{Effect on Dem affiliation conditional on being always-taker or complier}} \quad \cdot E(A_1)$$

From this expression, we get

$$\overbrace{E[D_1 - D_0|A_1 = 1]}^{\text{Effect on Dem affiliation conditional on being always-taker or complier}} = \frac{1}{E(A_1)}[\underbrace{E(D_1A_1 - D_0A_0)}_{\text{Effect on } D}$$
$$-\underbrace{Prob(A_1 > A_0)}_{\text{Effect on } A} \cdot \underbrace{E(D_0|A_1 > A_0)}_{\text{Unobservable}}],$$

which is equation [10].

As indicated in Section IV.B, to obtain an upper bound, we set $E(D_0|A_1 > A_0) = 0$. Indeed, the largest possible effect occurs if we assume that compliers would never affiliate with the Democratic Party after following trajectory zero if they decided to register and affiliate with either of the two major parties. To obtain a lower bound, we replace $E(D_0|A_1 > A_0)$ by the fraction of affiliated Democrats among trajectory one movers affiliated with either of the major parties in their state of destination. Indeed, voters' propensity to affiliate with the Democrats rather than the Republicans can be expected to be higher after following trajectory one and moving to a state with higher conditional Democratic Party affiliation than in the state of origin; and again higher in the state of

origin than after following trajectory zero and moving to a state with lower conditional Democratic Party affiliation. Note also that this fraction is higher than the fraction of affiliated Democrats among trajectory zero movers who do affiliate in their destination state. The choice of this high probability makes our lower bound conservative.

A.4 Additional Summary Statistics

Figure A.1: Destination-Origin Difference in Average Voter Turnout, Registration, and Party Affiliation

Notes: The figures show the distributions of the difference in average voter turnout, registration, major-party affiliation, Democratic Party affiliation, and Republican Party affiliation across states of origin and destination ($\hat{\delta}_i$) in the movers sample. The sample consists of all mover-years.

Figure A.2: Average Voter Turnout and Democratic Two-Party Affiliation Share by State, 2008–2018

(a) Voter Turnout

(b) Democratic Two-Party Affiliation

Notes: For each state, we show the simple average of voter turnout and Democratic Two-Party affiliation share across the six elections (2008–2018) in the Catalist data. The sample consists of all movers and non-movers.

Figure A.3: Distribution of Voter Registration and Major-Party, Democratic Party, and Republican Party Affiliation by State, 2008–2018

(a) Voter Registration

(b) Major-Party Affiliation

(c) Democratic Party Affiliation

(d) Republican Party Affiliation

Notes: The maps plot average state voter registration, major-party affiliation (a dummy equal to 1 for citizens who are registered and affiliated with either major party), Democratic Party affiliation (a dummy equal to 1 for registered Democrats and 0 for people who are not registered or registered but not affiliated with the Democrats), and Republican Party affiliation (defined similarly) in the Catalist data in six bins. Lower and upper limits of the outcome in each bin are displayed in the legend. For each state, we take the simple outcome average across the six elections (2008–2018) in the Catalist data. The sample consists of all movers and non-movers.

Figure A.4: Average Voter Registration and Major-Party, Democratic Party, and Republican Party Affiliation by State, 2008–2018

(a) Voter Registration

(b) Major-Party Affiliation

(c) Democratic Party Affiliation

(d) Republican Party Affiliation

Notes: For each state, we show the simple average of voter registration, major-party affiliation, Democratic Party affiliation, and Republican Party affiliation across the six elections (2008–2018) in the Catalist data. The sample consists of all movers and non-movers.

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Table A.1: Movers by Pairs of Census Divisions

					Destination					
		ENC	ESC	M-A	M	NE	P	SA	WNC	WSC	Total
	East North Central	3.05	1.32	0.65	1.58	0.26	1.17	4.08	1.31	1.19	14.59
	East South Central	0.79	0.87	0.16	0.27	0.06	0.26	1.72	0.20	0.66	4.98
	Middle Atlantic	0.76	0.33	2.73	0.73	1.05	0.99	6.01	0.21	0.60	13.42
	Mountain	0.77	0.27	0.35	2.40	0.20	2.44	1.16	0.74	1.13	9.45
Origin	New England	0.25	0.12	0.69	0.32	1.72	0.46	2.00	0.10	0.22	5.88
	Pacific	0.87	0.40	0.67	3.97	0.37	3.46	1.76	0.60	1.47	13.57
	South Atlantic	2.17	1.91	2.66	1.37	1.00	1.62	9.78	0.66	1.72	22.90
	West North Central	1.14	0.27	0.18	1.14	0.09	0.64	1.04	1.94	0.95	7.39
	West South Central	0.65	0.67	0.32	1.15	0.14	0.97	1.54	0.67	1.73	7.82
	Total	10.45	6.16	8.39	12.92	4.89	12.01	29.09	6.42	9.67	100.00

Notes: Each cell reports the percentage of all movers who moved from the census division in row to the census division in column. The denominator is all movers.

