

Online Appendix

“Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence”

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A. Theory appendix

A.1. A model with both close and distant observers

In this appendix, we describe the extended model with close and distant observers mentioned in Section I of the main text, and derive the expressions that characterize $\hat{\theta}_o$ and $\tilde{\theta}_o$. The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Online Appendix A5.

In this more general setup, we need to distinguish between the esteem obtained from close observers and that from distant observers. As in the main model, esteem from close observers is

$$E(\theta | o, a) \text{ for all } o \in [o_{min}, o_{max}] \text{ and all } a \in \{0, 1\}.$$

However, esteem from distant observers is a more complex object and is given by

$$\begin{cases} E(\theta | o, 1) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \text{ and individual is convicted} \\ E(\theta | \text{no conv}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{a.1})$$

where $E(\theta | \text{no conv})$, the expected type conditional on no conviction, is derived using Bayes' rule by considering all the possible opportunities o that the individual may have been presented with. Total expected esteem is therefore equal to¹

$$S(o, 1) = \begin{cases} E(\theta | o, 1)(1 + p) + (1 - p)E(\theta | \text{no conv}) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \\ E(\theta | o, 1) + E(\theta | \text{no conv}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and

$$S(o, 0) = E(\theta | o, 0) + E(\theta | \text{no conv})$$

As in the main model, taking esteem as given, the net utility from seizing the opportunity is decreasing in θ . For each opportunity o , we can therefore identify the highest θ who takes o . As before, $\hat{\theta}_o$, the highest θ who seizes a legal opportunity o is defined by (3) in the main text

$$t - \hat{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\hat{\theta}_o) = 0$$

while $\tilde{\theta}_o$, the highest θ who seizes an illegal opportunity o is now defined (when interior) by

$$t - \tilde{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\tilde{\theta}_o) + p[\mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) - \Psi - K] = 0. \quad (\text{a.2})$$

¹For simplicity, we assume that people care equally about the esteem of close and distant observers, but our results can be straightforwardly generalized to allow for different weights.

where $\Psi \equiv E(\theta \mid \text{no conv})$ is given by

$$\Psi = \mu_\theta \int_{o_{\min}}^{\bar{o}} \frac{g(o_i)}{\Theta} do_i + \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} \frac{g(o_i)}{\Theta} [(1 - F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}))\mathcal{M}^+(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) + F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i})(1 - p)\mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i})] do_i \quad (\text{a.3})$$

$$= \frac{\mu_\theta}{\Theta} - p \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} \frac{1}{\Theta} \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) g(o_i) do_i, \quad (\text{a.4})$$

where μ_θ is the prior mean and $\Theta \equiv 1 - p \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) g(o_i) do_i$ is the ex-ante probability that an individual has no criminal record.² Note that, so long as $\tilde{\theta}_o$ is interior for a non-empty set of opportunities o , $\Psi > \mu_\theta$. Throughout the text, we will assume that this is the case. Given $\Psi > \mu_\theta \geq \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)$, the expression in square brackets in (a.2) – which represents the total loss (material and reputational) incurred if the individual is caught breaking the law – is strictly negative even when $K = 0$. The difference in total expected esteem from seizing a marginally legal vs a marginally illegal opportunity is equal to

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) + p[\Psi - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)]. \quad (\text{a.5})$$

The first part of (a.5), namely

$$\mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) \quad (\text{a.6})$$

represents the difference in the esteem obtained from close observers, while the second part

$$p[\Psi - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)] \quad (\text{a.7})$$

represents the difference in the expected esteem obtained from distant observers. There are two effects at work here. First, since $\Psi > \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)$, seizing the illegal opportunity generates a loss in expected esteem from distant observers. Second, close observers take this into account when forming beliefs about the agent's type, and therefore update their beliefs less favorably when the agent seizes the illegal opportunity. In the proof of proposition 3, we show that, as a result, $\hat{\theta}_o > \tilde{\theta}_o$ for all o , even when $K = 0$. In turn, this ensures that (a.6) is strictly positive. In words, both the esteem from close observers and the expected esteem from distant observers experience a downward discontinuity at \bar{o} .

A.2. A Spence-like model

Suppose that, rather than seizing or leaving an opportunity that they are (exogenously) presented with, agents can choose the level of negative externality they impose on others, which may better capture some of the vignettes used in the experiments (e.g., speeding). Let $\bar{o} \gg 0$ indicate the legal

²The updating problem faced by distant observers when the individual has no criminal conviction shares similarities with the case – analysed in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) – where prosocial contributions can be forced.

threshold. We consider a setup with both close and distant observers. An individual who selects action $o \geq 0$ obtains utility

$$\begin{cases} t o - \theta \frac{o^2}{2} + \gamma(o) + \Psi & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \text{ (within the law)} \\ t o - \theta \frac{o^2}{2} + \gamma(o) + p(\gamma(o) - K) + (1 - p) \Psi & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \text{ (outside of law)} \end{cases}$$

where t is the marginal (material) return from o , $\theta \frac{o^2}{2}$ reflects the psychological cost for an individual of type θ from imposing a negative externality o on others, $\gamma(o) = E(\theta \mid o)$ and $\Psi \equiv E(\theta \mid \text{no conv})$.³ We restrict attention to

$$\theta_{\max} - K - \Psi < 0 \quad (\text{a.8})$$

which ensures that, conditional on breaking the law, an individual's expected payoff is decreasing in p , the probability of detection. As we show in Online Appendix A5, in equilibrium \bar{o} is chosen by at most one type. For brevity of exposition, we assume that \bar{o} is selected in equilibrium.⁴

Proposition A1: *Denote as θ_{thres} the type who selects \bar{o} in equilibrium. In any D1-refined equilibrium, the difference in total expected social esteem from choosing $\bar{o} - \varepsilon$ and $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ where $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ is given by,*

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)] = p(\Psi - \theta_{thres}) \quad (\text{a.9})$$

Proof: See Online Appendix A5.

Thus, a discontinuity in the total social esteem function emerges even in a model where individuals directly choose the level of the negative externality they impose on others. Here the effect is totally driven by esteem from distant observers. Note that a sufficient condition for (a.9) to be positive is that p is sufficiently high.⁵ Finally, clearly enough, the case where the law is absent is here isomorphic to a situation where $p \rightarrow 0$. In that case, Proposition A1 shows that the social esteem function exhibits no discontinuity.

A.3. Allowing t , K , p and the size of the audience to depend on o

More generally, in our main model of Section I we could allow t to change continuously in o , and p and K to depend continuously on the severity of the infraction, so that $u_{a=1}(o; \theta) = t(o) - \theta o - p(o)K(o)\mathbb{I}_{o>\bar{o}} + S(o, 1)$, where $t(o) > 0$ for all o and $p(o)K(o) > 0$ for all $o > \bar{o}$. For concreteness, consider the setup where all observers are close observers.⁶ The threshold type $\hat{\theta}_o$

³In equilibrium, $\Psi = \omega(\theta_{thres})\mathcal{M}^+(\theta_{thres}) + (1 - \omega(\theta_{thres}))\mathcal{M}^-(\theta_{thres})$ where θ_{thres} is the type who selects \bar{o} and $\omega(\theta_{thres}) \equiv \frac{1 - F(\theta_{thres})}{1 - F(\theta_{thres}) + (1 - p)F(\theta_{thres})}$.

⁴If this is not the case, Proposition A1 extends straightforwardly. It is easy to show that, in the D1-refined equilibrium, $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)] = p(\Psi - \theta_{min})$.

⁵This follows since, when $p = 1$, $\Psi = \mathcal{M}^+(\theta_{thres}) > \theta_{thres}$.

⁶The argument extends straightforwardly to the case of both close and distant observers.

would now satisfy $t(o) - \hat{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\hat{\theta}_o) = 0$, while $\tilde{\theta}_o$ would satisfy $t(o) - \tilde{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\tilde{\theta}_o) - p(o)K(o) = 0$. The discontinuity result relies on proving that, fixing o , we have $\hat{\theta}_o > \tilde{\theta}_o$. In turn, this ensures that $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) > 0$. Since the comparison between $\hat{\theta}_o$ and $\tilde{\theta}_o$ is made *keeping o fixed*, allowing t , p and K to change continuously in o would be entirely irrelevant for our argument. For this reason, in the model of the main text we adopted the simplest approach and considered the case where t , p and K are positive constants. A similar observation applies to letting the visibility of a given behavior (or the size of the audience) change continuously in the size of the negative externality generated.

A.4. Comparative Statics

We now explore how the size of the discontinuity in social esteem varies with various characteristics of law enforcement and the context. We start by looking at *police tolerance* and explore how the probability of enforcing a law and the size of the penalty associated with it affect the magnitude of the discontinuity in social esteem. We then turn to two characteristics of the context in which opportunities arise. First, we investigate the effects of the material return from taking an opportunity. We then ask whether behaviors that are less likely to be *measured accurately* and/or *taken intentionally* are subject to larger or smaller discontinuities in social esteem.

Strength of sanctions

The discontinuity in social esteem at the legal limit is increasing in the strength of sanctions. Recall from the results in our main body that $\hat{\theta}_o$ is the highest type seizing \bar{o} while $\tilde{\theta}_o$ is the highest type seizing $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ for $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$. From (a.2), for any o , a higher K decreases $\tilde{\theta}_o$ whilst leaving $\hat{\theta}_o$ unchanged. Since $\mathcal{M}^-(\cdot)$ is an increasing function, this implies that $\mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)$, the downward discontinuity in the social esteem function $S(o, 1)$ at \bar{o} , is now more pronounced.

Enforcement probability

The discontinuity in social esteem at the legal limit is increasing in the probability of sanctions against law-breaking being enforced. If $p = 0$ then, for any o , $\hat{\theta}_o$ and $\tilde{\theta}_o$ coincide and hence the discontinuity in esteem at the legal limit disappears. As p increases, for any o , $\tilde{\theta}_o$ decreases while $\hat{\theta}_o$ remains the same. As a result, the downward discontinuity in $S(o, 1)$ at the legal limit becomes more pronounced when p is larger.

Proposition A2 $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)]$ is strictly increasing in p .

Proof: See Online Appendix A5.

Material returns from the opportunity

The effect of a higher t for the discontinuity in $S(o, 1)$ is ambiguous. Intuitively, higher t makes seizing any given externality-generating opportunity more attractive. As a result, both $\widehat{\theta}_o$ and $\widetilde{\theta}_o$ increase, exerting countervailing forces on the size of the discontinuity. This implies that our theory does not deliver unambiguous predictions about the effect of a change in t for the downward esteem discontinuity.

Intentionality/measurability of behavior

Sometimes individuals may cause a negative externality unintentionally. To capture the key effects introduced by this possibility, suppose that, whenever an individual takes an illegal opportunity o , there is a probability that this might have happened *inadvertently*. Set $p = 1$ for simplicity. Suppose that close observers are able to observe intentionality, and therefore assign esteem μ_θ if an individual seizes o unintentionally and esteem $S(o, 1)$ if the action is intentional. Distant observers, on the other hand, are not able to distinguish intentionality. When an individual is caught breaking the law, distant observers cannot establish whether this happened intentionally or inadvertently.⁷ This implies that the esteem this individual obtains from distant observers is now given by

$$[(1 - q) F(\widetilde{\theta}_o) \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o) + q\mu_\theta]Z \quad (\text{a.10})$$

where q is the probability that the opportunity was taken unintentionally and $Z \equiv \frac{1}{(1-q)F(\widetilde{\theta}_o)+q}$. Consider then the decision of an individual to intentionally seize o . The case analyzed in the main text is a special case of this more general framework, in which $q = 0$. In this more general setup, $\widetilde{\theta}_o$ is defined by

$$t - l(\widetilde{\theta}_o) - \widetilde{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\widetilde{\theta}_o) = 0. \quad (\text{a.11})$$

where $l(\widetilde{\theta}_o) \equiv K + \Psi - [(1 - q) F(\widetilde{\theta}_o) \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o) - q\mu_\theta]Z > 0$. It is easy to show that, under mild assumptions, $\widetilde{\theta}_o$ is increasing in q , while $\widehat{\theta}_o$ is given, as before, by (3) in the main text

$$t - \widehat{\theta}_o o - \Delta(\widehat{\theta}_o) = 0$$

and is thus independent of q . Allowing for $q > 0$ affects social esteem in two ways. First, behavior is now less informative about an individual's underlying type and, as a result, esteem from distant observers depends less strongly on behavior, as highlighted by (a.10). Second, since esteem depends less strongly on behavior, people are now willing to (intentionally) take opportunities characterized by a higher o , which they would have left if $q = 0$. In other words, equilibrium behavior changes, which further affects the esteem consequences from seizing a given opportunity.

⁷Our result continues to apply if we assume that close observers can also not observe intentionality.

Proposition A3 $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)]$ is strictly decreasing in q .

Proof: See Online Appendix A5.

Because q changes $\tilde{\theta}_o$, it also affects $\mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)$, the esteem from close observers, who, differently from distant observers, are *perfectly aware* that the subject seizing the illegal opportunity is doing so in a fully intentional manner. Intuitively, although close observers forming beliefs about an individual's prosociality parameter know that the individual is seizing the opportunity intentionally, the fact that *distant observers* are unable to discern the individual's intentions changes the individual's behavior. This is reflected in threshold values depending on q , as described in (a.11).

The setup we have sketched here can also be used to describe an environment where illegal behavior can only be measured with a margin of error, implying that, when an individual is convicted for breaking the law, distant observers know that, with some probability q , this may be the result of a measurement error.

A.5. Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1 Define

$$\Lambda(\theta_o) \equiv t - \theta_o o - \Delta(\theta_o).$$

The threshold type $\hat{\theta}_o$ satisfies $\Lambda(\hat{\theta}_o) = 0$. To ensure an interior solution, we require $\Lambda(\theta_{\min}) > 0 > \Lambda(\theta_{\max})$ for all o . Note that $\lim_{\theta_o \rightarrow \theta_{\min}} \Delta(\theta_o) = \mu\theta - \theta_{\min}$ while $\lim_{\theta_o \rightarrow \theta_{\max}} \Delta(\theta_o) = \theta_{\max} - \mu\theta$.⁸ Hence, $\Lambda(\theta_{\min}) \geq t - \theta_{\min} o_{\max} - \mu\theta + \theta_{\min}$ and $\Lambda(\theta_{\max}) \leq t - \theta_{\max} o_{\min} + \mu\theta - \theta_{\max}$. We conclude that $t - \theta_{\min} o_{\max} - \mu\theta + \theta_{\min} > 0 > t - \theta_{\max} o_{\min} + \mu\theta - \theta_{\max}$ is sufficient to guarantee interior solutions.

Consider now monotonicity. Total differentiation delivers

$$\frac{d\hat{\theta}_o}{do} = \frac{\hat{\theta}_o}{\Lambda'(\hat{\theta}_o)}.$$

Monotonicity requires $\hat{\theta}_o$ to be decreasing in o and, hence, that $\Lambda'(\theta_o) < 0$ for all θ_o and o . Since $\Lambda'(\theta_o) = -o - \Delta'(\theta_o)$, the requirement that $o + \Delta'(\theta_o) > 0$ for all θ_o and o is sufficient to guarantee monotonicity. Note that, since $f(\theta)$ is continuous with full support, $\Delta(\cdot)$ is a continuous function and, hence, $\hat{\theta}_o$ is continuous in o .

Consider now $S(o, 1)$. Since o is a continuous variable, $\frac{dS(o, 1)}{do}$ is well defined and given by

$$\frac{dS(o, 1)}{do} = \mathcal{M}^{-1}(\hat{\theta}_o) \frac{\hat{\theta}_o}{\Lambda'(\hat{\theta}_o)} < 0$$

where the inequality follows because $\mathcal{M}^{-1}(\cdot)$ is an increasing function and $\Lambda'(\cdot) < 0$ by monotonic-

⁸We consider limits since, strictly speaking, if $\hat{\theta}_o = \theta_{\max}$ then $E(\theta | o, 0)$ is not well defined, and similarly for $E(\theta | o, 1)$ if $\hat{\theta}_o = \theta_{\min}$.

ity. Continuity of $S(o, 1)$ then follows from the continuity of $\mathcal{M}^-(\cdot)$ (which is guaranteed since since $f(\theta)$ is continuous with full support) and the continuity of $\hat{\theta}_o$ in o .⁹ ■

Proof of Proposition 2 We first prove that, under monotonicity, $S(o, 1)$ experiences a downward discontinuity at \bar{o} . We then derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity to hold. Define

$$\Xi(\theta_o) \equiv t - \theta_o o - \Delta(\theta_o) - pK. \quad (\text{a.12})$$

The threshold type $\tilde{\theta}_o$ (when interior) satisfies $\Xi(\tilde{\theta}_o) = 0$, so that

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{do} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_o}{\Xi'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} \quad (\text{a.13})$$

Monotonicity requires any interior $\tilde{\theta}_o$ to be decreasing in o and, hence, that $\Xi'(\theta_o) < 0$ for all θ_o and o . Henceforth, suppose that this is the case. Evaluated at $\theta_o = \hat{\theta}_o$, $\Xi(\hat{\theta}_o) = -pK < 0$ as long as $K > 0$. Given $\Xi'(\cdot) < 0$, and since $\tilde{\theta}_o$ solves $\Xi(\tilde{\theta}_o) = 0$, $\Xi(\hat{\theta}_o) < 0$ implies that $\hat{\theta}_o > \tilde{\theta}_o$ for all o . As a result,

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) > 0 \quad (\text{a.14})$$

since $\mathcal{M}^-(\cdot)$ is an increasing function.¹⁰ Note that, since $\Xi'(\theta_o) = -o - \Delta'(\theta_o)$, the requirement that $o + \Delta'(\theta_o) > 0$ for all θ and o is sufficient to guarantee monotonicity. ■

Proof of Proposition 3 We first prove that, under monotonicity, $S(o, 1)$ experiences a downward discontinuity at \bar{o} , which does not rely on $K > 0$. We then derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity to hold. Define

$$F(\theta_o) \equiv t - \theta_o o - \Delta(\theta_o) - p(K - \mathcal{M}^-(\theta_o) + \Psi) \quad (\text{a.15})$$

where $\Psi = \frac{\mu_\theta}{\Theta} - p \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} \frac{1}{\Theta} \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) g(o_i) do_i$ and $\Theta \equiv 1 - p \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) g(o_i) do_i$. The threshold type $\tilde{\theta}_o$ (when interior) satisfies $F(\tilde{\theta}_o) = 0$, so that

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{do} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_o}{F'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} \quad (\text{a.16})$$

Monotonicity requires any interior $\tilde{\theta}_o$ to be decreasing in o and, hence, that $F'(\theta_o) < 0$ for all θ_o and o . Henceforth, suppose that this is the case. Evaluated at $\theta_o = \hat{\theta}_o$, $F(\hat{\theta}_o) = -p(K - \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) + \Psi) < 0$ since $\Psi > \mu_\theta \geq \mathcal{M}^-(\cdot)$. Given $F'(\cdot) < 0$, and since $\tilde{\theta}_o$ solves $F(\tilde{\theta}_o) = 0$, $F(\hat{\theta}_o) < 0$ implies that $\hat{\theta}_o > \tilde{\theta}_o$ for all o . Importantly, this also applies when $K = 0$. Consider now the esteem function

⁹Continuity of $S(o, 0)$ is established analogously.

¹⁰Similarly, $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 0) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 0)] = \mathcal{M}^+(\hat{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) - \mathcal{M}^+(\tilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) > 0$ since $\mathcal{M}^+(\cdot)$ is an increasing function.