Table A.2: Movers and Non-Movers' Mean Outcomes by Demographic Groups

|	1(Voted)		1(Registered)		1(Affiliated with a Major Party)		1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)		1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)	
	Non-Movers (1)	Movers (2)	Non-Movers (3)	Movers (4)	Non-Movers (5)	Movers (6)	Non-Movers (7)	Movers (8)	Non-Movers (9)	Movers (10)
Panel A. By Gender, Race, or Age										
Female	.433	.513	.688	.763	.507	.538	.316	.308	.191	.230
Male	.425	.528	.693	.783	.485	.518	.264	.245	.221	.272
Non-Hispanic White	.454	.536	.692	.776	.498	.529	.247	.249	.251	.280
Non-Hispanic Black	.376	.460	.693	.761	.568	.598	.535	.554	.033	.044
Other race	.326	.410	.623	.717	.380	.411	.267	.289	.113	.122
Hispanic	.292	.391	.611	.714	.423	.480	.325	.347	.098	.133
Aged 18-34	.341	.422	.774	.777	.486	.480	.309	.290	.177	.190
Aged 35-59	.472	.539	.731	.788	.523	.536	.300	.274	.223	.261
Aged 60+	.585	.644	.765	.803	.616	.605	.351	.296	.265	.309
Panel B. By Gender-by-Race-and-Age Cells										
Non-Hispanic White female aged 18-34	.361	.432	.756	.767	.472	.479	.257	.276	.215	.202
Non-Hispanic White female aged 35-59	.505	.551	.745	.788	.539	.546	.279	.269	.260	.277
Non-Hispanic White female aged 60+	.604	.639	.781	.802	.642	.618	.349	.305	.293	.313
Non-Hispanic Black female aged 18-34	.370	.424	.808	.791	.623	.599	.589	.562	.034	.037
Non-Hispanic Black female aged 35-59	.473	.504	.747	.766	.640	.628	.607	.588	.033	.040
Non-Hispanic Black female aged 60+	.560	.581	.777	.777	.724	.707	.696	.671	.028	.036
Female of other race aged 18-34	.325	.391	.754	.763	.441	.449	.347	.368	.094	.081
Female of other race aged 35-59	.394	.451	.689	.742	.430	.436	.305	.304	.126	.131
Female of other race aged 60+	.471	.511	.744	.772	.520	.498	.354	.312	.166	.186
Hispanic female aged 18-34	.311	.356	.770	.744	.479	.472	.389	.371	.091	.100
Hispanic female aged 35-59	.355	.428	.663	.730	.481	.504	.375	.371	.106	.133
Hispanic female aged 60+	.442	.494	.725	.745	.599	.594	.458	.434	.141	.160
Non-Hispanic White male aged 18-34	.357	.436	.794	.797	.479	.469	.221	.223	.258	.245
Non-Hispanic White male aged 35-59	.506	.564	.755	.808	.527	.530	.226	.210	.301	.320
Non-Hispanic White male aged 60+	.615	.675	.766	.814	.600	.592	.286	.241	.314	.351
Non-Hispanic Black male aged 18-34	.271	.363	.789	.774	.573	.539	.530	.487	.043	.052
Non-Hispanic Black male aged 35-59	.388	.472	.727	.769	.584	.578	.540	.522	.043	.056
Non-Hispanic Black male aged 60+	.503	.578	.745	.778	.667	.670	.629	.623	.038	.047
Male of other race aged 18-34	.291	.366	.763	.762	.416	.412	.303	.305	.113	.107
Male of other race aged 35-59	.370	.437	.669	.733	.399	.389	.261	.251	.139	.139
Male of other race aged 60+	.462	.519	.720	.770	.479	.459	.305	.274	.173	.184
Hispanic male aged 18-34	.260	.336	.775	.750	.456	.451	.348	.320	.107	.131
Hispanic male aged 35-59	.319	.428	.637	.735	.447	.486	.329	.323	.118	.163
Hispanic male aged 60+	.427	.513	.692	.743	.558	.572	.414	.387	.144	.185

Notes: The table reports mean outcomes for non-movers and movers in different demographic groups. Pairs of consecutive columns correspond to different outcomes: odd- and even-numbered columns correspond to non-movers and movers, respectively. Each row corresponds to a different group defined by gender, race, age, or gender-by-race-by-age combinations.

A.5 Additional Results

Figure A.5: Event-Study Plot: δ_i Defined Using Year-Specific Differences in Average Voter Turnout Between States of Destination and Origin

Notes: The figure replicates Figure 3 using year-specific $\hat{\delta}_{it}$'s instead of the time-invariant $\hat{\delta}_i$'s.

Figure A.6: Event-Study Plot: δ_i Defined Using McDonald's State Turnout Figures

Notes: The figure replicates Figure 3 using $\hat{\delta}_i$'s based on McDonald (2021*a*,*b*,*c*,*d*,*e*,*f*,*g*)'s voter turnout data instead of the Catalist data.

Figure A.7: Event-Study Plots, Party Affiliation, Voters Who Updated Their Voter Registration Before Moving

(a) Major-Party Affiliation, Voters Who Updated Their Voter Registration Before Moving

(b) Democratic Party Affiliation, Voters Who Updated Their Voter Registration Before Moving

(c) Republican Party Affiliation, Voters Who Updated Their Voter Registration Before Moving

Notes: The figure plots estimates of $\theta_{r(i,t)}$ and 95-percent confidence intervals (robust to two-way clustering by states and individuals) from event-study specification [6]. The dependent variables are dummies defined whether voters are registered or not and equal to 1 if they are affiliated with either of the two major parties (resp. with the Democratic Party, and with the Republican Party), and 0 otherwise. For each mover, $\hat{\delta}_i$ is constructed using the difference in average outcome in the state of destination across all elections in our sample minus average outcome in the state of origin. The sample consists of all mover-years for movers who, in the state of origin, updated their voter registration between the second to last (i.e., $r(i,t) = -2$) and the last election (i.e., $r(i,t) = -1$) before moving. We define these voters as the union of the following groups: voters who switch from unregistered, in $r(i,t) = -2$, to registered, in $r(i,t) = -1$; voters who, between $r(i,t) = -2$ and $r(i,t) = -1$, move to a different county within the state of origin and update their voter registration; voters who are registered in both $r(i,t) = -2$ and $r(i,t) = -1$ but whose date of registration as of $r(i,t) = -1$ is posterior to that at $r(i,t) = -2$; and registered voters affiliated with different parties at $r(i,t) = -2$ and $r(i,t) = -1$. Since the sample is restricted to voters observed in at least two elections before moving, the plots exclude voters who moved between 2008 and 2010.

Figure A.8: Event-Study Plots, Party Affiliation, States with Identical Primary Rules

(a) Major-Party Affiliation, States with Identical Primary Rules

(b) Democratic Party Affiliation, States with Identical Primary Rules

(c) Republican Party Affiliation, States with Identical Primary Rules

Notes: The figure plots estimates of $\theta_{r(i,t)}$ and 95-percent confidence intervals (robust to two-way clustering by states and individuals) from event-study specification [6]. The dependent variables are dummies defined whether voters are registered or not and equal to 1 if they are affiliated with either of the two major parties (resp. with the Democratic Party, and with the Republican Party), and 0 otherwise. For each mover, $\hat{\delta}_i$ is constructed using the difference in average outcome in the state of destination across all elections in our sample minus average outcome in the state of origin. The sample consists of all mover-years for moves between states in which party affiliation is available and with identical primary rules.

Figure A.9: Correlates of Voter Registration State and Voter Effects

(a) Correlates of Voter Registration State Effects

(b) Correlates of Voter Registration Average Voter Effects

Figure A.9: Correlates of Voter Registration State and Voter Effects (cont.)

(c) Correlates of Voter Registration Individual-Level Voter Effects

Notes: Notes as in Figure 5.

Figure A.10: Correlates of Major-Party Affiliation State and Voter Effects

(a) Correlates of Major-Party Affiliation State Effects

(b) Correlates of Major-Party Affiliation Average Voter Effects

Figure A.10: Correlates of Major-Party Affiliation State and Voter Effects (cont.)

(c) Correlates of Major-Party Affiliation Individual-Level Voter Effects

Notes: Notes as in Figure 5.

Figure A.11: Correlates of Republican Party Affiliation State and Voter Effects

(a) Correlates of Republican Party Affiliation State Effects

(b) Correlates of Republican Party Affiliation Average Voter Effects

Figure A.11: Correlates of Republican Party Affiliation State and Voter Effects (cont.)

(c) Correlates of Republican Party Affiliation Individual-Level Voter Effects

Notes: Notes as in Figure 5.

Figure A.12: Event-Study Plots, Voter Turnout, by Year of Move

Notes: Each figure shows the voter turnout event-study plot restricting the sample to voters who moved in a given election (i.e., they live in a different state than in the previous general election). In all graphs, we also restrict restrict the sample to voters who are observed in all six elections covered by our data. Other notes as in Figure 3.

Figure A.13: Event-Study Plots, Voter Registration, by Year of Move

(a) 2010 Movers

(b) 2012 Movers

(c) 2014 Movers

(d) 2016 Movers

(e) 2018 Movers

Notes: Each figure shows the voter registration event-study plot restricting the sample to voters who moved in a given election (i.e., they live in a different state than in the previous general election). In all graphs, we also restrict restrict the sample to voters who are observed in all six elections covered by our data. Other notes as in Figure 6.

Figure A.14: Event-Study Plots, Major-Party Affiliation, by Year of Move

(a) 2010 Movers

(b) 2012 Movers

(c) 2014 Movers

(d) 2016 Movers

(e) 2018 Movers

Notes: Each figure shows the major-party affiliation event-study plot restricting the sample to voters who moved in a given election (i.e., they live in a different state than in the previous general election). In all graphs, we also restrict restrict the sample to voters who are observed in all six elections covered by our data. Other notes as in Figure 6.