$S(o, 1)$. In equilibrium, this is

$$S(o, 1) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{M}^-(\widehat{\theta}_o) + \Psi & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \\ \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o)(1 + p) + \Psi(1 - p) & \text{if } o > \bar{o}. \end{cases}$$

Since $\widehat{\theta}_o > \widetilde{\theta}_o$ (as proved above) and $\Psi > \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o)$, we have

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\widehat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o) + p[\Psi - \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_o)] > 0. \quad (\text{a.17})$$

This proves that, under monotonicity, $S(o, 1)$ experiences a downward discontinuity at \bar{o} .¹¹ We now show that the following conditions are sufficient for monotonicity: (i) $o + \Delta'(\theta) - \mathcal{M}'(\theta_o) > 0$ for all θ and o , and (ii) $g(o)$ is sufficiently small for all o . Straightforward computations deliver

$$F'(\theta_o) = -[o + \Delta'(\theta_o) - p\mathcal{M}'(\theta_o) + p\Psi'(\theta_o)]. \quad (\text{a.18})$$

Under conditions (i) and (ii), $F'(\theta_o) < 0$. Condition (ii) ensures that the absolute value of $\Psi'(\theta_o)$ is sufficiently small so that, even if it were negative, $o + \Delta'(\theta_o) - p\mathcal{M}'(\theta_o) > -p\Psi'(\theta_o)$ would still be satisfied. This is because $\Psi'(\theta_o)$ is equal to

$$g(o) \frac{p}{\Theta^2} \left\{ \mu_\theta f(\theta_o) - [\mathcal{M}'(\theta_o)F(\theta_o) + \mathcal{M}^-(\theta_o)f(\theta_o)]\Theta - f(\theta_o)p \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_{o_i})F(\widetilde{\theta}_{o_i})g(o_i) do_i \right\}. \quad (\text{a.19})$$

■

Proof of Proposition A1 The proof is adapted from Birke (2020) and is divided in steps.

Step 1 Incentive Compatibility requires that, in equilibrium, $o(\theta)$ is non-increasing: for any θ_1 and θ_0 that satisfy $\theta_1 > \theta_0$, we have $\sup o(\theta_1) \leq \inf o(\theta_0)$. As a result, $\gamma(o)$ is also non-increasing.

Proof of step 1: let $\theta_1 > \theta_0$, and consider o_1 and o_0 that satisfy $o_1 \in o(\theta_1)$ and $o_0 \in o(\theta_0)$. For $i \in \{0, 1\}$, let $r_i = 0$ if $o_i \leq \bar{o}$ and $r_i = p$ if $o_i > \bar{o}$. IC requires

$$\begin{aligned} u(o_0, r_0; \theta_0) &\geq u(o_1, r_1; \theta_0) \\ u(o_1, r_1; \theta_1) &\geq u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) \end{aligned}$$

where $u(o, r; \theta) \equiv to - \theta \frac{o^2}{2} + \gamma(o) + r(\gamma(o) - K) + (1 - r)\Psi$. Rearranging, this can be rewritten as

$$\frac{1}{2}\theta_1(o_0^2 - o_1^2) \geq G \geq \frac{1}{2}\theta_0(o_0^2 - o_1^2) \quad (\text{a.20})$$

where $G \equiv t(o_0 - o_1) + (1 + r_0)\gamma(o_0) - (1 + r_1)\gamma(o_1) + (\Psi + K)(r_1 - r_0)$. Condition (a.20)

¹¹The same holds for $S(o, 0)$, since $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 0) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 0)] = \mathcal{M}^+(\widehat{\theta}_o) + \Psi - \mathcal{M}^+(\widetilde{\theta}_o) - \Psi = \mathcal{M}^+(\widehat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^+(\widetilde{\theta}_o) > 0$.

implies $(\theta_1 - \theta_0)(o_0^2 - o_1^2) \geq 0$ and, hence, $o_0 \geq o_1$.

Step 2 $\theta_1 > \theta_0$ has a lower incentive than θ_0 to deviate to $o' > o_0$, and a larger incentive than θ_0 to deviate to $o'' < o_1$.

Proof of step 2: Consider first a deviation to $o' > o_0$. The net gain obtained by θ_0 from the deviation is

$$u(o', r'; \theta_0) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_0) \quad (\text{a.21})$$

The net gain obtained by θ_1 from the deviation is

$$u(o', r'; \theta_1) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) + u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) - u(o_1, r_1; \theta_1) \quad (\text{a.22})$$

$$\leq u(o', r'; \theta_1) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) \quad (\text{a.23})$$

where the inequality follows since, by incentive compatibility, $u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) - u(o_1, r_1; \theta_1) \leq 0$. To prove the result it remains to show that

$$u(o', r'; \theta_0) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_0) \geq u(o', r'; \theta_1) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) \quad (\text{a.24})$$

$$\text{i.e. } u(o', r'; \theta_0) - u(o', r'; \theta_1) \geq u(o_0, r_0; \theta_0) - u(o_0, r_0; \theta_1) \quad (\text{a.25})$$

Substituting, this requires

$$\frac{1}{2}(o')^2(\theta_1 - \theta_0) \geq \frac{1}{2}o_0^2(\theta_1 - \theta_0)$$

which always holds since $\theta_1 - \theta_0 > 0$ and $o' > o_0$. This proves that θ_1 has a lower incentive than θ_0 to deviate to $o' > o_0$. The proof to show that θ_1 has a higher incentive than θ_0 to deviate to $o'' < o_1$ is analogous and is therefore omitted.

Step 3 In equilibrium, there cannot be pooling at any $o > 0$.

Proof of step 3: Suppose that there is $o > 0$ at which types $[\theta_0, \theta_1]$ pool. Consider $o - \varepsilon$, where ε is arbitrarily small. If this action is taken in equilibrium, then $\gamma(o - \varepsilon) > \theta_1 > \gamma(o)$. If this action is not taken in equilibrium, then by the argument in step 2, the D1-refined belief following a deviation to $o - \varepsilon$ is that $\theta \geq \theta_1$. In both cases, types in $[\theta_0, \theta_1]$ would have an incentive to deviate to $o - \varepsilon$. This proves that any $o > 0$ is selected by at most one type in equilibrium.

Step 4 There exists $\varepsilon_0 > 0$ such that, in equilibrium, nobody selects $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ for all $\varepsilon < \varepsilon_0$.

Proof of step 4: Suppose that this is not the case. For any type θ , the net gain from selecting \bar{o} instead of $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ is

$$[t\bar{o} - \theta \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} + \gamma(\bar{o}) + \Psi] - [t(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) - \theta \frac{(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)^2}{2} + \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) + p(\gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) - K) + (1 - p)\Psi]$$

When $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ this becomes

$$\gamma(\bar{o}) - \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) + p[\Psi + K - \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)] > 0 \quad (\text{a.26})$$

where the inequality follows from (a.8) and the fact that, by step 1 and step 3, $\gamma(\bar{o}) > \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)$. This proves that, for ε sufficiently small, any type θ who selects $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ would have an incentive to deviate to \bar{o} .

Denote as θ_{thres} the type who selects \bar{o} in equilibrium. If $\theta_{thres} > \theta_{min}$, then there must be a $\theta_{thres} > \bar{o}$ such that θ_{thres} is indifferent between \bar{o} and θ_{thres} , and randomizes between the two in equilibrium. In this case the out-of-equilibrium belief upon observing $\bar{o} + \varepsilon < \theta_{thres}$ is not covered by step 2 since $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ is both higher than \bar{o} and lower than θ_{thres} . Conditional on $\theta > \theta_{thres}$, the net gain from deviating to $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ is

$$\begin{aligned} & t\bar{o} - \theta \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} + \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) + p(\gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon) - K) + (1 - p)\Psi \\ & - [t\theta - \theta \frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} + \theta + \Psi] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{a.27})$$

where $o(\theta) < \bar{o}$ is θ 's equilibrium action and $\gamma(o) = \theta$. The derivative of (a.27) with respect to θ is

$$\frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} - \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} - 1 + (\theta o(\theta) - t) o'(\theta) \quad (\text{a.28})$$

By optimality, $o(\theta)$ satisfies $t - \theta o + \gamma'(o) = 0$, implying that $\theta = \frac{t + \gamma'(o)}{o}$ and, hence, (since $\gamma(o) = \theta$)

$$\theta o = t + \frac{d\theta}{de} \text{ so that } o'(\theta) = \frac{1}{\theta o(\theta) - t} < 0.$$

Substituting in (a.28) we obtain $\frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} - \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} < 0$, implying that θ_{thres} experiences a greater net gain from deviating to $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ than any other $\theta > \theta_{thres}$. Consider now $\theta < \theta_{thres}$. The net gain from deviating to $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ is

$$t\bar{o} - \theta \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} + \gamma(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)(1 + p) - [t\theta - \theta \frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} + \theta(1 + p)] \quad (\text{a.29})$$

where $o(\theta) > o_{thres}$ is θ 's equilibrium action and $\gamma(o) = \theta$. The derivative of (a.29) with respect to θ gives

$$\frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} - \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} - (1+p) + (\theta o(\theta) - t) o'(\theta) \quad (\text{a.30})$$

By optimality, $o(\theta)$ satisfies $t - \theta o + \gamma'(o)(1+p) = 0$, implying that $\theta = \frac{t + \gamma'(o)(1+p)}{o}$ and, hence,

$$o'(\theta) = \frac{1+p}{\theta o(\theta) - t} < 0.$$

Substituting in (a.30) delivers $\frac{o(\theta)^2}{2} - \frac{\bar{o}^2}{2} > 0$, implying that θ_{thres} has a greater net gain from deviating to $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ than any other $\theta < \theta_{thres}$. This proves that the D1-refined belief upon observing $\bar{o} + \varepsilon$ is that $\theta = \theta_{thres}$. We now prove that the D1-refined belief upon observing $\bar{o} - \varepsilon$ tends to θ_{thres} as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$. If $\bar{o} - \varepsilon$ is played in equilibrium this is straightforward and follows from full separation and monotonicity of $o(\theta)$. If $\bar{o} - \varepsilon$ is not played in equilibrium, then the result is derived by applying Step 2 above. Overall, this implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon)] &= \Psi - p\theta_{thres} - (1-p)\Psi \\ &= p(\Psi - \theta_{thres}) \end{aligned}$$

as described in the proposition. ■

Proof of Proposition A2. Consider first the case where all observers are close. We have

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{dp} = \frac{K}{\Xi'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} \quad (\text{a.31})$$

where $\Xi(\cdot)$ is defined in (a.12) and, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.2, $\Xi'(\cdot) < 0$ under monotonicity. Hence, $d\tilde{\theta}_o/dp < 0$. Since $\hat{\theta}_o$ is independent of p , this means that

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)$$

is increasing in p .

Consider now the case of both close and distant observers. We have

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{dp} = \frac{K - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) + \Psi + p \frac{\partial \Psi}{\partial p}}{F'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} \quad (\text{a.32})$$

where $F(\cdot)$ is defined in (a.15) and, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.3, $F'(\cdot) < 0$ under monotonicity. Since $K - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) + \Psi > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \Psi}{\partial p} = \frac{1}{\Theta^2} \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) [\mu_{\theta} - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i})] g(o_i) do_i > 0$,

$d\tilde{\theta}_o/dp < 0$. Since $\hat{\theta}_o$ is unaffected by p , this means that

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) + p[\Psi - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)]$$

is increasing in p . ■

Proof of Proposition A3. We prove that, under monotonicity, $\tilde{\theta}_o$ is increasing in q . Define

$$\Upsilon(\theta_o) \equiv t - \theta_o o - K - \Psi + [(1 - q)F(\theta_o)\mathcal{M}^-(\theta_o) + q\mu_\theta]Z - \Delta(\theta_o) \quad (\text{a.33})$$

where, since $p = 1$,

$$\Psi = \frac{\mu_\theta}{\Theta} - \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} \frac{1}{\Theta} \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) g(o_i) do_i \quad (\text{a.34})$$

and $\Theta = 1 - \int_{\bar{o}}^{o_{\max}} g(o_i) F(\tilde{\theta}_{o_i}) do_i$. The threshold type $\tilde{\theta}_o$ (when interior) satisfies $\Upsilon(\tilde{\theta}_o) = 0$, so that

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{do} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_o}{\Upsilon'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} \quad (\text{a.35})$$

Monotonicity requires any interior $\tilde{\theta}_o$ to be decreasing in o and, hence, that $\Upsilon'(\theta_o) < 0$ for all θ_o and o . Henceforth, suppose that this is the case. Straightforward computations deliver

$$\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{dq} = -\frac{\mu_\theta - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o)}{\Upsilon'(\tilde{\theta}_o)} F(\tilde{\theta}_o) Z^2 > 0 \quad (\text{a.36})$$

given $\Upsilon'(\cdot) < 0$ and $\mu_\theta - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) > 0$. Consider now

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) + \Psi - 2\mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) > 0. \quad (\text{a.37})$$

Since $\hat{\theta}_o$ is unaffected by q , and since $\mathcal{M}^-(\theta)$ is an increasing function, $\frac{d\tilde{\theta}_o}{dq} > 0$ implies that $\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)]$ is decreasing in q . Finally, it is easy to verify that $\Upsilon'(\theta_o)$ is strictly smaller than $-o - \Delta'(\theta_o) - \Psi'(\theta_o) + \mathcal{M}'^-(\theta_o)$. Hence, the following conditions are sufficient for $\Upsilon'(\cdot) < 0$: (i) $o + \Delta'(\theta) - \mathcal{M}'^-(\theta) > 0$ for all θ and o and (ii) $g(o)$ is sufficiently small for all o . ■

B. Vignettes used in the experiments

The five vignettes we chose to investigate in all except for the Bad law experiment describe different types of behavior, all of which are illegal only if particular thresholds are crossed. The five behaviors to be evaluated were: 1) an older adult having sex with a person just below or above the legal age of consent; 2) selling alcohol to a youth who is known to be a vandal who is just below or above the age at which a person can legally be sold alcohol; 3) entering one's country with an amount of cash just below or above the threshold at which it must legally be declared to customs, and not declaring it; 4) driving with a blood-alcohol level just below or above the legal limit; 5) driving at a speed just below or above the legal speed limit.

These behaviors were chosen because each is subject to a legal threshold in both the UK and China (although for some of them the threshold is set at different levels in each country). Moreover, we wanted to select behaviors which, in their legal version, would cover a range of positions across the social appropriateness scale. For instance, while it may be viewed as morally dubious – even when such behavior is legal – for an older adult to have sex with a younger person, or for someone to sell alcohol to a youth (especially if they are a known local vandal), it is unlikely that anyone would consider it inappropriate to drive just below the legal speed limit, or carry a large but legal amount of cash undeclared through customs.

All five of the vignettes are constructed such that subjects are made aware of the legal threshold, and in all cases the characters whose behavior they are evaluating also know whether their behavior is legal or illegal.

B.1. Main experiment, Prosocial traits experiment and Rule of law experiment

Below, we present the vignettes from the main experiment (Section II of the main paper), prosocial traits experiment (Section IV.B) and rule of law experiment (Section IV.D). We present first the wordings of the vignettes, which were consistent across these experiments apart from the minor changes indicated and the fact that in second-order beliefs versions of experiments the vignettes were preceded by a statement informing subjects that this text had previously been shown to another set of participants. We then display the questions which were posed to subjects underneath the vignettes, which differed across the experiments.

Where two wordings appear in parentheses, the wording on the left applies to the UK experiments and the wording to the right to the China (rule of law) experiment.

AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE

Wording: A (20/18) year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl to come to his

home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of (16/14) years. The girl tells the man that she is aged (Age)*, and shows him an ID card which confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man then has sex with the girl.

* *The possible value of (Age) were: 16 years and 3 months, 16 years and 1 month, 15 years and 11 months or 15 years and 9 months for the UK student sample; 16 years and 4 months, 16 years and 3 months, 16 years and 2 months, 16 years and 1 month, 15 years and 11 months, 15 years and 10 months, 15 years and 9 months or 15 years and 8 months for the other UK samples; 14 years and 3 months, 14 years and 1 month, 13 years and 11 months or 13 years and 9 months for the China sample.*

Questions

Main experiment, Krupka-Weber method / Rule of Law experiment: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to have sex with the girl? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the man to have sex with the girl? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the man to have sex with the girl?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Prosocial traits experiment, first-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this man to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this man reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this man keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this man more change than he was due, how likely would the man be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this man keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this man volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Prosocial traits experiment, second-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked: "How likely is this man to keep a promise made to a friend?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man reads at least two books per month?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked: "If a cashier accidentally gave this man more change than he was due, how likely would the man be to return the extra change?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man volunteers for a charitable organisation?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE

Wordings: A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in (Britain/China) it is illegal for shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. The shopkeeper knows the youth personally, and knows that he is aged (Age)*. The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a box containing 20 alcoholic beers, and the shopkeeper sells it to him.

**The possible value of (Age) were: 18 years and 3 months, 18 years and 1 month, 17 years and 11 months or 17 years and 9 months for the UK student and China samples; 18 years and 4 months, 18 years and 3 months, 18 years and 2 months, 18 years and 1 month, 17 years and 11 months, 17 years and 10 months, 17 years and 9 months or 17 years and 8 months for the other UK samples.*

Questions

Main experiment, Krupka-Weber method / Rule of Law experiment: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Prosocial traits experiment, first-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this shopkeeper to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this shopkeeper reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this shopkeeper keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this shopkeeper more change than the shopkeeper was due, how likely would the shopkeeper be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this shopkeeper keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this shopkeeper volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Prosocial traits experiment, second-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked: "How likely is this shopkeeper to keep a promise made to a friend?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this shopkeeper reads at least two books per month?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this shopkeeper keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very

likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked: "If a cashier accidentally gave this shopkeeper more change than the shopkeeper was due, how likely would the shopkeeper be to return the extra change?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this shopkeeper keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this shopkeeper volunteers for a charitable organisation?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE

Wording: A man is returning to (Britain/China) from an overseas holiday. In his suitcase he is carrying cash worth (Amount)*. In the airport he notices a sign informing passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than (10,000 Euros into Britain / 5,000 US dollars into China) from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man enters the country without declaring the cash to customs.

**The possible values of (Amount) were 9,700, 9,900, 10,100 or 10,300 Euros for the UK student sample; 9,600, 9,700, 9,800, 9,900, 10,100, 10,200, 10,300 or 10,400 Euros for the other UK samples; \$4,700, \$4,900, \$5,100 or \$5,300 for the China sample.*

Questions

Main experiment, Krupka-Weber method / Rule of Law experiment: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Prosocial traits experiment, first-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this man to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this man reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this man keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this man more change than he was due, how likely would the man be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this man keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this man volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Prosocial traits experiment, second-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked: "How likely is this man to keep a promise made to a friend?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man reads at least two books per month?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked: "If a cashier accidentally gave this man more change than he was due, how likely would the man be to return the extra change?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this man volunteers for a charitable organisation?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very

likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE

Wording: A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art breathalysers, machines which can measure a person's blood alcohol content with extremely high accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in (City)*, the woman remembers she has one of the breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below (0.08% / 0.02%), the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in (England/China). She tests herself and discovers that her blood alcohol content is (Percentage)**. The woman then drives home.

**(City) was 'Nottingham' for the UK student sample, 'Ningbo' for the China sample, and 'a city in England' for the other UK samples. Note that we specified 'England' rather than 'Britain' because, unlike the laws featured in the other scenarios, drink-driving laws differ across the constituent countries of the UK. **The possible values of (Percentage) were: 0.077%, 0.079%, 0.081% or 0.083% for the UK student sample; 0.076%, 0.077%, 0.078%, 0.079%, 0.081%, 0.082%, 0.083% or 0.084% for the other UK samples; 0.017%, 0.019%, 0.021% or 0.023% for the China sample.*

Questions

Main experiment, Krupka-Weber method / Rule of Law experiment: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive home? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive home? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive home?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Prosocial traits experiment, first-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this woman to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this woman reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this woman keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this woman more change than she was due, how likely would the

woman be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this woman keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this woman volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Prosocial traits experiment, second-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked: "How likely is this woman to keep a promise made to a friend?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman reads at least two books per month?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked: "If a cashier accidentally gave this woman more change than she was due, how likely would the woman be to return the extra change?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman volunteers for a charitable organisation?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

SPEEDING VIGNETTE

Wording: A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is (70 miles per hour / 120 kilometres per hour). The woman drives for the next five minutes at (Speed)*, before turning onto a different road.

*The possible values of (Speed) were: 67, 69, 71 or 73 miles per hour for the UK student sample; 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73 or 74 miles per hour for the other UK samples; 117, 119, 121, 123 kilometers per hour for the China sample.

Questions

Main experiment, Krupka-Weber method / Rule of Law experiment: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Main experiment, Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Prosocial traits experiment, first-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this woman to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this woman reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this woman keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this woman more change than she was due, how likely would the woman be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this woman keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this woman volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Prosocial traits experiment, second-order beliefs: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked: "How likely is this woman to keep a promise made to a friend?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman reads at least two books per month?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked: "If a cashier accidentally gave this woman more change than she was due, how likely would the woman be to return the extra change?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked: "How likely is it that this woman volunteers for a charitable organisation?"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

B.2. Placebo experiment

The wordings of the vignettes were identical across the three samples among which we conducted the placebo experiment (Section IV.A of the main paper), except that for the second-order beliefs sample of the opinion matching version we first explained that the text had been presented to an earlier set of participants. The questions asked to subjects differed across versions, as indicated below.

AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE

Wording: A 20 year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl to come to his home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of 16 years. The girl tells the man that she is aged (Age)*, and shows him an ID card which confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man remembers a recent conversation with a group of friends, who expressed the opinion that it would be appropriate to have sex with any girl so long as she was above the age of 15 years and 6 months, and inappropriate otherwise. The man then has sex with the girl.

** The possible value of (Age) were 16 years and 4 months, 16 years and 3 months, 16 years and 2 months, 16 years and 1 month, 15 years and 11 months, 15 years and 10 months, 15 years and 9 months or 15 years and 8 months, 15 years and 7 months, 15 years and 5 months, 15 years and 4 months, 15 years and 3 months, 15 years and 2 months.*

Questions

Krupka-Weber method: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to have sex with the girl? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the man to have sex with the girl? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the man to have sex with the girl?" What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE

Wording: A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in Britain it is illegal for shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. The shopkeeper knows the youth personally, and knows that he is aged (Age)*. The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a box containing 20 alcoholic beers. The shopkeeper remembers recently visiting the website of a campaign group, who were arguing that it is appropriate to allow people to drink alcohol when at least 6 months have passed after their 18th birthday, and inappropriate otherwise. The shopkeeper then sells the beers to the youth.

**The possible value of (Age) were 18 years and 10 months, 18 years and 9 months, 18 years and 8 months, 18 years and 7 month, 18 years and 5 months, 18 years and 4 months, 18 years and 3 months, 18 years and 2 months, 18 years and 1 month, 17 years and 11 months, 17 years and 10 months, 17 years and 9 months, 17 years and 8 months.*

Questions Krupka-Weber method: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do

you think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE

Wording: A man is returning to Britain from an overseas holiday. In his suitcase he is carrying cash worth (Amount)*. In the airport he notices a sign informing passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than 10,000 Euros into Britain from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man overhears one customs official telling a colleague about a focus group that had previously been run among customs officials working in the airport, which had asked the officials what they thought the legal limit should be. The customs official said that most of the officials in the focus group thought the legal limit should be above 10,500 Euros, and told her colleague that she would therefore consider it appropriate if someone failed to disclose bringing in any amount less than 10,500 Euros, but inappropriate if they failed to disclose bringing any larger amount. After hearing this conversation, the man then enters the country without declaring the cash to customs.

**The possible values of (Amount) were 9,600, 9,700, 9,800, 9,900, 10,100, 10,200, 10,300, 10,400, 10,600, 10,700, 10,800, 10,900 Euros.*

Questions

Krupka-Weber method: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs: How appropriate do you think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs: Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs?" What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE

Wording: A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art breathalysers, machines which can measure a person's blood alcohol content with extremely high accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in a city in England, the woman remembers she has one of the breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below 0.08%, the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in England. She tests herself and discovers that her blood

alcohol content is (Percentage)*. The woman remembers reading the previous day about a panel of scientists who were arguing that it is appropriate to drive with a blood alcohol content below 0.075%, and inappropriate otherwise. The woman then drives home.

**The possible values of (Percentage) were 0.071%, 0.072%, 0.073%, 0.074%, 0.076%, 0.077%, 0.078%, 0.079%, 0.081%, 0.082%, 0.083%, 0.084%.*

Questions *Krupka-Weber method*: How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive home? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

***Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs*:** How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive home? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

***Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs*:** Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive home?" What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

SPEEDING VIGNETTE

Wording: A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is 70 miles per hour. The woman remembers hearing the previous week about a petition to raise speed limits on motorways, arguing that it is appropriate to drive at speeds up to 75mph, and inappropriate at higher speeds. The woman drives for the next five minutes at (Speed)*, before turning onto a different road.

**The possible values of (Speed) were 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79 miles per hour.*

Questions

***Krupka-Weber method*:** How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)? (Possible answers: Very socially appropriate; Somewhat socially appropriate; Somewhat socially inappropriate; Very socially inappropriate)

***Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs*:** How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

***Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs*:** Participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think it is for the woman to drive at (Speed)?" What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very appropriate; Somewhat appropriate; Somewhat inappropriate; Very inappropriate)

B.3. "Bad" law experiment

In this experiment, we used only one non-filler vignette, which was different from those used in all other experiments. The wording was the same in the first and second order beliefs versions, except that when eliciting second order beliefs we first told subjects that the vignette had already been presented to another set of respondents.

Wording: A landlord recently rented the apartment next door to a young woman who lives alone. The woman is sometimes visited in her apartment by her ex-boyfriend, who is often intoxicated. On one occasion, on July 5, the ex-boyfriend became violent and damaged property at the apartment, and the landlord called 911 which resulted in the ex-boyfriend being charged with Criminal Mischief.

After that incident, the police informed the landlord that, under the city's nuisance property ordinance, the apartment would be declared a chronic nuisance if the police had to respond to similar incidents at the same address on three more separate occasions within the next 30 days. This would mean that the landlord may be required to pay a civil penalty of \$250 per day until the nuisance is abated, plus a penalty of \$1000 per incident for any further incidents that occurred after the apartment had been declared a chronic nuisance. The police officer told him: "If you want to avoid being in violation of the ordinance, this is the rule: the police cannot be called to respond to similar incidents at the address more than twice again in the next 30 days."

Between July 6 and July 24, (Text A)*. Then, on July 25, the landlord finds the woman's ex-boyfriend outside the apartment as he is trying to kick down her front door, shouting threats at her. (Text B)*. The landlord calls 911 and asks the operator to send a police officer to the woman's apartment.

**The possible wordings of (Text A) were: "the landlord does not call the police to the woman's apartment again"; "the landlord calls the police to respond to a similar incident at the woman's apartment once more"; "the landlord calls the police to respond to a similar incident at the woman's apartment twice more"; "the landlord calls the police to respond to a similar incident at the woman's apartment three more times".*

Correspondingly, the possible wordings of (Text B) were: "The landlord knows that calling the police would not be in violation of the ordinance, as this would be the first occasion they had been called there since the initial incident on July 5"; "The landlord knows that calling the police would not be in violation of the ordinance, as this would be the second occasion they had been called there since the initial incident on July 5"; "The landlord knows that calling the police would be in violation of the ordinance, as this would be the third occasion they had been called there since the initial incident on July 5"; "The landlord knows that calling the police would be in violation of the ordinance, as this would be the fourth occasion they had been called there since the initial incident on July 5"

Questions

Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs, Trustworthiness/Honesty/Altruism treatment:

Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is this landlord to keep a promise made to a friend? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this landlord reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this landlord keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) If a cashier accidentally gave this landlord more change than he was due, how likely would the landlord be to return the extra change? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) How likely is it that this landlord keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) How likely is it that this landlord volunteers for a charitable organisation? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Opinion matching method, first-order beliefs, Rule-following treatment: Please answer the following questions.

1) How likely is it that this landlord obeys rules regardless of whether doing so has negative consequences for himself and/or others? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) How likely is it that this landlord reads at least two books per month? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) How likely is it that this landlord keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) How likely is it that this landlord keeps fit by regularly going to the gym? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs, Trustworthiness/Honesty/Altruism treatment: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked “How likely is this landlord to keep a promise made to a friend?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord reads at least two books per month?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord keeps a healthy diet, avoiding

fatty foods and refined sugar?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked “If a cashier accidentally gave this landlord more change than he was due, how likely would the landlord be to return the extra change?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

5) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

6) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord volunteers for a charitable organisation?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

Opinion matching method, second-order beliefs, Rule-following treatment: Please answer the following questions.

1) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord obeys rules regardless of whether doing so has negative consequences for himself and/or others?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

2) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord reads at least two books per month?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

3) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord keeps a healthy diet, avoiding fatty foods and refined sugar?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

4) Participants were asked “How likely is it that this landlord keeps fit by regularly going to the gym?” What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (Possible answers: Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely)

C. Screenshots of experimental instructions

We first present screenshots from the UK and US experiments and then from the China experiment. The size has been adjusted so that each screen fits on one page – in the experiment itself subjects could scroll up and down.

UK and US experiments

Screenshots are taken from the main experiment, Sample 2 version (UK General population, Krupka-Weber method). Where the other UK/US experiments differed, this is explained below (or occasionally above) each screenshot. Note that we used American spellings for the US experiment, but below all wordings are presented using British spellings.

0% 100%

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What is your age?

▼

What is your nationality?

United Kingdom
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba

>>

- This was not included in the student experiment.

- The Main experiment opinion-matching version, Placebo experiment, Prosocial traits experiment and “Bad” law experiment also required subjects to enter their Prolific ID at the top of this screen.

0% 100%

 The University of Nottingham

What is your gender?

Male

Female

Roughly, what is your pre-tax personal income per year?

Which region of the United Kingdom, as defined by the census, do you live in?

South West England

South East England

London

East England

East Midlands

West Midlands

Wales

North West England

Yorkshire and the Humber

North East England

Scotland

Northern Ireland

<< >>

- Not included in the student experiment.
- The Placebo experiment, Prosocial traits experiment and “Bad” law experiment also asked for subjects’ ethnicity.
- In the “Bad” law experiment, subjects were instead asked which American state they resided in.
- Following this screen, the second-order beliefs opinion-matching versions of the Main experiment and Placebo experiment, and the Krupka-Weber version of the Placebo experiment, had the below message.


Welcome!

Thank you for accepting our study.
Including the time for reading these instructions, the study will take about 15 minutes to complete.

To complete this study you will receive a guaranteed participation fee of **£1.88** plus a bonus of up to **£30** that will depend on your decisions during the study.

At the end of the study, you will receive a link taking you back to Prolific, which you must click on to receive your payment.

- The same message, excluding the mention of possible bonus payment, was included in the first-order beliefs versions of these experiments. The equivalent messages (respectively with and without the mention of possible bonus payment) were presented to subjects in the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, except that the guaranteed participation fee was £0.94 and the stated study duration was 5-10 minutes.



- The title was changed to *Qualtrics survey about behaviour* for the Prosocial traits experiment, and to *Qualtrics survey about behavior* for the “Bad” law experiment.
- *Socially appropriate* was replaced by *appropriate* for the first-order versions of the opinion-matching method Main and Placebo experiments.
- The sentence beginning *The project is a study about...* was replaced by *This project is a study about your predictions towards other people's opinions* in the second-order

versions of the opinion matching method Main and Placebo experiments, and second-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments. In the first-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, it was replaced by *The project is a study about people’s perceptions towards those who engage in particular behaviours.*

- The sentence beginning *In the following survey...* was replaced by *In the following survey, you will be presented with a series of questions that were asked to respondents of a previous survey, and you will be asked to report what you believe the most common answers to these questions were* in the second-order versions of the opinion-matching method Main and Placebo experiments, and second-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments. In the first-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, it was replaced by *In the following survey, you will be presented with a series of hypothetical people's behaviour, and you will be asked to report how these people would be likely to behave in other contexts.*
- The sentence beginning *Depending on your responses...* was not included in any first-order beliefs experiments. For second-order beliefs experiments, the text referred to the responses of *other participants* rather than *others to the survey.*
- In the student experiment, following *Any information provided will be confidential,* were the additional sentences: *Your student ID number will be taken so that we can contact participants who are selected to receive payment, but when stored the data will be anonymized as quickly as possible, and your identity will not be revealed to any third party.*
- In response to a request from our ethics committee, all experiments run in 2021 except the first-order beliefs version of the opinion matching Main experiment contained a warning on this screen that the survey would (or, in the Prosocial traits experiment, might) contain questions about sexual behaviour.

0% 100%

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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Project topic: Qualtrics survey on social appropriateness

Researchers' names: Tom Lane and Daniele Nosenzo

Please click on all the statements below, to confirm you agree with each statement.

I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the research project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part.

I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it.

I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and that this will not affect my status now or in the future.

I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be identified and my personal results will remain confidential.

I understand that data will be stored in accordance with data protection laws.


I understand that I may contact the researcher if I require more information about the research, and that I may contact the Research Ethics Sub-Committee of the Nottingham School of Economics if I wish to make a complaint related to my involvement in the research.

<< >>

- There was an additional screen at this point in the student experiment, reading:

This survey should take around 45 minutes to complete. If you need to stop, you can save your responses and return to the survey later.

First, please enter your student ID number. Make sure you enter this correctly, as we will use it to contact you regarding payment. (followed by box to enter ID number)



- This screen was not included in the first-order beliefs versions of the Main, Placebo, Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments.
- In the second-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, subjects were instead told we would randomly pick one out of every ten to be eligible to receive bonus payment.
- In the student experiment, this screen read:

Regarding payment:

After all participants have completed the survey, we will randomly pick one out of every five to receive payment. We will email all participants by September 28 to notify them whether they have been selected for payment or not. Participants selected for payment will then be able to collect their money from the Clive Granger Building on University Park Campus. If you have any questions regarding payment for this survey, please email Tom.Lane@nottingham.edu.cn.

If you are selected for payment, you will receive a participation fee of £10. Based on your response to the survey, you may also receive an additional £30. Further details will be provided at the relevant point in the survey.

0% 100%

The University of Nottingham

Information about this survey

This survey will describe 15 hypothetical situations, and will ask you how socially appropriate certain behaviour is in these situations. In each case, you must indicate whether the behaviour would be "socially appropriate" or "socially inappropriate". There will be four possible responses, as shown below, of which you must select exactly one.

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

By socially appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think most people would agree is the "right" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to behave in a socially inappropriate way, then other people might be angry at them. Note that the "right" thing to do may not necessarily be made explicit or supported by laws, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions. So an action may be 'appropriate' even if it is not legal; or 'inappropriate' even if it is not illegal. Rather, an appropriate action is an action that most people believe ought to be taken (regardless of whether it is legal or not), and they may be prepared to express their disapproval if it is not taken.

In each of your responses, we would like you to answer based on your opinions of what most people believe constitutes socially appropriate or socially inappropriate behaviour.

After all responses to the survey are completed, we will randomly select one of the situations we asked you about. We will look at your answer to how socially appropriate the behaviour described in the situation was. To reward you, if your answer to this question is the same as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey, and if you are one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment, we will give you a £30 bonus. All participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the first-order beliefs version of the opinion matching Main and Placebo experiments, the term *appropriate* was used instead of *socially appropriate*. In these experiments, the final three paragraphs were replaced by:

By appropriate, we mean behaviour that you think is the "right" thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if someone were to behave in an inappropriate way, then you might be angry at them. Note that the "right" thing to do may not necessarily be made explicit or supported by laws, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions. So you may think that an action is 'appropriate' even if it is not legal; or 'inappropriate' even if it is not illegal. Rather, an appropriate action is an action that you believe ought to be taken (regardless of whether it is legal or not), and you may be prepared to express your disapproval if it is not taken.

In each of your responses, we would like you to answer based on what you believe constitutes appropriate or inappropriate behaviour.

- In the second-order opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, subjects were told:

In this survey your task is to guess the most common answers given to questions in a previous survey.

This previous survey described 15 hypothetical situations, and we asked respondents how appropriate certain behaviour is in these situations. In each case, respondents had to indicate whether the behaviour was "appropriate" or "inappropriate". There were four possible responses, as shown below, of which respondents had to select exactly one.

Subjects then saw a picture of the four options available to respondents of the first-order beliefs version. They then saw the final paragraphs of the screen that had been presented to first-order beliefs subjects, preceded by the statement *We gave the following explanation to respondents about what we meant by "appropriate":*.

Finally, subjects in these versions saw the following paragraphs:

All participants in the previous survey were British and recruited online on Prolific.

After you have completed this survey, we will randomly select one of the questions in which we asked you to predict respondents' answers in the previous survey. We will look at your prediction as to what the most common answer was to how appropriate the behaviour described in the situation was. To reward you, if you correctly predicted the

most common answer for this situation, and if you are one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment, we will give you a £30 bonus.

- In the first-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, subjects were told:

This survey will describe 4 hypothetical people's behaviour, and in each case will ask your opinion about how this person would behave in other contexts. For each person, we will list possible behaviours in these other contexts and ask you how likely it is that this person would do them. For each question there will be four possible responses, as shown below, of which you must select exactly one.

The four options they were shown were (*Very likely, Somewhat likely, Somewhat unlikely, Very unlikely*). The last three paragraphs were dropped.

- In the second-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, subjects were told:

In this survey your task is to guess the most common answers given to questions in a previous survey.

This previous survey described 4 hypothetical people's behaviour, and in each case we asked respondents their opinions about how this person would behave in other contexts. For each person, we listed possible behaviours in these other contexts and asked respondents how likely it is that this person would do them. For each question, there were four possible responses, as shown below, of which respondents had to select exactly one.


After seeing the four available options, subjects in the Prosocial traits experiment were told:

All participants in the previous survey were British and recruited online on Prolific.

After you have completed this survey, we will randomly select one of the questions in which we asked you to predict respondents' answers in the previous survey. We will look at your prediction as to what the most common answer was regarding how likely the person described was to behave in a particular way. To reward you, if you correctly predicted the most common answer to this question, and if you are one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment, we will give you a £30 bonus.

Subjects in the “Bad” law experiment also saw the above wording, except that they were told all participants in the previous survey were American.

- In the student experiment, the final two sentences read: *To reward you, if your answer to this question is the same as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey, and if you are one of the participants selected for payment, we will give you £30 in addition to your participation fee. All participants in this survey are British and studying at the University of Nottingham.*



- In the second-order opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, *situation* was replaced by *question*.
- In the first-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, the sentence was replaced by *We will now go through an example of a possible person's behaviour and demonstrate how you would respond to questions about the person.*
- In the second-order version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, the sentence read *We will now go through an example of a possible set of questions and demonstrate how you would respond to them.*

An example situation

A man is planning to attend a friend's wedding on Saturday. The man is a big football fan and, two days before the wedding, he is offered free tickets to watch an important football match. The man decides to take the tickets. On the Saturday, he goes to the football match, and tells his friend he is too ill to attend the wedding.

Suppose you thought this behaviour was somewhat socially inappropriate. Then you would answer this question as follows:

How socially appropriate would most people think the man's behaviour is?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Then, if you were one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment and if this was the situation we randomly selected to look at, we would give you £30 if 'somewhat socially inappropriate' was also the answer to this question provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. If a different answer was provided by the highest number of participants, we would not give you this £30.

<<

>>

- In the first-order beliefs opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, *socially appropriate/inappropriate* was replaced by *appropriate/inappropriate*. The

question in the example was *How appropriate do you think the man's behaviour is?* The paragraph at the bottom of the screen was not present in these versions.

- In the second-order beliefs opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, the heading was changed to **An example question**. The vignette was preceded by the sentence *Suppose that we presented participants of the previous survey with the following scenario:*. The paragraph beginning *Suppose you thought this behaviour...* was replaced by:

Suppose participants were asked: "How appropriate do you think the man's behaviour is?"

Suppose you thought the most common answer was that the behaviour was somewhat inappropriate. Then you would answer this question as follows:

The question *How socially appropriate would most people think the man's behaviour is?* was replaced by *What do you think was the most common answer to the question "How appropriate would most people think the man's behaviour is?"* (in the possible answers, *socially appropriate* was replaced by *appropriate*)

The final paragraph read:

Then, if you were one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment and if this was the situation we randomly selected to look at, we would give you £30 if 'somewhat inappropriate' was the answer to this scenario provided by the highest number of participants in the previous survey. If a different answer was provided by the highest number of participants, we would not give you this £30.

- In the first-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits experiment, the heading was replaced by **An example of a person's behaviour**. The paragraph beginning *Suppose you thought this behaviour...* was replaced by:

Suppose we asked you:

(1) *"How likely, in future years, is this man to tell his friend the true reason why he missed the wedding?"*

(2) *"How likely is this man to watch the football World Cup Final?"*

Suppose you thought the answer to the first question was “Somewhat unlikely” and the answer to the second question was “Very likely”. Then you would answer the questions as follows:

The screenshot showing how the questions would be answered was altered accordingly, with the possible answers *Very likely, Somewhat likely, Somewhat unlikely and Very Unlikely*. The final paragraph of the screen was not included in this version.