Figure A.15: Event-Study Plots, Democratic Party Affiliation, by Year of Move

(a) 2010 Movers

(b) 2012 Movers

(c) 2014 Movers

(d) 2016 Movers

(e) 2018 Movers

Notes: Each figure shows the Democratic party affiliation event-study plot restricting the sample to voters who moved in a given election (i.e., they live in a different state than in the previous general election). In all graphs, we also restrict the sample to voters who are observed in all six elections covered by our data. Other notes as in Figure 6.

Figure A.16: Event-Study Plots, Republican Party Affiliation, by Year of Move

(a) 2010 Movers

(b) 2012 Movers

(c) 2014 Movers

(d) 2016 Movers

(e) 2018 Movers

Notes: Each figure shows the Republican party affiliation event-study plot restricting the sample to voters who moved in a given election (i.e., they live in a different state than in the previous general election). In all graphs, we also restrict to voters who are observed in all six elections covered by our data. Other notes as in Figure 6.

Table A.3: Linearly Additive Decompositions, Robustness Checks

| Sample	N	Mean outcome	Difference in outcome above/below median	Difference due to voters	Difference due to states	Share due to voters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Outcome: 1(Voted)						
(1) Baseline	1,572,225,389	.427	.072	.045	.027	.629
(2) Include multiple movers	1,604,600,607	.428	.071	.045	.026	.638
(3) Aged 25 through 60	908,592,504	.442	.088	.054	.033	.621
(4) Reweighting movers	1,381,288,667	.474	.088	.064	.023	.733
Panel B. Outcome: 1(Registered)						
(1) Baseline	1,572,225,389	.685	.069	.047	.022	.684
(2) Include multiple movers	1,604,600,607	.686	.069	.040	.029	.583
(3) Aged 25 through 60	908,592,504	.734	.074	.053	.021	.712
(4) Reweighting movers	1,381,288,667	.754	.066	.046	.020	.699
Panel C. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with a Major Party)						
(1) Baseline	877,053,808	.491	.157	.087	.070	.555
(2) Include multiple movers	895,357,512	.491	.156	.085	.071	.545
(3) Aged 25 through 60	504,831,313	.510	.174	.110	.065	.629
(4) Reweighting movers	769,869,354	.543	.171	.101	.070	.591
(5) Same primary systems	856,806,169	.491	.122	.075	.048	.611
Panel D. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)						
(1) Baseline	877,053,808	.287	.142	.102	.041	.713
(2) Include multiple movers	895,357,512	.286	.142	.100	.042	.705
(3) Aged 25 through 60	504,831,313	.299	.158	.117	.041	.742
(4) Reweighting movers	769,869,354	.315	.161	.118	.043	.732
(5) Same primary systems	856,806,169	.287	.106	.080	.026	.751
Panel E. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)						
(1) Baseline	877,053,808	.204	.111	.087	.024	.783
(2) Include multiple movers	895,357,512	.205	.111	.089	.022	.799
(3) Aged 25 through 60	504,831,313	.211	.119	.095	.024	.797
(4) Reweighting movers	769,869,354	.227	.122	.095	.027	.777
(5) Same primary systems	856,806,169	.204	.122	.096	.025	.794

Notes: The table reports state-level decompositions for states above versus below the median outcome for alternative specifications. Row (1) repeats the baseline results. Row (2) includes people who move across states more than once. Row (3) excludes voters below the age of 25 or above 60. Row (4) assigns movers weights based on the fraction of people with the same age ventile, gender, and race (non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, other non-Hispanic race, Hispanic) in their state of origin (with age ventile defined as of the first election in which a voter appears in the Catalist data). For this decomposition, the sample is restricted to voters with known age, gender, and race. For party-affiliation outcomes, samples in row (5) are restricted to non-movers and movers across states with identical party primary systems. In Panels C-E, the sample of the underlying regressions is restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation.

Table A.4: Linearly Additive Decomposition of Voter Turnout Differences, Weighting by Voting-Eligible Population

	Outcome: 1(Voted)			
	Top 25/ Bottom 26 states	Top 15/ Bottom 15 states	Top 10/ Bottom 10 states	Top 5/ Bottom 5 states
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Difference in average voter turnout				
Overall	.065	.108	.128	.167
Due to voters	.047	.071	.078	.097
Due to states	.018	.037	.050	.069
Share of difference due to				
Voters	.719	.653	.611	.584
States	.281	.347	.389	.416
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)

Notes: This table replicates Table 2 weighting states by McDonald's (2021a,b,c,d,e,f,g) estimates of the voting-eligible population (averaged across the six elections in our sample) to compute outcome means as well as average state and voter effects.

Table A.5: Linearly Additive Decomposition of Voter Registration and Party Affiliation Differences, Weighting by Voting-Eligible Population

	Top 25/ Bottom 26 states	Top 15/ Bottom 15 states	Top 10/ Bottom 10 states	Top 5/ Bottom 5 states
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Outcome: 1(Registered)				
Overall difference	.056	.086	.117	.153
Due to voters	.049	.075	.106	.132
Due to states	.007	.011	.011	.021
Share due to voters	.872	.870	.903	.865
Share due to states	.128	.130	.097	.135
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.004)
Panel B. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with a Major Party)				
Overall difference	-	.126	.233	.286
Due to voters	-	.058	.120	.139
Due to states	-	.067	.113	.147
Share due to voters	-	.465	.514	.486
Share due to states	-	.535	.486	.514
	-	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
Panel C. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)				
Overall difference	-	.109	.171	.242
Due to voters	-	.072	.110	.171
Due to states	-	.037	.061	.071
Share due to voters	-	.661	.644	.707
Share due to states	-	.339	.356	.293
	-	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Panel D. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)				
Overall difference	-	.082	.102	.222
Due to voters	-	.055	.063	.182
Due to states	-	.027	.039	.040
Share due to voters	-	.672	.614	.822
Share due to states	-	.328	.386	.178
	-	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)

Notes: This table replicates Table 3 weighting states by McDonald's (2021a,b,c,d,e,f,g) estimates of the voting-eligible population (averaged across the six elections in our sample) to compute outcome means as well as average state and voter effects.

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Table A.6: Mover Average Treatment Effect (MATE) Decompositions

	1(Voted)	1(Registered)	1(Affiliated with a Major Party)	1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)	1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. Above/Below Median					
Outcome difference (above/below median)	.081	.054	.133	.108	.085
	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Place share (mover regression)	.436	.379	.586	.324	.331
	(.024)	(.040)	(.029)	(.029)	(.030)
Place share ($0.5 \times (\text{MATE}_0 + \text{MATE}_1)$)	.441	.380	.587	.325	.334
	(.024)	(.040)	(.029)	(.029)	(.030)
Overidentification test statistic (d.f. = 0)	--	--	--	--	--
Overidentification test statistic p-value	--	--	--	--	--
Panel B. Top/Bottom Terciles					
Outcome difference (top/bottom tercile)	.115	.076	.223	.177	.115
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Place share (mover regression)	.314	.215	.402	.351	.354
	(.018)	(.037)	(.024)	(.022)	(.025)
Place share ($0.5 \times (\text{MATE}_0 + \text{MATE}_1)$)	.315	.210	.403	.330	.340
	(.019)	(.035)	(.024)	(.024)	(.025)
Overidentification test statistic (d.f. = 1)	.021	4.605	.403	.330	.340
Overidentification test statistic p-value	.884	.032	.525	.566	.560
Panel C. Top/Bottom Quartiles					
Outcome difference (top/bottom quartile)	.132	.108	.261	.192	.161
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Place share (mover regression)	.387	.221	.392	.349	.204
	(.020)	(.032)	(.023)	(.022)	(.032)
Place share ($0.5 \times (\text{MATE}_0 + \text{MATE}_1)$)	.389	.243	.415	.325	.197
	(.025)	(.033)	(.024)	(.024)	(.037)
Overidentification test statistic (d.f. = 3)	6.025	9.002	2.644	1.896	12.457
Overidentification test statistic p-value	.110	.029	.450	.594	.006

Notes: The table reports estimated place (i.e., state) shares from mover regressions and Hull's (2018) MATE-based decompositions excluding non-movers. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Each panel corresponds to a different treatment groups comparison. In columns 3 through 5, the sample is restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation, and the median, terciles, and quartiles used to classify the states are computed in this subsample. Treatment groups are specific to each pair of consecutive elections; that is, for each pair of consecutive elections, we compute average state outcomes and define period-specific treatment groups. For consistency with MATE-based place shares, in each panel/column, the regression-based place share represents the estimated β^J coefficient from the following first-difference regression: $\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha + \Sigma_{j=2..J} \beta^j \Delta D_{ijt} + \gamma' X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$, where $\Delta D_{ijt} = 1$ if, between t-1 and t, voter i moved from a state in the bottom quantile of the outcome distribution (defined over t-1 and t) to a state in the j-th quantile, $\Delta D_{ijt} = -1$ if voter i moved in the opposite direction, and 0 otherwise. Mover regressions, as well as probit specifications underlying MATE decompositions, control for race-by-year, gender, and age ventile fixed effects. For computational ease, we run all regressions on a random 1 percent sample of voters from the Catalist data, while classifications of state-year pairs into treatment groups are based on the full Catalist data. Overidentification test statistics in Panels B and C are the GMM minimands of the respective MATE estimators; the underlying null hypothesis is that the MATE estimator's assumptions are jointly valid. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using a voter-level bootstrap with 50 replications.