- In the second-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits experiment, the heading was replaced by ***Example questions***. The vignette was preceded by *Suppose that we presented participants of the previous survey with the following hypothetical person's behaviour:*

The paragraph beginning *Suppose you thought this behaviour...* was replaced by:

Suppose participants were asked:

(1) "How likely, in future years, is this man to tell his friend the true reason why he missed the wedding?"

(2) "How likely is this man to watch the football World Cup Final?"

Suppose you thought the most common answer to the first question was “somewhat unlikely” and the most common answer to the second question was “very likely”. Then you would answer these questions as follows:

The screenshot showing how the questions would be answered was altered accordingly, with the questions in the pictures commencing with *What do you think was the most common answer in the previous survey to the question...*

In this version, the final paragraph of the screen was replaced by:

Then, if you were one of the participants selected as eligible for bonus payment and if we randomly selected the second question about this person to look at, we would give you £30 if ‘very likely’ was the answer to this scenario provided by the highest number of participants in the previous survey. If a different answer was provided by the highest number of participants, we would not give you this £30.

- In the first- and second-order beliefs versions of the “Bad” law experiment, this screen looked the same as in the corresponding version of the Prosocial traits experiment, except


that the word ‘match’ was replaced by ‘game’ and the second question was replaced by “How likely is this man to watch the Superbowl?”

- In the student experiment, *selected as eligible for bonus payment* was replaced by *selected for payment*.
- Before the next screen, an additional screen was added to all experiments conducted in 2021 and 2022. For the first-order opinion matching versions of the Main and Placebo experiments, and the Krupka-Weber version of the Placebo experiment, this screen read:

Note: *When providing your answers, you should imagine that these situations are all taking place BEFORE the existence of Covid-19. So it is not necessary for the people in these hypothetical situations to practice social distancing or take any pandemic-related precautions.*

For the first-order Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, the screen was as above except *situations* was replaced by *behaviours* and *the people in these hypothetical situations* was replaced by *these hypothetical people*.

The second-order beliefs versions of the opinion matching Main and Placebo experiments, and Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiment, contained the equivalent text to the first-order versions, except that *Note* was replaced by *Note that we told participants in the previous survey*.



- For the second-order beliefs versions of the opinion matching Main and Placebo experiments, the first sentence was replaced by *On the next screen you will be asked to*

make your first of 15 predictions about the answers from the previous survey. Such language was also used in the second-order beliefs versions of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments, except for referring to 4 sets of predictions rather than 15 predictions.

- For the first-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiment, the sentence was replaced by *On the next screen you will be asked to evaluate the first of 4 people.*

(The following three vignettes were presented in random order)

0% 100%

 The University of Nottingham

A man is helping a friend transport goods between two houses in a village in your region. The distance between the houses is 200 metres, and today there are no other cars on the road. The man fills his car with boxes and prepares to drive between the two houses. On the radio he hears a news report reminding listeners that it is illegal to drive without wearing a seatbelt. The man does not wear a seatbelt, and drives the 200 metres to the other house at a maximum speed of 10 miles per hour.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to drive this journey without wearing a seatbelt?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

>>

- In the “Bad” laws version of the above vignette, the wording refers to *two local farms* rather than *two houses in a village in your region*, and changes *200 metres* to *500 feet*.

Changes were made to the screen above, and all subsequent vignette screens, as follows:

- In the first-order beliefs opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, *socially appropriate* was replaced by *appropriate*. In these versions, questions asked *How appropriate do you think* rather than *How socially appropriate would most people think...* The paragraph at the bottom of each screen in these versions read *Remember that by appropriate we mean behaviour that you think is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not).*
- In the second-order beliefs opinion matching version of the Main and Placebo experiments, the vignettes were preceded by *Participants in the previous survey were presented with the following situation:*

In these versions, the questions took the format:

Participants were asked: "(wording from first-order beliefs version)"

What do you predict was the most common answer to that question? (possible answers: Very appropriate, Somewhat appropriate, Somewhat inappropriate, Very inappropriate)

The bottom paragraph of each screen read:

Remember that we explained to participants that, by appropriate, we mean behaviour that they think is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you correctly predict the most common response to the question in the previous survey. Remember that all participants in the previous survey were British and recruited online on Prolific.

- In the first-order beliefs version of the Prosocial traits experiment, the one question was replaced by the set of six questions indicated in Online Appendix B.1; in the first-order beliefs version of the "Bad" law experiment, the one question was replaced by the set of either six or four questions (depending on treatment) indicated in Online Appendix B.3. The questions were always the same for all vignettes for the same subject, only changing to reflect the gender of the person in the vignette. The paragraph at the bottom of each vignette screen was not present in these versions.
- In the second-order beliefs versions of the Prosocial traits and "Bad" law experiments, all vignettes were preceded by *Participants in the previous survey were presented with the following hypothetical person's behaviour:* The one question was replaced by the set of six questions indicated in Online Appendix B.1 for the Prosocial traits experiment, or the set of either six or four questions (depending on treatment) indicated in Online Appendix B.3. The questions were always the same for all vignettes for the same subject, only changing to reflect the gender of the person in the vignette. The bottom paragraph on

each screen in this version of the Prosocial traits experiment was the following, with the same wording in the “Bad” law experiment, except that subjects were told all participants in the previous survey were American:

Remember that, if one of these questions is selected for payment, you can earn £30 from it only if you correctly predict the most common response to the question in the previous survey. Remember that all participants in the previous survey were British and recruited online on Prolific.

- In the Krupka-Weber version of the Placebo experiment, the last sentence on each screen read: *Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online on Prolific.*
- In the student experiment, the last sentence on each screen read: *Remember that all participants in this survey are British and studying at the University of Nottingham.*
- On the above screen of the student experiment, *village in your region* was replaced by *village near Nottingham.*

0% 100%



A woman has saved up £2,000 which she intends to spend on a luxury beach holiday. Just before she books the holiday, she reads a news report about a charity providing aid for hungry people in an impoverished African country. The woman decides she should donate the £2,000 to the charity instead of booking the beach holiday. However, she then changes her mind and books the beach holiday, and does not donate any money to charity.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to book the beach holiday and not donate any money to charity?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the “Bad” law experiment, the above vignette refers to \$ as the currency, and replaces *holiday* with *vacation*.

0% 100%



A woman wants to watch a foreign movie which has not yet been released in Britain. Her friends tell her about a website they have found from which she can download the movie for free. They warn her that downloading the movie from this website is illegal. Later, the woman visits the website but decides not to download the movie.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman not to download the movie?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the “Bad” law experiment, the above vignette read: *A woman wants to watch a Netflix TV show, but does not have a Netflix subscription. Her friends tell her about a website they found where she can download the show for free, but they warn her that downloading the show from this website is illegal. Later, the woman visits the website but decides not to download the show.*

(The following 12 vignettes were presented in random order, except in the Prosocial traits and “Bad” law experiments; in the Prosocial traits experiment, only one of the five threshold vignettes was randomly selected to be presented and the other filler vignettes were not presented; in the “Bad” law experiment, only the landlord vignette was presented (see Appendix B.3) and the other remaining filler vignettes were excluded).

The screenshot shows a survey question interface with a teal border. At the top, there is a progress bar from 0% to 100%. The University of Nottingham logo is in the top right. The question text describes a man who did not pay for a meal. Below the question are four radio button options: 'Very socially appropriate', 'Somewhat socially appropriate', 'Somewhat socially inappropriate', and 'Very socially inappropriate'. A final paragraph explains the survey's purpose and rules. A '>>' button is at the bottom right.

0% 100%

 The University of Nottingham

A man has eaten a meal in a restaurant. The food took a very long time to arrive, and tasted bad. The man asks the waiter for the bill, but after ten minutes the waiter has not returned. The man walks out of the restaurant without paying his bill.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to walk out without paying his bill?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

[>>](#)

0% 100%

 The University of Nottingham

A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is 70 miles per hour. The woman drives for the next five minutes at 68 miles per hour, before turning onto a different road.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive at 68 miles per hour?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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- The wording of this vignette was modified in the Placebo experiments, as indicated in Online Appendix B.2.

0%

100%



A student is having lunch at a coffee shop near campus. When she gets up to leave, she notices a wallet unattended on the floor. The student checks to see nobody is looking, and then picks the wallet up and walks out of the coffee shop with it.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the student to pick the wallet up and walk out of the coffee shop with it?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<<

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0%

100%



A homeowner wakes in the middle of the night and finds a burglar attempting to steal his television. He catches the burglar and beats him heavily, breaking the burglar's arm, before throwing him out through the front door.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the homeowner to treat the burglar this way?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<<

>>

0% 100%



On his way home from work in your local city, a doctor is approached by a man begging for money. The doctor ignores the beggar and walks away from him.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the doctor to ignore the beggar and walk away from him?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the student experiment, *your local city* was replaced by *Nottingham*.

0%

100%



A student is taking an exam which she expects to fail. Before the exam she writes some notes on a sheet of paper, and hides it under her sleeve. Just before the exam begins, the invigilator makes an announcement reminding all students that it is an offence for them to bring any materials into the exam to help them answer questions. During the exam the student secretly looks at the notes and uses them to help her answer the questions.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the student to use the notes this way?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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0% 100%

 The University of Nottingham

A construction company in your local city is bidding to the government to win a contract for a largescale infrastructure project. The CEO of the company attends a conference where an important government official makes a speech. In the speech, the official mentions that a businessman recently tried to bribe him. The official says that offering bribes to government officials is not only illegal but also bad for business. Later, the CEO asks to speak privately with the official, and then offers him a bribe worth £1 million to ensure the construction company wins the contract.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the CEO to offer the official this bribe?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the student experiment, *your local city* was replaced by *Nottingham*.

0%

100%



A woman is on her way to meet a friend, when she sees an injured man lying by the street. The woman stops to ask the man if he is OK; the man tells her he has been attacked and had his wallet and phone stolen. The woman phones the police and waits with the man until they arrive.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to help the man in this way?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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0% 100%



A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in Britain it is illegal for shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. The shopkeeper knows the youth personally, and knows that he is aged 18 years and 4 months. The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a box containing 20 alcoholic beers, and the shopkeeper sells it to him.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the shopkeeper to sell the beers to the youth?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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- The wording of this vignette was modified in the Placebo experiments, as indicated in Online Appendix B.2.

0% 100%



A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art breathalysers, machines which can measure a person's blood alcohol content with extremely high accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in a city in England, the woman remembers she has one of the breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below 0.08%, the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in England. She tests herself and discovers that her blood alcohol content is 0.079%. The woman then drives home.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the woman to drive home?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

<< >>

- In the student experiment, *a city in England* was replaced by *Nottingham*.
- The wording of this vignette was modified in the Placebo experiments, as indicated in Online Appendix B.2.

0% 100%



A 20 year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl to come to his home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of 16 years. The girl tells the man that she is aged 15 years and 8 months, and shows him an ID card which confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man then has sex with the girl.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to have sex with the girl?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate

Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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- The wording of this vignette was modified in the Placebo experiments, as indicated in Online Appendix B.2.

0% 100%



A man is returning to Britain from an overseas holiday. In his suitcase he is carrying cash worth €9,900. In the airport he notices a sign informing passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than €10,000 into Britain from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man enters the country without declaring the cash to customs.

How socially appropriate would most people think it is for the man to enter the country without declaring the cash to customs?

Very socially appropriate

Somewhat socially appropriate


Somewhat socially inappropriate

Very socially inappropriate

Remember that by socially appropriate we mean behaviour that most people taking this survey would agree is the "right thing to do" (regardless of whether it is legal or not). You can earn £30 from this question (if it is selected for payment) only if you give the same answer as the answer provided by the highest number of participants in this survey. Remember that all participants in this survey are British and recruited online.

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- The wording of this vignette was modified in the Placebo experiments, as indicated in Online Appendix B.2.



- Not included in the student, Placebo or “Bad” law experiments.
- In the second-order beliefs opinion matching version of the Main experiment, the following sentence was added at the bottom of the screen: ***In the following questions we are asking about your own opinions, not your predictions of how others would answer them.***
- In the first-order Prosocial traits experiment, this screen read:

*Finally, please consider one additional hypothetical person and answer some questions about their described behaviour. This behaviour will be **either the same as, or similar to, the behaviour of one of the people you have already considered.***

- In the second-order Prosocial traits experiment, it read:

*Finally, please consider one additional hypothetical person and answer some questions about their described behaviour. This behaviour will be **either the same as, or similar to, the behaviour of one of the people you have already considered.***


In these questions, you should answer by stating your own opinions, rather than predicting the answers of others.

(The following questions about the five scenarios were presented in random order in the Main experiment, except for the student version where they were not included. In the Prosocial traits experiment, only the questions about the vignette that was randomly presented to subjects were displayed.)

The screenshot shows a survey interface with a progress bar at the top (0% to 100%) and the University of Nottingham logo in the top right corner. The main content area is titled 'Party scenario' and contains the following text: 'A 20 year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl to come to his home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of 16 years. **The girl tells the man that she is aged 15 years and 11 months (which is below the minimum legal age of 16 years)**, and shows him an ID card which confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man then has sex with the girl.' Below the text is the question: 'In this scenario, do you think the man has broken the law?'. There are four radio button options: 'Definitely', 'Probably', 'Probably not', and 'Definitely not'. A blue '>>' button is located in the bottom right corner of the form.

- This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our soft launch data (N=35) from the Krupka-Weber version of the Main experiment, which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning *The girl tells the man...* was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (*which is below the*

minimum legal age of 16 years) was absent. Other experiments in which these screens were present always featured the updated versions.



The screenshot shows a survey interface with a teal border. At the top, a progress bar indicates 0% completion. The University of Nottingham logo is in the top right. The main text asks for a brief explanation of the previous answer, followed by a text input field. Navigation buttons are at the bottom.

- Not included if subject answered *Definitely* to previous question)

Party scenario (continued)

A 20 year old man meets a girl at a party. The man invites the girl to come to his home, and she agrees. At his home, the man tells the girl he wants to have sex with her, but that she looks young, and asks whether she is above the legal age of consent of 16 years. The girl tells the man that she is aged 15 years and 11 months (which is below the minimum legal age of 16 years), and shows him an ID card which confirms this. She tells the man that she wants to have sex with him. The man then has sex with the girl.

If the man in this scenario had wanted to avoid breaking the law, to what extent would achieving this have been within the man's control?

It would have been completely within his control

It would have been to a large extent within his control

It would have been to a small extent within his control

It would have been completely out of his control

Suppose the police observe this behavior. How accurately can the police detect whether the man in this scenario has broken the law?

Very accurately (beyond reasonable doubt)

Somewhat accurately

Somewhat inaccurately

Very inaccurately

Suppose the police have evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the man in this scenario has broken the law. How likely would they be to take action against the man?

Very likely

Somewhat likely

Somewhat unlikely

Very unlikely

0% 100%



Shop scenario

A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in Britain it is illegal for shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. **The shopkeeper knows the youth personally, and knows that he is aged 17 years and 11 months (which is below the minimum legal age of 18 years)**. The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a box containing 20 alcoholic beers, and the shopkeeper sells it to him.

In this scenario, do you think the shopkeeper has broken the law?

Definitely

Probably

Probably not

Definitely not

[>>](#)

- This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our soft launch data (N=35) from the Krupka-Weber version of the Main experiment, which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning *The shopkeeper knows the youth...* was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (*which is below the minimum legal age of 18 years*) was absent. Other experiments in which these screens were present always featured the updated versions.

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 The University of Nottingham

Please very briefly explain your choice of answer for the previous question.

 <<  >>

- Not included if subject answered *Definitely* to previous question

Shop scenario (continued)

A youth enters a local shop with the intention of buying some beer. He sees a sign in the shop reminding customers that in Britain it is illegal for shopkeepers to sell alcohol to people younger than 18 years. The shopkeeper knows the youth personally, and knows that he is aged 17 years and 11 months (which is below the minimum legal age of 18 years). The shopkeeper knows that the youth often gets drunk and vandalises property in his neighbourhood. The youth, who appears sober, asks to buy a box containing 20 alcoholic beers, and the shopkeeper sells it to him.

If the shopkeeper in this scenario had wanted to avoid breaking the law, to what extent would achieving this have been within the shopkeeper's control?

It would have been completely within the shopkeeper's control

It would have been to a large extent within the shopkeeper's control

It would have been to a small extent within the shopkeeper's control

It would have been completely out of the shopkeeper's control

Suppose the police observe this behavior. How accurately can the police detect whether the shopkeeper in this scenario has broken the law?

Very accurately (beyond reasonable doubt)

Somewhat accurately

Somewhat inaccurately

Very inaccurately

Suppose the police have evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the shopkeeper in this scenario has broken the law. How likely would they be to take action against the shopkeeper?

Very likely

Somewhat likely

Somewhat unlikely

Very unlikely

0% 100%



Bar scenario

A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art breathalysers, machines which can measure a person's blood alcohol content with extremely high accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in a city in England, the woman remembers she has one of the breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below 0.08%, the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in England. **She tests herself and discovers that her blood alcohol content is 0.081% (which is above the maximum legal level of 0.08%).** The woman then drives home.

In this scenario, do you think the woman has broken the law?

Definitely

Probably

Probably not

Definitely not

>>

- This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our soft launch data (N=35) from the Krupka-Weber version of the Main experiment, which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning *She tests herself...* was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (*which is above the maximum legal level of 0.08%*) was absent. Other experiments in which these screens were present always featured the updated versions.

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 The University of Nottingham

Please very briefly explain your choice of answer for the previous question.

- Not included if subject answered *Definitely* to previous question

0%

100%



Bar scenario (continued)

A woman works for a company which manufactures state-of-the-art breathalysers, machines which can measure a person's blood alcohol content with extremely high accuracy. One day, after drinking in a bar in a city in England, the woman remembers she has one of the breathalysers in her bag, and wonders whether her blood alcohol content is below 0.08%, the maximum level at which a person can legally drive in England. She tests herself and discovers that her blood alcohol content is 0.081% (which is above the maximum legal level of 0.08%). The woman then drives home.

If the woman in this scenario had wanted to avoid breaking the law, to what extent would achieving this have been within the woman's control?

It would have been completely within her control

It would have been to a large extent within her control

It would have been to a small extent within her control

It would have been completely out of her control

Suppose the police observe this behavior. How accurately can the police detect whether the woman in this scenario has broken the law?

Very accurately (beyond reasonable doubt)

Somewhat accurately

Somewhat inaccurately

Very inaccurately

Suppose the police have evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the woman in this scenario has broken the law. How likely would they be to take action against the woman?"

Very likely

Somewhat likely

Somewhat unlikely

Very unlikely

>>

0% 100%



Airport scenario

A man is returning to Britain from an overseas holiday. **In his suitcase he is carrying cash worth €10,100 (which is above the maximum legal amount of €10,000).** In the airport he notices a sign informing passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than €10,000 into Britain from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man enters the country without declaring the cash to customs.

In this scenario, do you think the man has broken the law?

Definitely

Probably

Probably not

Definitely not

>>

- This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our soft launch data (N=35) from the Krupka-Weber version of the Main experiment, which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning *In his suitcase...* was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (*which is above the maximum legal amount of €10,000*) was absent. Other experiments in which these screens were present always featured the updated versions.

0%  100%



Please very briefly explain your choice of answer for the previous question.

- Not included if subject answered *Definitely* to previous question.

Airport scenario (continued)

A man is returning to Britain from an overseas holiday. In his suitcase he is carrying cash worth €10,100 (which is above the maximum legal amount of €10,000). In the airport he notices a sign informing passengers that it is illegal to bring cash worth more than €10,000 into Britain from overseas without declaring it to customs. After reading the sign, the man enters the country without declaring the cash to customs.

If the man in this scenario had wanted to avoid breaking the law, to what extent would achieving this have been within the man's control?

It would have been completely within his control

It would have been to a large extent within his control

It would have been to a small extent within his control

It would have been completely out of his control

Suppose the police observe this behavior. How accurately can the police detect whether the man in this scenario has broken the law?

Very accurately (beyond reasonable doubt)

Somewhat accurately

Somewhat inaccurately

Very inaccurately

Suppose the police have evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the man in this scenario has broken the law. How likely would they be to take action against the man?

Very likely

Somewhat likely

Somewhat unlikely

Very unlikely



0% 100%



Driving scenario

A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is 70 miles per hour. **The woman drives for the next five minutes at 71 miles per hour (which is above the maximum legal speed of 70 miles per hour)**, before turning onto a different road.