Table A.7: Variance Decomposition of Voter Turnout Differences

	(1)
Cross-state variance of average	
Voter turnout	.0021
Voter effects	.0012
State effects	.0008
Correlation of average voter and state effects	.0646
	(.0057)
Share variance would be reduced if:	
Voter effects were made equal	.638
	(.004)
State effects were made equal	.421
	(.004)

Notes: The table reports the results of the variance decomposition described in Section III.A. Cross-state variances of state and average voter effects, as well as their correlation, are estimated using the split-sample approach described in the text. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are computed using a voter-level bootstrap with 50 replications. The sample used to run the underlying regression [1] consists of all movers and non-movers (N=1,572,225,389 voter-years).

Table A.8: Event-Study Estimates for Voter Turnout

	Outcome:	
	1(Voted)	1(Voted) McDonald's Delta's
	(1)	(2)
$\delta_i \times$(5 elections pre-move)	.064	.072
	(.054)	(.057)
$\delta_i \times$(4 elections pre-move)	.075	.094
	(.056)	(.060)
$\delta_i \times$(3 elections pre-move)	-.008	.001
	(.047)	(.045)
$\delta_i \times$(2 elections pre-move)	-.032	-.029
	(.023)	(.021)
$\delta_i \times$(1 elections pre-move)	-	-
	-	-
$\delta_i \times$(1st post-move election)	.395	.363
	(.048)	(.043)
$\delta_i \times$(2nd post-move election)	.365	.337
	(.039)	(.034)
$\delta_i \times$(3rd post-move election)	.334	.326
	(.039)	(.034)
$\delta_i \times$(4th post-move election)	.282	.233
	(.053)	(.046)
$\delta_i \times$(5th post-move election)	.264	.249
	(.061)	(.053)
Voter FEs	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓
Relative year FEs	✓	✓
N	77,988,312	77,988,312
N voters	14,337,595	14,337,595

Notes: The table reports event-study estimates and standard errors for voter turnout. Column 2's specification uses deltas based on McDonald's (2021a,b,c,d,e,f,g) turnout data. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voters and states.

Table A.9: Decomposition of Outcome Differences Across Counties, Using Within-State, Cross-County Moves

	Above/ Below median	Top/ Bottom quartiles	Top/ Bottom deciles	Top/ Bottom ventiles
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Outcome: 1(Voted)				
Overall difference	.065	.105	.170	.193
Share due to voters	.888	.881	.935	.938
Share due to counties	.112	.119	.065	.062
Panel B. Outcome: 1(Registered)				
Overall difference	.047	.079	.112	.134
Share due to voters	.894	.934	.930	.924
Share due to counties	.106	.066	.070	.076
Panel C. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with a Major Party)				
Overall difference	.033	.071	.079	.129
Share due to voters	.629	.734	.635	.774
Share due to counties	.371	.266	.365	.226
Panel D. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)				
Overall difference	.100	.157	.217	.266
Share due to voters	.804	.781	.787	.803
Share due to counties	.196	.219	.213	.197
Panel E. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)				
Overall difference	.091	.143	.220	.269
Share due to voters	.822	.815	.831	.824
Share due to counties	.178	.185	.169	.176

Notes: The table decomposes cross-county variation in the outcome indicated in the panel title between its county- and voter-driven components. Each column reports the results obtained using a different set of counties R and R'. In computing outcome means as well as average county and voter effects in R and R', we weight counties by total population based on the 2015 ACS 5-year estimates. The sample is restricted to non-movers and within-state movers. The groups of counties above and below median are defined based on state-specific medians, so that half of the counties of each state are included in either group (column 1). Similarly, in columns 2 through 4, counties are split across groups based on state-specific quartiles, deciles, or ventiles, respectively. For computational reasons, the sample used to run the underlying regression [1] consists of all movers and, for each county, a random sample of non-movers of size equal to the largest between 1,000 (or a county's population, for counties with fewer than 1,000 distinct non-movers) and 5% of the county's non-movers. Non-movers are weighted by the inverse of their sampling probability to account for the sampling procedure. In Panels C-E, the sample of the underlying regressions is restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation. The sample size is 183,479,923 and 98,137,437 voter-years in Panels A-B and C-E, respectively.

Table A.10: Variance Decomposition of Voter Registration and Party Affiliation Differences

	Outcome:			
	1(Registered)	1(Affiliated with a Major Party)	1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)	1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cross-state variance of average				
Outcome	.0022	.0094	.0090	.0061
Voter effects	.0018	.0035	.0050	.0041
State effects	.0011	.0025	.0010	.0007
Correlation of average voter and state effects	-.2188	.5890	.6696	.4115
	(.0053)	(.0064)	(.0081)	(.0110)
Share variance would be reduced if:				
Voter effects were made equal	.525	.735	.887	.890
	(.004)	(.003)	(.001)	(.002)
State effects were made equal	.206	.633	.447	.332
	(.006)	(.004)	(.004)	(.006)

Notes: Each column in this table reports results of the variance decomposition described in Section III.A for a different outcome. Cross-state variances of state and average voter effects, as well as their correlations, are estimated using the split-sample approach described in the text. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are computed using a voter-level bootstrap with 50 replications. In column 1, the sample used to run the underlying regression [1] consists of all movers and non-movers (N=1,572,225,389 voter-years). The sample for columns 2-4 is restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation (N=877,053,808 voter-years).