In this scenario, do you think the woman has broken the law?

Definitely

Probably

Probably not

Definitely not

[>>](#)

- This screen, and the screen after next, were changed slightly after reviewing the responses to our soft launch data (N=35) from the Krupka-Weber version of the Main experiment, which revealed some subjects were misunderstanding these follow up questions relating to each of the scenarios, incorrectly believing the questions were asking about the version of the vignette they evaluated earlier. The sentence beginning *The woman drives...* was not initially in bold, and the parentheses (*which is above the maximum legal speed of 70 miles per hour*) was absent. Other experiments in which these screens were present always featured the updated versions.

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 The University of Nottingham

Please very briefly explain your choice of answer for the previous question.

<<

>>

- Not included if subject answered *Definitely* to previous question.

Driving scenario (continued)

A woman is driving between two cities in order to attend a meeting. She turns onto a road and notices a sign informing motorists that the legal speed limit on the road is 70 miles per hour. The woman drives for the next five minutes at 71 miles per hour (which is above the maximum legal speed of 70 miles per hour), before turning onto a different road.

If the woman in this scenario had wanted to avoid breaking the law, to what extent would achieving this have been within the woman's control?

It would have been completely within her control

It would have been to a large extent within her control

It would have been to a small extent within her control

It would have been completely out of her control

Suppose the police observe this behavior. How accurately can the police detect whether the woman in this scenario has broken the law?

Very accurately (beyond reasonable doubt)

Somewhat accurately

Somewhat inaccurately

Very inaccurately

Suppose the police have evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the woman in this scenario has broken the law. How likely would they be to take action against the woman?*

Very likely

Somewhat likely

Somewhat unlikely

Very unlikely

China experiment

0% 100%



关于在社会上的得当性Qualtrics问卷调查的参与者信息表

尊敬的参与者:

感谢你愿意做这份与我们在宁波诺丁汉大学的研究项目相关的问卷调查。此项目研究人们对特定行为的在社会上的得当性认知。在以下的调查中,我们将向你说明一系列某人可能做出的假定行为,并要求你报告你觉得这些行为在社会上的得当程度如何。根据你的回答和其他参与者对调查的回答,你可能会收到参与酬金。

你参与这项调查出于自愿。你可以随时退出调查,并且可以请求不将所提供的信息用于该项目。所提供的任何信息将予以保密。你必需填写学生证号码,以便我们联系被选中的参与者收取酬金,但在储存资料时,我们将尽快使其匿名化,且不会向任何第三方披露你的身份。

该研究项目已根据伦理审查流程在宁波诺丁汉大学审查到位。该等流程受到大学研究行为守则和研究道德的管制。目前或今后你若有任何疑问,请联系我们。你若对我们进行的调查或研究道德有任何顾虑,请联系大学的伦理委员会。

致礼,
Tom Lane

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(Joanna.Huang@nottingham.edu.cn)

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参与者同意表

项目主题: 关于在社会上的得当性的Qualtrics问卷调查

研究者姓名: Tom Lane和Daniele Nosenzo

请点选以下所有声明，以确认你同意各项声明。

本人已阅读声明，项目组织者已经我解释了研究项目的性质和宗旨。本人理解并同意参与。

本人理解项目的目的和在项目中的参与作用。

本人明白可以在研究项目的任何阶段退出，不会因此影响现在以及将来的状况

本人明白研究过程中信息可能会被公开，但本人身份不会被确认，个人的调查结果始终是被保密。

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本人理解，如果需要更多有关研究的信息，可以联系研究者。并且如果想就本人与研究的牵涉提出投诉，可以联系宁波诺丁汉大学研究道德委员会。



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完成这份调查大约需要45分钟。如果需要暂停，你可以保存你的回答，以后再继续作答。

首先，请输入你的学生证号码。确保准确输入，我们将通过该号码就酬金事宜与你联系。

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关于酬金：

所有参与者完成调查后，我们会随机在每五位参与者中挑选一位获取酬金。我们将在9月28日前发电子邮件给每位参与者，告知其是否被选中获取酬金。被选中的参与者届时可以到UNNC校园的行政楼领取酬金。若对这份调查的酬金有任何疑问，请发送电邮至 Tom.Lane@nottingham.edu.cn。

你若被选中获得酬金，你将收到62元的参与费。根据你对调查问卷的答复，你还有可能获得186元的额外奖金。在调查问卷的相关问题上会提供更多详情。

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关于这份调查的信息

这份调查将描述15个假设情境，然后就这些情境询问你觉得某种行为在社会上的得当程度如何。在每种情景下，你必须指出该行为“在社会上被认为是得当的”还是“在社会上被认为是不得当的”，将会有四个可能的回应（如下所示），你必须从其中选择一个。

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

我们用“在社会上被认为是得当的”描述的行为是指你认为大多数人会认同这是应该做的“正确”事。从另一个角度考虑，如果某人做出的行为在社会上是不得当的，那么其他人可能会对他表示生气。要注意的是，该做的“正确”事不一定在法律上有明确规定或受到法律支持，也不一定受法律制裁的威胁而必须遵守。所以，即使某行为违反法律，也有可能是‘得当的’；又或者即使其并没有违法，也有可能是‘不得当的’。更确切地说，一个得当的行为指的是大多数人认为这是一个应该要做的行为（不论其是否合法）；如果某人不做此行为，其他人可能会随时准备表达他们的不满。

在你作出每个回应时，你需要考虑大多数人认为该行为是得当的还是不得当的。

完成所有调查问卷的回应后，我们将随机挑选你被问及的其中一个情境。对于该情境所描述的行为，我们会了解你对该行为在社会上的得当程度如何所作出的回应。如果你对该问题的回应在本次调查中与被参与者中最多次的回应一致，并且你是被选中的有酬参与者，则除了参与酬金外，我们将给你发放100元的奖金。本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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现在，我们将举个可能情境的示例，并演示如何作答。

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示例情境

有位男子计划星期六去参加一个朋友的婚礼。他是个大球迷，在婚礼开始两天前，有人给他一场重要球赛的免费门票。他决定收下门票。周六时，他去观看了足球赛，并告诉他朋友因为生病不能参加婚礼。

假设你认为该行为在社会上是有些不得当的。那么你将作出如下回答：

大多数人会如何看待该男子的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

那么，如果你是其中一位被选中获得酬金的参与者，并且这就是我们随机选中查看的情景，我们将会给予你186元酬金，若“在社会上被认为是不恰当的”正是那个在本次调查中被参与者们选中最多的回答。如果被参与者们选中最多的是一个另外的回答，我们将不会给予你这笔186元的酬金。

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下一个屏幕，你将被问及如何评价15个情境的第一个。点击下一步开始作答。

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(The following three vignettes were presented in random order)

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一名女子想要看一部还未在中国发行的外国影片。她朋友们告诉她一个网站，他们发现该网站可以免费下载该影片。他们警告她说，从该网站下载电影是违法的。后来该女子访问了该网站，但她决定不下载影片。

大多数人会如何看待该女子不下载电影的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

请记住，“在社会上被认为是得当的”是指参与本次调查的大多数人都认同的“该做的正确事”（不论是否合法）。你可以从这个问题赢取186元（若被选中作为获奖问题），条件是但你的回答必须与在本次调查中被参与者选中最多次的回答一致。记住本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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在宁波附近的一个村庄，一名男子正帮一个朋友在两栋住所之间搬运货物。两栋住所间的距离是200米，而且今天路上没有其他车辆。该男子将货箱装上车后，准备在两栋住所之间行驶。他在收音机中听到一则新闻报道，提醒听众未系安全带开车是违法的。该男子并没有系安全带，然后以每小时15公里的最大速度行驶200米到另一处住所。

大多数人会如何看待该男子未系安全带行驶这趟旅程，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名女子存储了12,000元，她打算用这笔钱度一个豪华海滨假期。就在她预订假期前，读到一则新闻报道称一个慈善机构正在为某个贫困的非洲国家的饥民提供援助。该女子决定不预订海滨假期，而是向慈善机构捐出了12,000元。但是，她又改变了主意，然后预订了海滨假期，而没有向慈善机构捐款。

大多数人会怎么看待该女子预订海滨假期却不向慈善机构捐款的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

请记住，“在社会上被认为是得当的”是指参与本次调查的大多数人都认同的“该做的正确事”（不论是否合法）。你可以从这个问题赢取186元（若被选中作为获奖问题），条件是但你的回答必须与在本次调查中被参与者选中最多次的回答一致。记住本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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(The following 12 vignettes were presented in random order)

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一个女子在去见朋友的路上，她看到一个受伤的男子躺在街边。她停下来询问该男子怎么回事；他告诉她遭到袭击，钱包和手机都被偷了。该女子报警后陪着男子，直到警察赶来。

大多数人会如何看待该女子以这种方式帮助该男子，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

请记得，“在社会上被认为是得当的”是指参与本次调查的大多数人都认同的“该做的正确事”（不论是否合法）。你可以从这个问题赢取186元（若被选中作为获奖问题），条件是但你的回答必须与在本次调查中被参与者选中最多次的回答一致。记住本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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一名学生正在校园附近某咖啡馆吃午饭。她起身准备离开时，发现地上有一个被丢的钱包。该学生看看周围无人注意，于是捡起钱包并带着离开了咖啡馆。

大多数人会如何看待该学生捡起钱包并带着离开咖啡馆的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

请记住，“在社会上被认为是得当的”是指参与本次调查的大多数人都认同的“该做的正确事”（不论是否合法）。你可以从这个问题赢取186元（若被选中作为获奖问题），条件是但你的回答必须与在本次调查中被参与者选中最多次的回答一致。记住本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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一个青年人去当地一家店买了几瓶啤酒。他看到店里的一个标牌提醒顾客：在中国店主向未满18岁的青年出售含酒精的饮料是违法行为。店主认识该青年，并且知道他17岁零9个月。店主知道该青年经常喝醉并且破坏周边小区的财产。该名看上去头脑清醒的青年人要求买一箱（20瓶）啤酒，店主就卖了一箱啤酒给他。

大多数人会如何看待店主向该青年出售啤酒的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

请记得，“在社会上被认为是得当的”是指参与本次调查的大多数人都认同的“该做的正确事”（不论是否合法）。你可以从这个问题赢取186元（若被选中作为获奖问题），条件是但你的回答必须与在本次调查中被参与者选中最多次的回答一致。记住本次调查的所有参与者均为中国人并且在宁波诺丁汉大学学习。

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宁波的一家建筑公司在向政府投标，为赢得一个大型基建项目的合同。公司首席执行官（CEO）参加了一个有政府重要官员进行演讲的会议。该官员在演讲中提及最近有位商人试图向他行贿。该官员说向政府官员行贿不仅是违法行为，而且对公司不利。会后，该CEO要求与该官员私下交谈，然后向他行贿600万元，以确保该建筑公司能够中标。

大多数人会如何看待该CEO向官员行贿的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一个女子为一家生产先进的呼气测醉器的公司工作，该仪器能测量人体血液酒精含量，准确率极高。某天，在宁波某酒吧喝酒后，该女子记起包里有一个呼气测醉器，想测一测她血液中的酒精含量是否低于0.02%。在中国超过该含量开车属于非法行为。她自测后发现血液中的酒精含量为0.019%。随后她驾车回家。

大多数人会怎么看待该女子驱车回家的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名女子为参加一个会议在两座城市之间行驶。她转到一条马路上，看到一个标牌指示驾驶员该路段的合法限速为每小时120公里。接下来的五分钟内她以每小时123公里的速度行驶，直到拐入另一条路。

大多数人会如何看待该女子以每小时123公里的速度行驶的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名男子结束了海外旅行准备返回中国。他在行李箱中携带数额4,900美元的现金。他在机场注意到一个标牌告知旅客：携带数额超过5,000美元的现金从国外入境中国但未向海关申报属于违法行为。读过标牌后，该男子未向海关申报就入境了。

大多数人会如何看待该男子未向海关申报现金就入境的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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宁波的一名医生在下班回家的路上，被一名男子靠近乞讨金钱。该医生不理乞丐并径自走开了。

大多数人会如何看待医生不理乞丐径自走开的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名房主在半夜醒来，发现一名窃贼想偷他家的电视机。他抓住窃贼并下重手打他，打断了窃贼的胳膊，然后从前门将他仍出去。

大多数人会如何看待该房主这样对待窃贼，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名学生在参加一个她预计会失利的考试。考前她在一页纸上写下一些笔记，然后藏在袖子里。考试开始前，监考人宣布并提醒所有学生：携带任何材料进入考场帮助答题是违规的。考试期间，该学生偷看笔记并用以帮助她作答。

大多数人会如何看待该学生以这种方式使用笔记，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一男子在一家餐馆吃饭。上菜很慢，并且味道较差。他让服务员结账，但十分钟过后服务员还未回来。该男子未付款就离开了餐馆。

大多数人会如何看待该男子未结账就走掉的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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一名18岁的男子在一个聚会上结识了一个女孩。他邀请女孩来家里，女孩也接受了邀请。到家后，男子告诉女孩：他想和她发生性关系，但女孩看起来很小。男子继而问女孩是否年满14岁即法律允许的性行为的最低年龄。女孩告诉男子她的年龄是14岁零1个月，并向她出示了身份证确认。她告诉男子想和他发生性关系。随后该男子就与她发生了性关系。

大多数人会如何看待该男子与那女孩发生性关系的行为，这在社会上是否得当？

在社会上被认为是非常得当的

在社会上被认为是相对得当的

在社会上被认为是有些不得当的

在社会上被认为是非常不得当的

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D. Distributions of appropriateness ratings in the experiments

D.1. Main experiment

**TABLE D1: APPROPRIATENESS OF SEX IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – MAIN EXPERIMENT**

		Very (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) appropriate	Very (socially) appropriate
Sample 1: UK Students, Krupka-Weber method					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 3	16.7	35.4	29.2	18.8
	16, 1	23.3	27.9	30.2	18.6
	15, 11	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0
	15, 9	59.0	31.2	9.8	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Krupka-Weber method					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	5.3	26.3	26.3	42.1
	16, 3	8.0	24.0	46.0	22.0
	16, 2	10.0	17.5	45.0	27.5
	16, 1	6.4	23.8	49.2	20.6
	15, 11	73.8	16.4	6.6	3.3
	15, 10	77.1	8.6	8.6	5.7
	15, 9	76.5	13.7	7.8	2.0
	15, 8	83.8	8.1	2.7	5.4
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – first order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	5.1	25.6	33.3	35.9
	16, 3	16.7	16.7	54.8	11.9
	16, 2	14.6	34.2	26.8	24.4
	16, 1	16.9	33.9	33.9	15.4
	15, 11	81.7	16.7	1.7	0.0
	15, 10	95.5	4.6	0.0	0.0
	15, 9	87.8	12.2	0.0	0.0
	15, 8	87.5	6.3	3.1	3.1
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – second order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	21.9	25.0	34.4	18.8
	16, 3	10.3	28.2	43.6	18.0
	16, 2	14.6	29.3	31.7	24.4
	16, 1	22.2	33.3	27.8	16.7
	15, 11	83.3	11.9	2.4	2.4
	15, 10	91.8	8.2	0.0	0.0
	15, 9	87.5	10.0	2.5	0.0
	15, 8	89.2	10.8	0.0	0.0

Notes: Table D1 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Age of consent vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D2: APPROPRIATENESS OF SALE IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – MAIN EXPERIMENT**

		Very (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) appropriate	Very (socially) appropriate
Sample 1: UK Students, Krupka-Weber method					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 3	2.4	26.2	45.2	26.2
	18, 1	1.7	32.8	39.7	25.9
	17, 11	73.9	23.9	2.2	0.0
	17, 9	82.4	13.7	3.9	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Krupka-Weber method					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	20.0	45.0	25.0	10.0
	18, 3	11.6	25.6	30.2	32.6
	18, 2	12.5	33.3	33.3	20.8
	18, 1	11.5	36.1	41.0	11.5
	17, 11	83.0	13.2	1.9	1.9
	17, 10	83.3	9.5	4.8	2.4
	17, 9	72.2	13.9	8.3	5.6
	17, 8	86.5	9.6	3.9	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – first order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	6.1	27.3	39.4	27.3
	18, 3	10.0	30.0	46.7	13.3
	18, 2	9.4	28.1	28.1	34.4
	18, 1	10.0	25.0	43.3	21.7
	17, 11	85.5	13.0	0.0	1.5
	17, 10	90.5	9.5	0.0	0.0
	17, 9	86.4	13.6	0.0	0.0
	17, 8	96.9	3.1	0.0	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – second order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	8.1	35.1	35.1	21.6
	18, 3	15.0	35.0	40.0	10.0
	18, 2	0.0	40.0	36.0	24.0
	18, 1	7.3	29.1	41.8	21.8
	17, 11	87.0	13.0	0.0	0.0
	17, 10	84.8	15.2	0.0	0.0
	17, 9	93.2	6.8	0.0	0.0
	17, 8	87.9	9.1	3.0	0.0

Notes: Table D2 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Alcohol to youth vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D3: APPROPRIATENESS OF NON-DECLARATION IN CASH AT CUSTOMS
VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – MAIN EXPERIMENT**

		Very (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) appropriate	Very (socially) appropriate
Sample 1: UK Students, Krupka-Weber method					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,700	2.6	0.0	15.4	82.0
	9,900	0.0	4.2	12.5	83.3
	10,100	5.6	57.4	27.8	9.3
	10,300	12.5	57.1	26.8	3.6
Sample 2: UK General population, Krupka-Weber method					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	10.3	2.6	12.8	74.4
	9,700	9.5	11.9	33.3	45.2
	9,800	4.7	4.7	18.6	72.1
	9,900	3.2	7.9	12.7	76.2
	10,100	14.8	49.2	31.2	4.9
	10,200	17.8	55.6	15.6	11.1
	10,300	18.4	44.7	34.2	2.6
	10,400	18.2	45.5	31.8	4.6
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – first order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	2.1	2.1	12.8	83.0
	9,700	0.0	2.6	10.5	86.8
	9,800	0.0	3.9	7.7	88.5
	9,900	4.8	1.6	14.5	79.0
	10,100	11.5	50.0	26.9	11.5
	10,200	13.0	54.4	26.1	6.5
	10,300	24.3	46.0	24.3	5.4
	10,400	17.7	58.8	23.5	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – second order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	7.7	0.0	7.7	84.6
	9,700	0.0	0.0	2.5	97.5
	9,800	0.0	2.8	0.0	97.2
	9,900	4.8	1.6	6.4	87.3
	10,100	14.8	50.8	23.0	11.5
	10,200	12.1	60.6	21.2	6.1
	10,300	5.4	62.2	24.3	8.1
	10,400	15.8	63.2	13.2	7.9

Notes: Table D3 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Cash at customs vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D4: APPROPRIATENESS OF DRIVING IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – MAIN EXPERIMENT**

		Very (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) appropriate	Very (socially) appropriate
Sample 1: UK Students, Krupka-Weber method					
Blood alcohol content	0.077%	8.2	32.7	42.9	16.3
	0.079%	12.5	31.3	37.5	18.8
	0.081%	18.4	61.2	16.3	4.1
	0.083%	25.5	54.9	17.7	2.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Krupka-Weber method					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	21.6	24.3	35.1	18.9
	0.077%	22.6	18.9	28.3	30.2
	0.078%	25.7	20.0	40.0	14.3
	0.079%	15.5	23.9	36.6	23.9
	0.081%	45.3	32.0	16.0	6.7
	0.082%	42.4	42.4	12.1	3.0
	0.083%	50.0	25.0	13.9	11.1
	0.084%	42.9	42.9	8.6	5.7
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – first order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	15.4	41.0	30.8	12.8
	0.077%	20.6	29.4	38.2	11.8
	0.078%	2.4	41.5	43.9	12.2
	0.079%	14.8	37.0	27.8	20.4
	0.081%	46.3	37.0	13.0	3.7
	0.082%	52.3	40.9	2.3	4.6
	0.083%	64.3	28.6	7.1	0.0
	0.084%	61.8	35.3	2.9	0.0
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – second order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	16.1	25.8	35.5	22.6
	0.077%	10.9	32.6	37.0	19.6
	0.078%	11.1	33.3	48.2	7.4
	0.079%	6.0	34.0	40.0	20.0
	0.081%	36.4	45.5	18.2	0.0
	0.082%	56.5	23.9	13.0	6.5
	0.083%	51.4	32.4	10.8	5.4
	0.084%	59.5	28.6	11.9	0.0

Notes: Table D4 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Drink driving vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D5: APPROPRIATENESS OF SPEED IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – MAIN EXPERIMENT**

		Very (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) inappropriate	Somewhat (socially) appropriate	Very (socially) appropriate
Sample 1: UK Students, Krupka-Weber method					
Speed (miles per hour)	67	0.0	1.9	19.2	78.9
	69	0.0	0.0	10.0	90.0
	71	0.0	4.3	42.6	53.2
	73	5.2	31.0	37.9	25.9
Sample 2: UK General population, Krupka-Weber method					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	4.0	14.0	14.0	68.0
	67	2.7	5.4	29.7	62.2
	68	2.4	11.9	26.2	59.5
	69	0.0	7.8	21.6	70.6
	71	5.1	30.5	42.4	22.0
	72	12.1	39.4	21.2	27.3
	73	14.0	34.0	42.0	10.0
	74	15.1	47.2	24.5	13.2
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – first order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	2.8	19.4	77.8
	67	0.0	0.0	6.5	93.6
	68	0.0	0.0	15.4	84.6
	69	0.0	0.0	27.8	72.2
	71	2.7	38.4	41.1	17.8
	72	5.1	56.4	30.8	7.7
	73	12.5	31.3	37.5	18.8
	74	18.4	52.6	18.4	10.5
Sample 2: UK General population, Opinion matching – second order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	0.0	8.9	91.1
	67	0.0	0.0	11.1	88.9
	68	0.0	2.9	11.4	85.7
	69	0.0	0.0	13.0	87.0
	71	7.4	33.3	40.7	18.5
	72	5.6	38.9	27.8	27.8
	73	7.1	47.6	42.9	2.4
	74	22.0	48.8	17.1	12.2

Notes: Table D5 displays the percentages of subjects, by sample and treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Speeding vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

D.2. Placebo experiment

Krupka-Weber Method

**TABLE D6: APPROPRIATENESS OF SEX IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, KRUPKA-WEBER
METHOD**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	40.0	17.1	34.3	8.6
	16, 3	11.4	43.2	34.1	11.4
	16, 2	22.7	40.9	25.0	11.4
	16, 1	23.6	30.6	33.3	12.5
	15, 11	93.0	7.0	0.0	0.0
	15, 10	87.5	12.5	0.0	0.0
	15, 9	92.3	5.8	1.9	0.0
	15, 8	92.3	7.7	0.0	0.0
	15, 7	91.4	7.1	1.4	0.0
	15, 5	93.0	5.6	1.4	0.0
	15, 4	93.3	6.7	0.0	0.0
	15, 3	96.7	3.3	0.0	0.0
	15, 2	97.9	2.1	0.0	0.0

Notes: Table D6 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Age of consent vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D7: APPROPRIATENESS OF SALE IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, KRUPKA-WEBER
METHOD**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 10	9.3	14.0	48.8	27.9
	18, 9	2.2	17.4	41.3	39.1
	18, 8	5.6	16.7	37.0	40.7
	18, 7	6.0	14.0	40.0	40.0
	18, 5	11.9	13.4	43.3	31.3
	18, 4	6.5	15.2	37.0	41.3
	18, 3	4.6	27.3	29.6	38.6
	18, 2	2.0	19.6	31.4	47.1
	18, 1	8.2	18.0	34.4	39.3
	17, 11	76.8	21.4	0.0	1.8
	17, 10	83.7	14.0	2.3	0.0
	17, 9	71.1	29.0	0.0	0.0
	17, 8	75.9	22.2	0.0	1.9

Notes: Table D7 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Alcohol to youth vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D8: APPROPRIATENESS OF NON-DECLARATION IN CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	3.8	7.6	15.1	73.6
	9,700	5.1	15.4	20.5	59.0
	9,800	0.0	7.1	10.7	82.1
	9,900	0.0	8.5	23.4	68.1
	10,100	8.3	58.3	23.3	10.0
	10,200	9.8	43.9	41.5	4.9
	10,300	11.1	37.0	40.7	11.1
	10,400	10.6	48.5	33.3	7.6
	10,600	18.6	57.1	21.4	2.9
	10,700	26.5	55.1	14.3	4.1
	10,800	21.6	52.9	23.5	2.0
	10,900	25.5	46.8	27.7	0.0

Notes: Table D8 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Cash at customs vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D9: APPROPRIATENESS OF DRIVING IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Blood alcohol content	0.071%	22.0	22.0	36.0	20.0
	0.072%	16.7	22.9	29.2	31.3
	0.073%	15.7	29.4	27.5	27.5
	0.074%	9.7	27.4	40.3	22.6
	0.076%	17.1	35.5	36.8	10.5
	0.077%	22.9	35.4	27.1	14.6
	0.078%	18.2	36.4	36.4	9.1
	0.079%	24.7	44.2	18.2	13.0
	0.081%	40.7	44.1	13.6	1.7
	0.082%	62.2	26.7	8.9	2.2
	0.083%	70.6	23.5	3.9	2.0
	0.084%	71.4	26.2	2.4	0.0

Notes: Table D9 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Drink driving vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D10: APPROPRIATENESS OF SPEED IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, KRUPKA-WEBER
METHOD**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	11.3	22.6	66.0
	67	2.3	9.3	23.3	65.1
	68	0.0	4.2	8.3	87.5
	69	1.6	1.6	10.9	85.9
	71	4.9	29.5	32.8	32.8
	72	5.7	39.6	35.9	18.9
	73	14.5	35.5	32.3	17.7
	74	18.3	36.7	41.7	3.3
	76	25.0	45.3	23.4	6.3
	77	49.0	30.6	12.2	8.2
	78	34.2	58.5	4.9	2.4
	79	32.7	49.1	10.9	7.3

Notes: Table D10 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Speeding vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

Opinion-matching Method

**TABLE D11: APPROPRIATENESS OF SEX IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, OPINION-MATCHING
METHOD**

		Very inappropriate	Somewhat inappropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Very appropriate	
First-order beliefs						
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	10.5	52.6	31.6	5.3	
	16, 3	27.8	33.3	33.3	5.6	
	16, 2	16.7	50.0	33.3	0.0	
	16, 1	25.9	33.3	33.3	7.4	
	15, 11	85.7	10.7	3.6	0.0	
	15, 10	95.2	4.8	0.0	0.0	
	15, 9	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	15, 8	87.5	6.3	6.3	0.0	
	15, 7	84.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	
	15, 5	92.9	7.1	0.0	0.0	
	15, 4	94.4	5.6	0.0	0.0	
	15, 3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	15, 2	94.1	5.9	0.0	0.0	
	Second-order beliefs					
	Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	18.6	37.2	25.6	18.6
		16, 3	33.3	16.7	33.3	16.7
16, 2		15.4	30.8	38.5	15.4	
16, 1		31.5	22.2	38.9	7.4	
15, 11		82.4	11.8	4.4	1.5	
15, 10		85.7	11.4	2.9	0.0	
15, 9		91.3	8.7	0.0	0.0	
15, 8		90.7	9.3	0.0	0.0	
15, 7		89.9	8.7	1.5	0.0	
15, 5		90.6	7.8	1.6	0.0	
15, 4		96.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	
15, 3		97.1	2.9	0.0	0.0	
15, 2		89.4	6.4	2.1	2.1	

Notes: Table D11 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Age of consent vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D12: APPROPRIATENESS OF SALE IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, OPINION-MATCHING
METHOD**

		Very inappropriate	Somewhat inappropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Very appropriate	
First-order beliefs						
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 10	0.0	21.4	71.4	7.1	
	18, 9	12.5	12.5	37.5	37.5	
	18, 8	8.7	21.7	30.4	39.1	
	18, 7	0.0	0.0	30.8	69.3	
	18, 5	13.9	13.9	27.8	44.4	
	18, 4	0.0	18.8	31.3	50.0	
	18, 3	6.7	26.7	46.7	20.0	
	18, 2	4.0	8.0	36.0	52.0	
	18, 1	3.6	28.6	28.6	39.3	
	17, 11	73.9	26.1	0.0	0.0	
	17, 10	82.4	17.7	0.0	0.0	
	17, 9	92.3	7.7	0.0	0.0	
	17, 8	61.5	38.5	0.0	0.0	
	Second-order beliefs					
	Age of youth (years, months)	18, 10	4.0	26.0	34.0	36.0
		18, 9	7.1	9.5	33.3	50.0
18, 8		2.5	15.0	42.5	40.0	
18, 7		0.0	12.2	40.8	46.9	
18, 5		11.1	15.9	36.5	36.5	
18, 4		7.9	10.5	42.1	39.5	
18, 3		3.7	9.3	48.2	38.9	
18, 2		11.1	22.2	44.4	22.2	
18, 1		8.0	22.7	37.3	32.0	
17, 11		82.9	15.8	0.0	1.3	
17, 10		88.9	11.1	0.0	0.0	
17, 9		86.8	7.9	5.3	0.0	
17, 8		77.1	17.1	5.7	0.0	

Notes: Table D12 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Alcohol to youth vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D13: APPROPRIATENESS OF NON-DECLARATION IN CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, OPINION-MATCHING METHOD

		Very inappropriate	Somewhat inappropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Very appropriate	
First-order beliefs						
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	0.0	13.6	22.7	63.6	
	9,700	0.0	6.9	10.3	82.8	
	9,800	7.1	14.3	28.6	50.0	
	9,900	0.0	0.0	18.8	81.2	
	10,100	21.4	50.0	17.9	10.7	
	10,200	8.3	45.8	41.7	4.2	
	10,300	25.0	62.5	6.3	6.3	
	10,400	38.1	28.6	28.6	4.8	
	10,600	35.5	38.7	22.6	3.2	
	10,700	17.4	52.2	13.0	17.4	
	10,800	47.4	15.8	31.6	5.3	
	10,900	35.3	41.2	23.5	0.0	
	Second-order beliefs					
	Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	3.8	1.9	20.8	73.6
9,700		3.2	9.5	9.5	77.8	
9,800		4.9	7.3	19.5	68.3	
9,900		5.3	5.3	14.7	74.7	
10,100		13.8	48.3	25.9	12.1	
10,200		15.8	52.6	21.1	10.5	
10,300		12.5	64.6	16.7	6.3	
10,400		20.6	52.4	20.6	6.4	
10,600		30.7	53.2	14.5	1.6	
10,700		31.1	42.2	22.2	4.4	
10,800		25.9	48.3	24.1	1.7	
10,900		37.8	40.5	21.6	0.0	

Notes: Table D13 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Cash at customs vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D14: APPROPRIATENESS OF DRIVING IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, OPINION-MATCHING METHOD

		Very inappropriate	Somewhat inappropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Very appropriate	
First-order beliefs						
Blood alcohol content	0.071%	15.0	15.0	35.0	35.0	
	0.072%	6.3	18.8	62.5	12.5	
	0.073%	17.7	23.5	29.4	29.4	
	0.074%	18.5	33.3	33.3	14.8	
	0.076%	25.9	37.0	25.9	11.1	
	0.077%	33.3	41.7	8.3	16.7	
	0.078%	21.4	53.6	25.0	0.0	
	0.079%	14.3	42.9	25.0	17.9	
	0.081%	54.8	32.3	12.9	0.0	
	0.082%	60.0	20.0	13.3	6.7	
	0.083%	42.9	50.0	7.1	0.0	
	0.084%	84.0	12.0	4.0	0.0	
	Second-order beliefs					
	Blood alcohol content	0.071%	4.7	27.9	53.5	14.0
0.072%		22.5	22.5	25.0	30.0	
0.073%		14.9	8.5	40.4	36.2	
0.074%		6.4	31.8	39.7	22.2	
0.076%		23.5	35.3	33.8	7.4	
0.077%		23.5	45.1	21.6	9.8	
0.078%		25.5	35.3	31.4	7.8	
0.079%		27.7	26.2	32.3	13.9	
0.081%		52.8	38.9	8.3	0.0	
0.082%		60.4	34.0	1.9	3.8	
0.083%		62.5	35.0	2.5	0.0	
0.084%		62.5	29.2	8.3	0.0	

Notes: Table D14 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Drink driving vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D15: APPROPRIATENESS OF SPEED IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – PLACEBO EXPERIMENT, OPINION-MATCHING
METHOD**

		Very inappropriate	Somewhat inappropriate	Somewhat appropriate	Very appropriate
First-order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	5.3	10.5	31.6	52.6
	67	4.8	0.0	9.5	85.7
	68	7.7	0.0	23.1	69.2
	69	0.0	12.5	12.5	75.0
	71	2.3	30.2	44.2	23.3
	72	16.7	33.3	41.7	8.3
	73	35.7	35.7	14.3	14.3
	74	4.4	47.8	43.5	4.4
	76	30.0	56.7	3.3	10.0
	77	39.1	34.8	26.1	0.0
	78	38.1	47.6	9.5	4.8
	79	32.0	64.0	4.0	0.0
	Second-order beliefs				
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	4.4	22.2	73.3
	67	2.1	8.5	17.0	72.3
	68	0.0	8.3	12.5	79.2
	69	0.0	1.8	12.3	86.0
	71	4.6	36.9	40.0	18.5
	72	18.9	37.7	34.0	9.4
	73	12.8	53.9	23.1	10.3
	74	36.5	46.0	15.9	1.6
	76	33.8	47.3	16.2	2.7
	77	48.8	39.5	11.6	0.0
	78	42.9	44.6	12.5	0.0
	79	43.1	54.9	2.0	0.0

Notes: Table D15 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation in the Speeding vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

D.3. Prosocial traits experiment

**TABLE D16: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS**

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	5.0	25.0	65.0	5.0
	16, 3	20.0	20.0	53.3	6.7
	16, 2	7.1	42.9	42.9	7.1
	16, 1	6.1	36.4	51.5	6.1
	15, 11	27.3	45.5	22.7	4.6
	15, 10	35.3	52.9	5.9	5.9
	15, 9	46.7	46.7	0.0	6.7
	15, 8	30.8	23.1	46.2	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	4.8	33.9	56.5	4.8
	16, 3	12.0	32.0	44.0	12.0
	16, 2	11.5	26.9	50.0	11.5
	16, 1	8.3	33.3	46.7	11.7
	15, 11	30.0	51.7	16.7	1.7
	15, 10	43.2	34.1	20.5	2.3
	15, 9	45.5	34.1	18.2	2.3
	15, 8	36.1	47.2	13.9	2.8

Notes: Table D16 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Age of consent vignette keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D17: HONESTY IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	20.0	30.0	45.0	5.0
	16, 3	20.0	53.3	26.7	0.0
	16, 2	28.6	50.0	21.4	0.0
	16, 1	9.1	48.5	30.3	12.1
	15, 11	50.0	40.9	9.1	0.0
	15, 10	58.8	29.4	5.9	5.9
	15, 9	53.3	46.7	0.0	0.0
	15, 8	46.2	38.5	15.4	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	24.2	35.5	32.3	8.1
	16, 3	32.0	46.0	8.0	14.0
	16, 2	23.1	40.4	25.0	11.5
	16, 1	21.7	38.3	31.7	8.3
	15, 11	61.7	33.3	3.3	1.7
	15, 10	59.1	36.4	4.6	0.0
	15, 9	56.8	43.2	0.0	0.0
	15, 8	61.1	33.3	5.6	0.0

Notes: Table D17 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Age of consent vignette returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D18: ALTRUISM IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	35.0	50.0	15.0	0.0
	16, 3	53.3	33.3	13.3	0.0
	16, 2	42.9	42.9	14.3	0.0
	16, 1	24.2	48.5	27.3	0.0
	15, 11	77.3	13.6	9.1	0.0
	15, 10	82.4	5.9	5.9	5.9
	15, 9	80.0	20.0	0.0	0.0
	15, 8	61.5	30.8	7.7	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Age of girl (years, months)	16, 4	54.8	40.3	4.8	0.0
	16, 3	38.0	54.0	6.0	2.0
	16, 2	51.9	38.5	5.8	3.9
	16, 1	40.0	45.0	15.0	0.0
	15, 11	75.0	23.3	1.7	0.0
	15, 10	77.3	20.5	2.3	0.0
	15, 9	77.3	20.5	2.3	0.0
	15, 8	61.1	36.1	2.8	0.0

Notes: Table D18 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Age of consent vignette volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D19: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS**

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	0.0	30.0	60.0	10.0
	18, 3	0.0	8.3	66.7	25.0
	18, 2	0.0	25.0	58.3	16.7
	18, 1	0.0	10.0	66.7	23.3
	17, 11	20.6	50.0	29.4	0.0
	17, 10	9.5	47.6	42.9	0.0
	17, 9	15.8	42.1	31.6	10.5
	17, 8	18.2	36.4	45.5	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	6.7	15.6	55.6	22.2
	18, 3	2.1	18.8	56.3	22.9
	18, 2	3.7	16.7	59.3	20.4
	18, 1	4.6	15.4	61.5	18.5
	17, 11	31.6	42.1	19.3	7.0
	17, 10	23.9	37.0	26.1	13.0
	17, 9	16.7	58.3	19.4	5.6
	17, 8	15.0	47.5	32.5	5.0

Notes: Table D19 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the shopkeeper in the Alcohol to Youth vignette keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded. This analysis excludes 7 subjects in the first-order beliefs treatment who, due to an experimental glitch, were presented with the word ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘likely’ in one of the possible responses..

TABLE D20: HONESTY IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	20.0	30.0	30.0	20.0
	18, 3	16.7	16.7	50.0	16.7
	18, 2	10.5	36.8	31.6	21.1
	18, 1	3.3	10.0	43.3	43.3
	17, 11	38.2	44.1	14.7	2.9
	17, 10	42.9	33.3	14.3	9.5
	17, 9	15.8	47.4	26.3	10.5
	17, 8	18.2	36.4	36.4	9.1
Second order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	22.2	17.8	40.0	20.0
	18, 3	4.2	31.3	31.3	33.3
	18, 2	7.4	14.8	51.9	25.9
	18, 1	9.2	16.9	43.1	30.8
	17, 11	49.1	21.1	17.5	12.3
	17, 10	43.5	23.9	28.3	4.4
	17, 9	44.4	30.6	16.7	8.3
	17, 8	32.5	40.0	22.5	5.0

Notes: Table D20 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the shopkeeper in the Alcohol to Youth vignette returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D21: ALTRUISM IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	30.0	60.0	10.0	0.0
	18, 3	25.0	33.3	41.7	0.0
	18, 2	15.8	57.9	26.3	0.0
	18, 1	16.7	43.3	36.7	3.3
	17, 11	55.9	38.2	5.9	0.0
	17, 10	28.6	57.1	14.3	0.0
	17, 9	26.3	63.2	10.5	0.0
	17, 8	54.6	27.3	18.2	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 4	48.9	33.3	17.8	0.0
	18, 3	33.3	54.2	12.5	0.0
	18, 2	29.6	59.3	9.3	1.9
	18, 1	32.3	55.4	12.3	0.0
	17, 11	61.4	33.3	5.3	0.0
	17, 10	54.4	41.3	2.2	2.2
	17, 9	69.4	27.8	2.8	0.0
	17, 8	62.5	30.0	7.5	0.0

Notes: Table D21 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the shopkeeper in the Alcohol to Youth vignette volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D22: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS**

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	0.0	5.3	63.2	31.6
	9,700	0.0	13.0	69.6	17.4
	9,800	11.1	11.1	50.0	27.8
	9,900	0.0	9.1	68.2	22.7
	10,100	3.9	38.5	57.7	0.0
	10,200	0.0	35.7	64.3	0.0
	10,300	0.0	40.0	50.0	10.0
	10,400	0.0	50.0	42.9	7.1
Second order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	2.0	2.0	77.6	18.4
	9,700	0.0	7.9	71.1	21.1
	9,800	0.0	6.4	61.7	31.9
	9,900	2.0	12.2	61.2	24.5
	10,100	7.7	42.3	50.0	0.0
	10,200	2.2	39.1	54.4	4.4
	10,300	9.5	40.5	42.9	7.1
	10,400	9.1	40.9	45.5	4.6

Notes: Table D22 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Cash at customs vignette keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D23: HONESTY IN CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	5.3	26.3	52.6	15.8
	9,700	8.7	26.1	52.2	13.0
	9,800	5.6	38.9	50.0	5.6
	9,900	9.1	36.4	54.6	0.0
	10,100	38.5	50.0	11.5	0.0
	10,200	28.6	50.0	21.4	0.0
	10,300	40.0	30.0	30.0	0.0
	10,400	35.7	50.0	14.3	0.0
Second order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	12.2	30.6	38.8	18.4
	9,700	13.2	15.8	63.2	7.9
	9,800	12.8	14.9	61.7	10.6
	9,900	10.2	24.5	53.1	12.2
	10,100	40.4	42.3	13.5	3.9
	10,200	34.8	41.3	19.6	4.4
	10,300	50.0	33.3	11.9	4.8
	10,400	54.6	31.8	11.4	2.3

Notes: Table D23 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Cash at customs vignette returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D24: ALTRUISM IN CASH AT CUSTOMS VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	15.8	63.2	21.0	0.0
	9,700	0.0	65.2	26.1	8.7
	9,800	11.1	66.7	22.2	0.0
	9,900	18.2	54.6	27.3	0.0
	10,100	34.6	53.9	11.5	0.0
	10,200	50.0	35.7	14.3	0.0
	10,300	50.0	40.0	10.0	0.0
	10,400	28.6	50.0	14.3	7.1
Second order beliefs					
Amount imported (Euros)	9,600	20.4	63.3	14.3	2.0
	9,700	21.1	57.9	18.4	2.6
	9,800	14.9	61.7	21.3	2.1
	9,900	12.2	59.2	24.5	4.1
	10,100	38.5	53.9	7.7	0.0
	10,200	43.5	47.8	8.7	0.0
	10,300	42.9	47.6	9.5	0.0
	10,400	50.0	40.9	9.1	0.0

Notes: Table D24 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the man in the Cash at customs vignette volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D25: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS**

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	0.0	20.0	73.3	6.7
	0.077%	0.0	15.8	57.9	26.3
	0.078%	0.0	66.7	0.0	33.3
	0.079%	0.0	14.3	67.9	17.9
	0.081%	2.8	33.3	58.3	5.6
	0.082%	0.0	36.8	36.8	26.3
	0.083%	14.3	28.6	57.1	0.0
	0.084%	4.6	31.8	59.1	4.6
Second order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	0.0	9.4	65.6	25.0
	0.077%	0.0	7.5	62.5	30.0
	0.078%	4.7	18.6	51.2	25.6
	0.079%	0.0	22.2	59.7	18.1
	0.081%	4.8	39.7	47.6	7.9
	0.082%	4.0	30.0	60.0	6.0
	0.083%	7.9	39.5	36.8	15.8
	0.084%	3.0	45.5	48.5	3.0

Notes: Table D25 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Drink driving vignette keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded. This analysis excludes 12 subjects in the first-order beliefs treatment who, due to an experimental glitch, were presented with the word ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘likely’ in one of the possible responses.