Table A.11: Event-Study Estimates for Registration and Party Affiliation

	Outcome:			
	1(Registered)	1(Affiliated with a Major Party)	1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)	1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\delta_i \times$(5 elections pre-move)	.028	-.086	-.009	-.102
	(.117)	(.067)	(.049)	(.040)
$\delta_i \times$(4 elections pre-move)	.056	-.036	-.001	-.074
	(.063)	(.042)	(.031)	(.023)
$\delta_i \times$(3 elections pre-move)	.057	-.019	.004	-.067
	(.043)	(.035)	(.024)	(.018)
$\delta_i \times$(2 elections pre-move)	.039	-.017	-.006	-.044
	(.020)	(.017)	(.011)	(.012)
$\delta_i \times$(1 elections pre-move)	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-
$\delta_i \times$(1st post-move election)	.202	.475	.325	.284
	(.065)	(.034)	(.051)	(.048)
$\delta_i \times$(2nd post-move election)	.157	.491	.363	.306
	(.048)	(.027)	(.043)	(.030)
$\delta_i \times$(3rd post-move election)	.168	.490	.350	.326
	(.053)	(.032)	(.039)	(.031)
$\delta_i \times$(4th post-move election)	.238	.490	.340	.343
	(.083)	(.053)	(.047)	(.036)
$\delta_i \times$(5th post-move election)	.209	.476	.328	.345
	(.095)	(.072)	(.058)	(.041)
Voter FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Relative Year FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	77,988,312	28,010,004	28,010,004	28,010,004
N voters	14,337,595	5,135,238	5,135,238	5,135,238

Notes: The table reports event-study estimates and standard errors for whether a voter is registered (column 1), registered and affiliated with a major party (column 2), registered and affiliated with the Democratic Party (column 3), or registered and affiliated with the Republican Party (column 4). Standard errors are two-way clustered by voters and states. Samples in columns 2-4 are restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voters and states.

Table A.12: Event-Study Estimates for Registration and Party Affiliation, States with Identical Primary Rules

	Outcome:		
	1(Affiliated with a Major Party)	1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)	1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)
	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\delta_i \times$(5 elections pre-move)	.067	.130	-.108
	(.085)	(.039)	(.039)
$\delta_i \times$(4 elections pre-move)	.006	.058	-.092
	(.052)	(.029)	(.022)
$\delta_i \times$(3 elections pre-move)	.007	.038	-.076
	(.043)	(.026)	(.018)
$\delta_i \times$(2 elections pre-move)	-.002	.014	-.046
	(.024)	(.013)	(.011)
$\delta_i \times$(1 elections pre-move)	-	-	-
	-	-	-
$\delta_i \times$(1st post-move election)	.260	.154	.235
	(.059)	(.045)	(.037)
$\delta_i \times$(2nd post-move election)	.372	.246	.253
	(.052)	(.042)	(.027)
$\delta_i \times$(3rd post-move election)	.400	.226	.277
	(.069)	(.064)	(.032)
$\delta_i \times$(4th post-move election)	.441	.208	.301
	(.104)	(.115)	(.039)
$\delta_i \times$(5th post-move election)	.460	.192	.303
	(.120)	(.142)	(.032)
Voter FEs	✓	✓	✓
Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
Relative Year FEs	✓	✓	✓
N	7,762,365	7,762,365	7,762,365
N voters	1,414,968	1,414,968	1,414,968

Notes: The table replicates columns 2-4 of Appendix Table A11, restricting the sample to moves across states with identical state primary election rules. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voters and states.

	1(Voted)	1(Registered)	1(Affiliated with a Major Party)	1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)	1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Panel A. Cross-State Moves		
β^{post}	.397	.184	.480	.337	.286
	(.048)	(.059)	(.035)	(.051)	(.043)
γ^{post}	-.035	.004	.003	.004	.018
	(.021)	(.024)	(.023)	(.019)	(.013)
N	77,988,312	77,988,312	28,010,004	28,010,004	28,010,004
N voters	14,337,595	14,337,595	5,135,238	5,135,238	5,135,238
		Panel B. Cross-State Moves, States with Identical Primaries Rules			
β^{post}	-	-	.279	.179	.235
	-	-	(.056)	(.043)	(.034)
γ^{post}	-	-	.057	.017	.020
	-	-	(.037)	(.037)	(.018)
N	-	-	7,762,365	7,762,365	1,414,968
N voters	-	-	1,414,968	1,414,968	7,762,365
			Panel C. Within-State, Cross-County Moves		
β^{post}	.048	.091	.194	.185	.121
	(.027)	(.020)	(.029)	(.020)	(.013)
γ^{post}	.026	.024	.017	.008	.021
	(.009)	(.009)	(.008)	(.003)	(.003)
N	115,466,589	115,466,589	60,204,902	60,204,902	60,204,902
N voters	22,008,170	22,008,170	11,477,146	11,477,146	11,477,146