TABLE D26: HONESTY IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	6.7	20.0	46.7	26.7
	0.077%	5.3	15.8	68.4	10.5
	0.078%	6.7	13.3	46.7	33.3
	0.079%	3.6	21.4	57.1	17.9
	0.081%	5.6	38.9	50.0	5.6
	0.082%	10.5	31.6	47.4	10.5
	0.083%	28.6	35.7	21.4	14.3
	0.084%	13.6	40.9	36.4	9.1
Second order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	7.8	28.1	48.4	15.6
	0.077%	2.5	22.5	57.5	17.5
	0.078%	2.3	34.9	53.5	9.3
	0.079%	6.9	31.9	43.1	18.1
	0.081%	12.7	63.5	22.2	1.6
	0.082%	14.0	46.0	34.0	6.0
	0.083%	18.4	42.1	31.6	7.9
	0.084%	3.0	57.6	36.4	3.0

Notes: Table D26 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Drink driving vignette returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D27: ALTRUISM IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	6.7	46.7	46.7	0.0
	0.077%	10.5	47.4	31.6	10.5
	0.078%	13.3	40.0	40.0	6.7
	0.079%	10.7	35.7	50.0	3.6
	0.081%	16.7	55.6	27.8	0.0
	0.082%	26.3	57.9	15.8	0.0
	0.083%	35.7	42.9	21.4	0.0
	0.084%	27.3	31.8	36.4	4.6
Second order beliefs					
Blood alcohol content	0.076%	10.9	59.4	29.7	0.0
	0.077%	17.5	50.0	32.5	0.0
	0.078%	11.6	55.8	25.6	7.0
	0.079%	15.3	58.3	26.4	0.0
	0.081%	23.8	66.7	9.5	0.0
	0.082%	18.0	72.0	10.0	0.0
	0.083%	34.2	39.5	21.1	5.3
	0.084%	30.3	57.6	12.1	0.0

Notes: Table D27 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Drink driving vignette volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D28: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	0.0	60.0	40.0
	67	0.0	0.0	52.6	47.4
	68	0.0	0.0	42.9	57.1
	69	0.0	3.6	46.4	50.0
	71	0.0	8.7	91.3	0.0
	72	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0
	73	0.0	0.0	73.7	26.3
	74	0.0	16.7	77.8	5.6
Second order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0
	67	0.0	0.0	25.5	74.5
	68	0.0	2.6	29.0	68.4
	69	0.0	1.4	35.6	63.0
	71	0.0	4.7	62.5	32.8
	72	0.0	6.5	67.4	26.1
	73	2.3	9.3	69.8	18.6
	74	2.3	4.6	81.8	11.4

Notes: Table D28 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Speeding vignette keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded. This analysis excludes 30 subjects in the first-order beliefs treatment who, due to an experimental glitch, were presented with the word ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘likely’ in one of the possible responses.

TABLE D29: HONESTY IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	15.4	30.8	53.9
	67	10.5	5.3	31.6	52.6
	68	0.0	14.3	28.6	57.1
	69	0.0	10.7	46.4	42.9
	71	0.0	19.4	77.4	3.2
	72	0.0	25.0	66.7	8.3
	73	0.0	31.6	52.6	15.8
	74	0.0	44.4	44.4	11.1
Second order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	1.8	7.1	26.8	64.3
	67	0.0	2.0	21.6	76.5
	68	2.6	5.3	47.4	44.7
	69	2.7	6.9	37.0	53.4
	71	4.7	28.1	48.4	18.8
	72	10.9	30.4	50.0	8.7
	73	7.0	32.6	53.5	7.0
	74	6.8	29.6	59.1	4.6

Notes: Table D29 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Speeding vignette returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D30: ALTRUISM IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	0.0	7.7	76.9	15.4
	67	0.0	31.6	47.4	21.1
	68	7.1	7.1	64.3	21.4
	69	0.0	32.1	53.6	14.3
	71	3.2	61.3	35.5	0.0
	72	8.3	66.7	25.0	0.0
	73	5.3	68.4	15.8	10.5
	74	0.0	66.7	27.8	5.6
Second order beliefs					
Speed (miles per hour)	66	1.8	35.7	41.1	21.4
	67	2.0	15.7	70.6	11.8
	68	0.0	26.3	65.8	7.9
	69	5.5	23.3	61.6	9.6
	71	7.8	50.0	40.6	1.6
	72	8.7	54.4	34.8	2.2
	73	11.6	62.8	25.6	0.0
	74	18.2	59.1	22.7	0.0

Notes: Table D30 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the woman in the Speeding vignette volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

D.4. “Bad” law experiment

TABLE D31: TRUSTWORTHINESS IN LANDLORD VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	2.2	11.1	46.7	40.0
	3	5.7	11.3	45.3	37.7
	4	2.1	4.2	20.8	72.9
	5	1.8	10.9	27.3	60.0
Second order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	1.0	4.9	52.4	41.8
	3	0.0	8.9	40.6	50.5
	4	0.0	4.3	29.0	66.7
	5	1.0	6.9	21.8	70.3

Notes: Table D31 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the landlord keeping a promise to a friend. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D32: HONESTY IN LANDLORD VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	13.3	22.2	33.3	31.1
	3	5.7	17.0	56.6	20.8
	4	4.2	6.3	27.1	62.5
	5	3.6	16.4	32.7	47.3
Second order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	5.8	23.3	40.8	30.1
	3	6.9	22.8	38.6	31.7
	4	0.0	8.6	37.6	53.8
	5	3.0	10.9	35.6	50.5

Notes: Table D32 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the landlord returning excess change to a cashier. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D33: ALTRUISM IN LANDLORD VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	11.1	44.4	40.0	4.4
	3	13.2	30.2	50.9	5.7
	4	6.3	27.1	58.3	8.3
	5	9.1	30.9	49.1	10.9
Second order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	19.4	47.6	28.2	4.9
	3	15.8	42.6	32.7	8.9
	4	7.5	32.3	43.0	17.2
	5	7.9	27.7	53.5	10.9

Notes: Table D33 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the landlord volunteering for charity. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

TABLE D34: RULE-COMPLIANCE TENDENCY IN LANDLORD VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS

		Very unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Very likely
First order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	2.2	17.8	48.9	31.1
	3	2.0	12.2	36.7	49.0
	4	11.9	6.8	15.3	66.1
	5	8.7	13.0	21.7	56.5
Second order beliefs					
Number of incidents reported	2	4.08	15.3	35.7	44.9
	3	3.5	8.7	37.4	50.4
	4	6.5	15.1	14.0	64.5
	5	6.1	11.2	22.5	60.2

Notes: Table D34 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each evaluation regarding the likelihood of the landlord following rules in general. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

D.5. Rule of law experiment

**TABLE D35: APPROPRIATENESS OF SEX IN AGE OF CONSENT VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – CHINA SAMPLE (KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD)**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Age of girl (years, months)	14, 3	24.6	32.8	24.6	18.0
	14, 1	24.6	40.4	24.6	10.5
	13, 11	76.6	14.1	9.4	0.0
	13, 9	81.8	16.7	1.5	0.0

Notes: Table D35 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Age of consent vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D36: APPROPRIATENESS OF SALE IN ALCOHOL TO YOUTH VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – CHINA SAMPLE (KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD)**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Age of youth (years, months)	18, 3	3.2	46.0	38.1	12.7
	18, 1	11.7	43.3	31.7	13.3
	17, 11	52.2	34.3	7.5	6.0
	17, 9	62.1	31.0	6.9	0.0

Notes: Table D36 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Alcohol to youth vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D37: APPROPRIATENESS OF NON-DECLARATION IN CASH AT CUSTOMS
VIGNETTE: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – CHINA SAMPLE (KRUPKA-WEBER
METHOD)**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Amount imported (USD)	4,700	8.6	10.3	10.3	70.7
	4,900	5.0	8.8	17.5	68.8
	5,100	35.9	43.4	17.0	3.8
	5,300	36.8	45.6	15.8	1.8

Notes: Table D37 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Cash at customs vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D38: APPROPRIATENESS OF DRIVING IN DRINK DRIVING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – CHINA SAMPLE (KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD)**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Blood alcohol content	0.017%	9.6	30.8	40.4	19.2
	0.019%	13.0	46.8	27.3	13.0
	0.021%	40.9	39.4	16.7	3.0
	0.023%	49.1	43.4	7.6	0.0

Notes: Table D38 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Drink driving vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

**TABLE D39: APPROPRIATENESS OF SPEED IN SPEEDING VIGNETTE:
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS – CHINA SAMPLE (KRUPKA-WEBER METHOD)**

		Very socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially inappropriate	Somewhat socially appropriate	Very socially appropriate
Speed (kilometers per hour)	117	4.0	13.3	28.0	54.7
	119	1.9	17.3	34.6	46.2
	121	24.6	49.2	23.0	3.3
	123	23.3	58.3	15.0	3.3

Notes: Table D39 displays the percentages of subjects, by treatment, who chose each social appropriateness evaluation in the Speeding vignette. In each case, the modal evaluation is shaded.

E. Robustness analysis & moderators of the expressive power of law

Robustness analysis. To further probe the robustness of the results of Section III, we conducted a placebo analysis where, for each vignette, we tested for the existence of discontinuities at arbitrary points to the right and to the left of the actual legal threshold. Specifically, for each vignette we estimated a series of regression models, using the following specification:

$$s(o_i) = \alpha + \beta_1(T - o_i) + \beta_2 FalseThreshold_i + \beta_3(T - o_i) * FalseThreshold_i + \epsilon_i \quad (\text{a.38})$$

where $s(o_i)$ is subject i 's evaluation of appropriateness of behavior in the vignette describing opportunity o_i , $FalseThreshold_i$ is a dummy taking value 1(0) for points to the right(left) of a “placebo” threshold that is always different from the actual legal threshold, and $(T - o_i)$ measures the distance between the placebo threshold and o_i . Across specifications, we systematically vary the position of the placebo threshold to span all the feasible values in a vignette’s running variable.¹²

In all specifications the coefficient of interest is β_2 , which captures the difference between the estimates of the norm function for opportunities to the left and to the right of the placebo threshold, and thus measures the magnitude of any discontinuity that may occur at these points. We expect the estimates of β_2 in these placebo regressions to be generally small and insignificantly different from zero, compared to the estimates of β_2 in the regressions of the main text where the value of the threshold differentiates between legal and illegal actions.

We report results in Table E.1. For ease of comparability, in the table we also report the coefficients of the regressions ran with the actual legal threshold dummy that we already reported in the main text. Across the 60 models we ran with placebo thresholds, in 43 (72%) we do not detect any significant discontinuity at the placebo threshold. In those cases where we detect significant discontinuities, coefficients take a positive sign in nearly half (47%) of cases and a negative sign in the other half of cases. In contrast, the discontinuities we observed at the true legal thresholds are always significantly negative in all models. Importantly, the placebo discontinuities are always substantially smaller than the discontinuities at the true legal thresholds. Moreover, while the discontinuities at the true legal threshold are statistically significant and of similar magnitude across all three samples, the discontinuities at the placebo thresholds are never consistently significant across samples. Overall, these patterns suggest that – as expected – the discontinuities at the placebo thresholds are neither as systematic nor as substantial as those at the true legal threshold.

¹²Note that for this analysis we need to observe at least two points to the left and right of each placebo threshold. For this reason, we only run specifications where the position of $FalseThreshold_i$ leaves at least two points both to the left and to the right of the threshold. Note also that this implies that we cannot run this analysis for experiments where we only elicited four points on the running variable (i.e., our 2017 experiments with Sample 1).

Table E.1: OLS regressions, Main experiment: Placebo analysis

Age of Consent	Sample 2	Sample 3 (first-order beliefs)	Sample 3 (second-order beliefs)
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	0.215	0.122	-0.091
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.080	-0.050	-0.318**
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.890***	-0.803***	-0.813***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.077	-0.222***	-0.214**
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.066	0.119	0.154*
Alcohol to Youth	Sample 2	Sample 3 (first-order beliefs)	Sample 3 (second-order beliefs)
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	-0.263	0.315*	0.410**
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.324**	-0.176	-0.112
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.920***	-1.047***	-1.137***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.105	-0.103	-0.193**
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.313**	0.185***	-0.008
Cash at Custom	Sample 2	Sample 3 (first-order beliefs)	Sample 3 (second-order beliefs)
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	0.487***	0.074	-0.073
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.026	-0.176*	-0.310***
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.948***	-0.820***	-0.971***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.214	-0.200	-0.110
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.039	0.001	0.243*
Drink driving	Sample 2	Sample 3 (first-order beliefs)	Sample 3 (second-order beliefs)
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	-0.105	0.331*	0.078
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	0.081	-0.095	0.116
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.522***	-0.487***	-0.542***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.112	-0.196	-0.118
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.055	-0.156	0.082
Speeding	Sample 2	Sample 3 (first-order beliefs)	Sample 3 (second-order beliefs)
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	0.122	0.011	0.116
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	0.104	-0.145*	0.032
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.461***	-0.592***	-0.577***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.192	-0.197*	0.005
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	-0.128	0.216	-0.079

Note: Coefficients from regressions run either with the true legal threshold (*Illegal* dummy) or with placebo dummies shifting the position of the threshold to the left or to the right of the legal threshold. In the models with *Illegal-2*, the variables are re-coded such that we set the threshold in between the points 2 and 3 spaces to the left of the real legal threshold in the graphs in Figure 1 of the main text, and code all actions to right of this as illegal. Models with *Illegal-1* set the placebo threshold between the points 1 and 2 spaces left of the legal threshold; those with *Illegal + 1* and *Illegal + 2* respectively set the placebo thresholds between the points 1 and 2 spaces right, and 2 and 3 spaces right, of the legal threshold. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in all regressions. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level

Moderators of the expressive power of law. The results of Section III have shown that the expressive power of law varies across the five legal threshold situations. In the case of the experiments in the UK, results suggest the existence of a systematic separation between the age of consent, alcohol to youth, and cash at customs situations on the one hand, and the drink driving and speeding situations on the other. This separation does not seem related to the legal nature of the offence described in the vignette (the UK legal system differentiates between “summary” and “indictable” offences, but this does not organize the data; for instance, both selling alcohol to minors and speeding are summary offences), nor does it appear to be positively correlated with the severity of the legal penalties (for instance, importing undeclared cash at customs is subject to a fine of up to £5,000, while a drink-driving offence is subject to up to 6 months’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, and a driving ban for at least 1 year).

However, the separation could be related to other aspects of the situations that determine the strength of the signal that illegal behavior sends about the type of person who violates the law, and which our model identifies as potential moderators of the expressive power of law (see Online Supplementary Materials A), and which may differ across vignettes. Specifically, these aspects are: 1) whether illegal behavior can be measured accurately or with a margin of error (which we refer to as “measurability” below); 2) the level of tolerance adopted by law enforcement towards law violations (“tolerance”); and 3) the extent to which law violations may be accidental rather than intentional (“intentionality”). For instance, we hypothesized that (small) violations of the speed law may be perceived as subject to possible measurement error and potentially accidental and tolerated by the police, compared to transgressions of, e.g., the age of consent law. If this is the case, we would expect that speed law violations may provide a weaker signal about a person’s type relative to violations of the age of consent law, and, according to our model, this could explain why speeding laws have a weaker effect on norms compared to age of consent laws.

To probe whether these aspects do moderate the expressive power of law, for Samples 2 and 3 of the main experiment (with the UK general population, using the Krupka-Weber and opinion matching methods respectively), we included a series of follow-up questions designed to estimate perceived measurability, tolerance and intentionality for each situation. After participants had completed the evaluations of the 15 vignettes, we asked them to consider, in random order, five additional scenarios which were similar to the five legal threshold situations they had already evaluated except that in all cases the scenarios now described an instance where the behavior was just on the illegal side of the threshold. In each case, we asked them (in non-incentivized questions) to report the extent to which they agreed that: 1) the police could accurately measure the legality of the behavior; 2) if the police were sure the person had broken the law, they would be likely to take action against them; 3) avoiding breaking the law would have been within the person’s control. As these beliefs were all recorded on a four-point ordered scale, we transform the answers onto an

evenly spaced numerical scale, with 1 indicating the highest level of agreement and -1 the lowest. (Note that we made minor changes to the presentation of these questions after we had collected our first 35 observations. Details are available next to the relevant screenshots in Online Appendix C. Excluding these 35 observations makes negligible differences to the results we outline below).

We use the responses to these questions in two ways. First, we check whether there is indeed variability in the perceptions of measurability, tolerance and intentionality across the five situations – a necessary condition for these factors to be candidate sources of between-vignette variability in the expressive power of law. Second, having established this, we check whether the effect of law on norms differs across subjects who hold different perceptions about each of these factors – which would indicate that they are indeed mediators of the expressive power of law.

Figure E.1 shows, for each vignette, the mean perceptions of measurability of behavior, tolerance and intentionality. Data is pooled from all subjects from all versions of the main experiment in which we employed these follow-up questions (Samples 2 and 3, $N = 1,051$). We observe clear differences across vignettes in each of the three factors. Of particular interest are the differences between the two groups of situations between which we observed differences in the expressive power of law (speeding and drink-drive on one hand; age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs on the other).


The significance of cross-vignette differences is tested by the OLS regressions reported in Table E.2. These contain the numerically-transformed response as the dependent variable, with vignette dummies along with demographic control variables.

Regarding speeding, as expected, we find that subjects perceive lower accuracy in measuring behavior, lower likelihood of police intervention, and lower intentionality in breaking the law in the speeding vignette compared to the three vignettes with stronger expressive power of law (the differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level).