Notes: The table reports estimates of β^{post} and γ^{post} from the following specification: $y_{it} = \tilde{\alpha} + \theta_{r(i,t)}\delta_i \times 1(r(i,t)<0) + \beta^{post} \times \delta_i \times 1(r(i,t)\geq 0) + \gamma^{post} \times \delta_i \times 1(r(i,t)\geq 0) \times r(i,t) + \tau_t + \rho_{r(i,t)} + \varepsilon_{it}$. Samples in columns 3-5 are restricted to the 30 states for which Catalist records party affiliation. The sample in Panel A consists of all one-time cross-state movers. The sample in Panel B is restricted to movers across states with identical state primary election rules. The sample in Panel C consists of one-time within-state, cross-county movers. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voters and states.

Table A.14: Linearly Additive Decompositions, Robustness to Using Group-Specific State Fixed Effects

Sample	N	Mean outcome	Difference in outcome above/below median	Difference due to voters	Difference due to states	Share due to voters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Outcome: 1(Voted)						
(1) Age national weights	1,413,493,837	.470	.083	.056	.026	.680
(2) Age national weights & age × state FEs	1,413,493,837	.470	.083	.057	.026	.689
(3) Gender national weights	1,543,167,674	.434	.072	.045	.027	.630
(4) Gender national weights & gender × state FEs	1,543,167,674	.434	.072	.045	.027	.629
(5) Race national weights	1,572,225,389	.427	.055	.029	.026	.520
(6) Race national weights & race × state FEs	1,572,225,389	.427	.055	.028	.027	.514
Panel B. Outcome: 1(Registered)						
(1) Age national weights	1,413,493,837	.751	.067	.047	.020	.708
(2) Age national weights & age × state FEs	1,413,493,837	.751	.067	.048	.019	.720
(3) Gender national weights	1,543,167,674	.694	.070	.054	.016	.776
(4) Gender national weights & gender × state FEs	1,543,167,674	.694	.070	.054	.016	.774
(5) Race national weights	1,572,225,389	.685	.071	.051	.020	.722
(6) Race national weights & race × state FEs	1,572,225,389	.685	.071	.048	.022	.685
Panel B. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with a Major Party)						
(1) Age national weights	791,289,577	.539	.539	.321	.217	.596
(2) Age national weights & age × state FEs	791,289,577	.539	.539	.326	.212	.606
(3) Gender national weights	859,951,510	.498	.498	.280	.218	.562
(4) Gender national weights & gender × state FEs	859,951,510	.498	.498	.280	.218	.562
(5) Race national weights	877,053,808	.491	.491	.282	.209	.575
(6) Race national weights & race × state FEs	877,053,808	.491	.491	.273	.218	.556
Panel C. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Democratic Party)						
(1) Age national weights	791,289,577	.314	.160	.118	.042	.738
(2) Age national weights & age × state FEs	791,289,577	.314	.160	.117	.043	.731
(3) Gender national weights	859,951,510	.291	.146	.105	.041	.719
(4) Gender national weights & gender × state FEs	859,951,510	.291	.146	.105	.041	.719
(5) Race national weights	877,053,808	.287	.132	.091	.041	.690
(6) Race national weights & race × state FEs	877,053,808	.287	.132	.089	.043	.675
Panel D. Outcome: 1(Affiliated with the Republican Party)						
(1) Age national weights	791,289,577	.224	.120	.096	.024	.801
(2) Age national weights & age × state FEs	791,289,577	.224	.120	.097	.024	.802
(3) Gender national weights	859,951,510	.208	.112	.088	.024	.786
(4) Gender national weights & gender × state FEs	859,951,510	.208	.112	.088	.024	.785
(5) Race national weights	877,053,808	.204	.096	.068	.028	.706
(6) Race national weights & race × state FEs	877,053,808	.204	.096	.070	.026	.726

Notes: This table reports outcome differences between above- and below-median states due to states and voters for alternative specifications. Each panel corresponds to a different outcome. In each panel, row (1) reports the results of a decomposition where state average outcomes, as well as state and average voter fixed effects are computed weighting voters aged 18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60+ based on the national (instead of state-level) share of voters in these age ranges. In addition to reweighting voters based on national age shares, the regression for row (2) controls for age-specific state fixed effects. Similarly, rows (3) and (5) reweight voters based on the national (instead of state-level) share of female versus male and White versus non-White voters, respectively. Rows (4) and (6) supplement the national gender and race reweighting with gender- and race-specific state fixed effects, respectively. Results in row (2) (resp. rows (4) and (6)) should be compared to results in row (1) (resp. rows (3) and (5)).

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