Regarding drink-driving, the evidence is more mixed. We do find that, compared to violations of the age of consent and sale of alcohol to minors laws, drink-driving offences are perceived to be less accurately measurable, less likely to be prosecuted, and less intentional (all significant at the 1% level). However, when comparing the drink-driving and cash at customs vignettes, we find drink-driving has significantly lower perceived measurability, but significantly higher perceived tolerance (both at the 1% level), while the difference in perceived intentionality is insignificant.

In spite of this mixed evidence, this first analysis suggests that any of these three factors can potentially explain some of the between-vignette variability in the expressive power of law. To investigate whether they systematically moderate the influence that the law exerts on social norms in the five situations, we conduct an effect heterogeneity analysis – that is, we examine whether the magnitude of the discontinuity of the norm functions at the legal threshold varies across subjects who hold different perceptions of measurability, tolerance and intentionality.

Figure E.1: Variation in measurability of behavior, police tolerance and intentionality across vignettes



Note: The figure plots the perceived measurability of behavior, police tolerance and intentionality in each vignette. AoC = Age of Consent; AtY = Alcohol to Youth; C = Cash at Customs; DD = Drink Drive; S = Speeding. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Table E.2: OLS regressions, Differences between vignettes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Measurability	Lack of Tolerance	Intentionality
<i>Age of consent</i>	0.450*** (0.021)	0.779*** (0.024)	0.129*** (0.014)
<i>Alcohol to youth</i>	0.450*** (0.021)	0.743*** (0.023)	0.129*** (0.013)
<i>Cash at customs</i>	0.332*** (0.022)	0.455*** (0.021)	0.058*** (0.015)
<i>Drink driving</i>	0.244*** (0.018)	0.651*** (0.023)	0.076*** (0.014)
<i>Constant</i>	0.210*** (0.037)	-0.142*** (0.048)	0.677*** (0.025)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.108	0.190	0.053
N.	5,205	5,205	5,205
Linear restriction tests (adjusted p-values)			
<i>Drink driving vs Age of consent</i>	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<i>Drink driving vs Alcohol to youth</i>	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<i>Drink driving vs Cash at customs</i>	<0.001	<0.001	0.200
<i>Cash at customs vs Age of consent</i>	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<i>Cash at customs vs Alcohol to youth</i>	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<i>Age of consent vs Alcohol to youth</i>	0.957	0.065	0.997

Note: Dependent variables are the numerically-transformed responses to the questions asking about the degree of measurability of, (lack of) tolerance towards, and intentionality of illegal behavior. The omitted vignette dummy is *Speeding*. Robust standard errors (with clustering at the individual level) in parentheses. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. The p-values from linear restriction tests have been adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method. We have 5,205 instead of 5,255 observations because we have missing values in some control questions for 10 subjects. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

To do so, for each follow-up question we divide subjects into two categories, depending on whether or not they expressed the highest possible level of agreement (that is, they said that in a given vignette behavior was very accurately measurable, police were very likely to take action against violators, and behavior was completely within the control of the individual). We then estimate modified versions of the regression models from Table 2, including dummies capturing a subject's category and interacting these with the Illegal dummy. This is done separately for measurability, tolerance and intentionality (each model pools data from all versions of the experiment in which the follow-up questions were asked). These regressions (reported in Table E.3) test whether the magnitude of the discontinuities of the norm functions differ between subjects who express the highest possible level of agreement to the given question and those who do not.


Figure E.2 presents the estimates of the magnitude of these discontinuities in each vignette for subjects belonging to either group. A number of interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, in all cases, the effect of the law on norms is larger among subjects who rate the illegal behavior described in the vignette as highly measurable, very likely to be prosecuted, and completely within the control of the person.

Second, the significance of these differences varies across the three factors. For police tolerance, the differences are significant only in the cash at custom vignette (at the 1% level) and speeding vignette (at the 10% level). Thus, although perceptions of police tolerance differ widely across vignettes (see Figure E.1), this factor alone cannot explain the observed differences in expressive power of the law across situations since it does not necessarily moderate the effect of law on norms.

In contrast, both measurability and intentionality of behavior are significant moderators of the effect of the law on norms in all cases except for measurability in the drink-driving vignette and intentionality in the age of consent vignette. Since we also observe differences in perceptions of measurability and intentionality of behavior between the speeding vignette and the three vignettes with relatively strong expressive power of law (see Figure E.1), these two factors can partly explain the differences in expressive power of law between these situations. In the speeding vignette, subjects think that small violations of the law are measured more inaccurately and are poorer reflections of a person's intentions than in the other three cases, and this reduces the influence that the law has on shaping the underlying norm of conduct.

Intentionality may also partially explain why the drink-driving vignette has relatively weak expressive power of law, since it is lower in this vignette than in the age of consent and alcohol to youth vignettes, and it significantly moderates the effect of the law on norms in the drink-driving and alcohol to youth vignettes. Although measurability is perceived to be lower in the drink-driving vignette than in all three vignettes with relatively strong expressive power of law, it is not a significant moderator of the effect of the law in the drink-driving vignette (and only is at the 10% level

Figure E.2: Measurability of behavior, police tolerance and intentionality as mediators of the effect of legal thresholds on norms



Note: The figure plots the estimated magnitude of the discontinuity in the norm function at the threshold for each vignette, disaggregated between subjects who think that: 1) behavior can or cannot be measured very accurately (full or hollow square), 2) police are or are not very likely to take action upon detection of a crime (full or hollow circle), 3) the individual has or has not complete control of their behavior in the situation (full or hollow triangle). The black connectors between markers indicate whether the corresponding difference is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% in the OLS regressions reported in Table E.3.

in the alcohol to youth vignette), so the evidence that measurability is an important determinant of the comparatively mild expressive power of law in the drink-driving vignette is relatively weak.

Overall, this analysis shows that contextual differences in the measurability and intentionality of behavior can partially explain the differences in the expressive power of laws observed in the main experiment. These results provide suggestive support for the type-signaling mechanism underlying our model. In situations where the illegality of behavior is difficult to observe, or may be accidental, it conveys a weaker signal about the type of person who engages in such behavior, and should therefore not be expected to impact as strongly on the norms regulating that behavior.

Table E.3: OLS regressions, Mediation analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$	0.056* (0.024)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.015)
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.876*** (0.078)	-1.077*** (0.070)	-1.016*** (0.078)	-0.553*** (0.093)	-0.715*** (0.084)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	-0.042 (0.029)	0.029 (0.026)	0.047* (0.028)	0.074** (0.031)	0.116*** (0.025)
<i>Measurement Error</i>	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.056)	-0.092** (0.045)	0.156*** (0.057)	-0.000 (0.041)
<i>Measurement Error * Illegal</i>	0.197*** (0.070)	0.122* (0.066)	0.240*** (0.065)	0.042 (0.074)	0.239*** (0.073)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.156* (0.090)	0.269*** (0.078)	0.783*** (0.077)	0.012 (0.093)	0.886*** (0.073)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.478	0.525	0.486	0.236	0.421
N.	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$	0.056** (0.024)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.015)
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.855*** (0.079)	-1.068*** (0.074)	-0.984*** (0.073)	-0.569*** (0.083)	-0.609*** (0.067)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	-0.042 (0.029)	0.029 (0.026)	0.046* (0.028)	0.074** (0.031)	0.111*** (0.025)
<i>Non - Intentionality</i>	0.166** (0.081)	-0.183** (0.078)	-0.225*** (0.070)	0.024 (0.074)	-0.111** (0.046)
<i>Non - Intentionality * Illegal</i>	0.108 (0.123)	0.459*** (0.114)	0.395*** (0.088)	0.262*** (0.097)	0.283*** (0.069)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.183** (0.086)	0.279*** (0.074)	0.793*** (0.075)	0.068 (0.089)	0.911*** (0.066)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.481	0.532	0.490	0.231	0.419
N.	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$	0.056** (0.024)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.015)
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.826*** (0.075)	-1.065*** (0.066)	-0.984*** (0.073)	-0.569*** (0.083)	-0.609*** (0.067)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	-0.044 (0.029)	0.028 (0.026)	0.046* (0.028)	0.074** (0.031)	0.111*** (0.025)
<i>Non - Intentionality</i>	0.166** (0.081)	-0.183** (0.078)	-0.225*** (0.070)	0.024 (0.074)	-0.111** (0.046)
<i>Non - Intentionality * Illegal</i>	0.108 (0.123)	0.459*** (0.114)	0.395*** (0.088)	0.262*** (0.097)	0.283*** (0.069)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.183** (0.086)	0.279*** (0.074)	0.793*** (0.075)	0.068 (0.089)	0.911*** (0.066)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.481	0.532	0.490	0.231	0.419
N.	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041

Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *Measurement Error* = 0 if subject reports that police can measure illegal behavior very accurately, = 1 if they do not. *Tolerance* = 0 if subject reports that police are very likely to take action against person breaking law, = 1 if they do not. *Non-Intentionality* = 0 if subject reports that avoiding breaking law completely within person's control, = 1 if they do not. We have 1,041 instead of 1,051 observations because we have missing values in some control questions for 10 subjects. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

F. Placebo thresholds experiment, regression results

We formally analyze the results of our placebo thresholds experiment (see Section IV.A of the main paper) by running the following regression model, separately for each vignette:

$$s(o_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Illegal}_i + \beta_2 \text{Placebo}_i + \beta_3(T - o_i) + \beta_4(T - o_i) * \text{Illegal}_i + \beta_5(P - o_i) * \text{Placebo}_i + \epsilon_i$$

where $s(o_i)$ is subject i 's evaluation of the appropriateness of taking opportunity o_i that was described in the vignette the subject was randomly assigned to. The key explanatory variables are:

1. The dummy Illegal_i that takes value 1 if subject i evaluated a version of the vignette that contained illegal behavior, and 0 otherwise;
2. The dummy Placebo_i that takes value 1 if subject i evaluated a version of the vignette that contained behavior deemed inappropriate according to the placebo threshold P , and 0 otherwise;
3. The variable $(T - o_i)$ measuring the distance between the legal threshold T and opportunity o_i ;
4. The interaction between Illegal_i and $(T - o_i)$;
5. The interaction between Placebo_i and $(P - o_i)$, a variable measuring the distance between the placebo threshold P and opportunity o_i .

The coefficients β_3 , β_4 and β_5 can be used to calculate the slope of the relationship between appropriateness and the vignette's running variable (age, blood-alcohol content, etc.) for opportunities that are, respectively, to the left of the leftmost threshold, between the two thresholds, or to the right of the rightmost threshold. The coefficients of interest are β_1 and β_2 . The former captures the discontinuity of the norm at the legal threshold, while the latter captures the discontinuity at the placebo threshold.

Table F.1 reports the results of OLS regressions run separately for the experiments that used the Krupka-Weber method (Panel A) and the opinion matching method (Panel B). For the latter, the analysis focuses on second-order beliefs, since we only measured first-order beliefs using a small sample of subjects with the purpose of incentivizing second-order beliefs and so we lack power to perform meaningful statistical analysis. Nevertheless, for completeness, we report regressions of first-order beliefs in Table F.2. All regressions also include controls for gender, age and income (not reported in the table).

Starting with β_1 , the regressions reproduce the results of our main experiment. We observe large discontinuities at the legal threshold for the age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs

Table F.1: OLS regressions, Placebo thresholds experiment

	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
Panel A: Krupka-Weber	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.884*** (0.107)	-1.297*** (0.105)	-0.880*** (0.103)	-0.203* (0.121)	-0.547*** (0.111)
<i>Placebo</i>	0.001 (0.045)	-0.176 (0.134)	-0.219* (0.114)	-0.219 (0.135)	-0.024 (0.127)
$(T - o_i)$	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.037 (0.040)	-0.074*** (0.025)
$(T - o_i) * Illegal$	0.023 (0.043)	0.016 (0.035)	0.014 (0.041)	0.049 (0.042)	0.212*** (0.042)
$(P - o_i) * Placebo$	0.022 (0.014)	0.007 (0.046)	0.023 (0.041)	0.084 (0.051)	-0.100** (0.047)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.248** (0.113)	0.813** (0.336)	0.615*** (0.085)	0.466 (0.299)	0.967*** (0.084)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.507	0.524	0.466	0.243	0.460
N.	653	653	653	653	653
Test <i>Illegal = Placebo</i> , p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.918	0.000
	(B1)	(B2)	(B3)	(B4)	(B5)
Panel B: Opinion matching (2nd order)	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.678*** (0.122)	-1.184*** (0.098)	-0.740*** (0.124)	-0.485*** (0.122)	-0.612*** (0.100)
<i>Placebo</i>	-0.008 (0.055)	-0.202 (0.123)	-0.081 (0.119)	-0.464*** (0.132)	0.223** (0.110)
$(T - o_i)$	0.032 (0.043)	-0.055 (0.034)	0.016 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.047** (0.023)
$(T - o_i) * Illegal$	-0.010 (0.045)	-0.038 (0.034)	0.035 (0.044)	0.038 (0.044)	0.230*** (0.037)
$(P - o_i) * Placebo$	-0.035 (0.024)	0.077* (0.043)	-0.054 (0.046)	0.006 (0.050)	-0.125*** (0.039)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.191 (0.125)	0.919*** (0.291)	0.641*** (0.104)	0.488* (0.268)	0.956*** (0.078)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.451	0.552	0.472	0.280	0.599
N.	641	641	641	641	641
Test <i>Illegal = Placebo</i> , p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.878	0.026

Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

vignettes, regardless of the method used to elicit social norms. The size of the discontinuities is comparable to that measured in the main experiment. We observe generally smaller discontinuities for the drink driving and speeding vignette, which is also consistent with what is reported in Section III of the main paper. For the drink driving vignette, the discontinuity is only marginally significant in the experiment that used the Krupka-Weber method (Panel A, model A4).¹³

Turning to β_2 , in Panel A the coefficient is not statistically different from zero in four out of five regressions. The only case where we observe a marginally significant discontinuity is in the cash at customs vignette (model A3). The magnitude of the placebo discontinuity, however, is significantly smaller than that of the discontinuity at the legal threshold (see linear restriction test reported in the last row of Panel A, $p = 0.000$). In fact, the discontinuity at the placebo threshold is significantly smaller than that at the legal threshold in all cases except the drink driving vignette where we fail to detect a large discontinuity at both the legal and placebo thresholds.

We find similar results in Panel B where we report regressions run with the data from the opinion matching experiment. We find no discontinuity at the placebo threshold for the age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs vignettes. For the speeding vignette (model B5), we find a small discontinuity that is significant at the 5% level, but in the opposite direction of what we would have expected (exceeding the placebo limit *increases* appropriateness). The absolute magnitude of the placebo discontinuity is significantly smaller than absolute magnitude of the discontinuity at the legal threshold (linear restriction test, $p = 0.026$). In the drink driving vignette (model B4), we observe a significant discontinuity at the placebo threshold that is roughly the same size of the discontinuity at the legal threshold (linear restriction test, $p = 0.878$).

¹³In Panel A, a series of Chow tests find that the β_1 coefficients of the age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs vignettes, $\beta_1^{consent}$, $\beta_1^{alcohol}$, and β_1^{cash} , are significantly larger than the coefficients of the speeding and drink driving vignettes, $\beta_1^{drink-drive}$ and $\beta_1^{speeding}$, (all $p \leq 0.034$). We also find that $\beta_1^{alcohol}$ is significantly larger than both $\beta_1^{consent}$ and β_1^{cash} (both $p \leq 0.008$), and that $\beta_1^{drink-drive}$ is significantly smaller than $\beta_1^{speeding}$ ($p = 0.034$). We find fewer significant differences in Panel B. $\beta_1^{alcohol}$ is significantly larger than both $\beta_1^{drink-drive}$ and $\beta_1^{speeding}$ (both $p \leq 0.001$) as well as larger than both $\beta_1^{consent}$ and β_1^{cash} (both $p \leq 0.013$). None of the other bilateral comparisons reach statistical significance (all $p \geq 0.265$). All reported p-values from Chow tests have been adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR procedure.

Table F.2: OLS regressions, Placebo thresholds experiment (first-order beliefs)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Opinion matching (1st order)	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.714*** (0.160)	-1.328*** (0.158)	-0.893*** (0.194)	-0.421** (0.187)	-0.507*** (0.190)
<i>Placebo</i>	-0.045 (0.077)	-0.410** (0.194)	0.146 (0.214)	-0.177 (0.231)	-0.038 (0.187)
$(T - o_i)$	0.011 (0.053)	-0.148*** (0.050)	-0.025 (0.045)	0.114* (0.063)	-0.048 (0.058)
$(T - o_i) * Illegal$	-0.011 (0.057)	0.010 (0.053)	0.091 (0.071)	0.125* (0.068)	0.170** (0.072)
$(P - o_i) * Placebo$	-0.001 (0.028)	0.131** (0.065)	-0.044 (0.077)	-0.166* (0.085)	-0.071 (0.059)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.092 (0.175)	1.598*** (0.458)	0.789*** (0.171)	-0.535 (0.462)	0.742*** (0.189)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.497	0.515	0.430	0.262	0.443
N.	260	260	260	260	260
Test <i>Illegal = Placebo</i> , p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.303	0.047

Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette (measured using first-order beliefs). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

G. Prosocial traits experiment, regression results

We formally analyze the results of our prosocial traits experiment (see Section IV.B of the main paper) by running the following regression model, separately for each vignette and for each prosocial trait:

$$s(o_i) = \alpha + \beta_1(T - o_i) + \beta_2Illegal_i + \beta_3(T - o_i) * Illegal_i + \epsilon_i$$

where $s(o_i)$ is subject i 's evaluation of the likelihood that the person taking opportunity o_i is trustworthy, honest or altruistic. The key explanatory variables are:

1. The dummy $Illegal_i$ that takes value 1 if subject i evaluated a version of the vignette that contained illegal behavior, and 0 otherwise;
2. The variable $(T - o_i)$ measuring the distance between the legal threshold T and opportunity o_i ;
3. The interaction between $Illegal_i$ and $(T - o_i)$;

The coefficient of interest is β_2 which captures the discontinuities in the trait perceptions at the legal threshold. The coefficients β_1 and β_3 measure the slope of the relationship between trait perception and the vignette's running variable (age, blood-alcohol content, etc.), allowing for different slopes between legal and illegal actions.

Table G.1 reports the results of OLS regressions run separately for each vignette and for each prosocial trait. The regressions use data on second-order beliefs collected using the opinion matching method, since we measured first-order beliefs using only a small sample of subjects with the purpose of incentivizing second-order beliefs, and so we lack power to perform meaningful statistical analysis. Nevertheless, for completeness, we report regressions of first-order beliefs in Table G.2. All regressions also include controls for gender, age and income (not reported in the table).

For trustworthiness (Panel A), we find evidence of significant discontinuities at the legal threshold in all vignettes ($p \leq 0.002$), except the drink driving vignette where the discontinuity is smaller and statistically insignificant ($p = 0.130$). A series of Chow tests indicate that there are no significant differences between the Illegal coefficients of the age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs vignettes, $\beta_2^{consent}$, $\beta_2^{alcohol}$, and β_2^{cash} (all $p \geq 0.392$), or between the estimates of $\beta_2^{drink-drive}$ and $\beta_2^{speeding}$ ($p = 0.549$).¹⁴ There are instead significant differences between the former group of coefficients ($\beta_2^{consent}$, $\beta_2^{alcohol}$ and β_2^{cash}) and the latter ($\beta_2^{drink-drive}$ and $\beta_2^{speeding}$). Specifically, we find that $\beta_2^{drink-drive}$ is significantly different from $\beta_2^{alcohol}$ ($p = 0.030$), and marginally

¹⁴All p-values from Chow tests reported in this Appendix are adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR procedure, as described in the main text

different from both $\beta_2^{consent}$ and β_2^{cash} (both $p = 0.092$). Instead, $\beta_2^{speeding}$ is significantly different from $\beta_2^{alcohol}$ ($p = 0.039$), but not from $\beta_2^{consent}$ and β_2^{cash} (both $p \geq 0.147$).

For honesty (Panel B), we observe significant discontinuities at the legal threshold in all vignettes ($p \leq 0.001$). The differences in magnitude between the coefficients in the various vignettes are directionally similar as those discussed above, but less pronounced. In fact, a series of Chow tests find no significant differences between the coefficients of the five vignettes in any bilateral comparison (all $p \geq 0.174$).

For altruism (Panel C), we observe generally smaller discontinuities relative to trustworthiness and honesty. They are statistically significant in the age of consent, alcohol to youth and cash at customs vignettes (all $p \leq 0.009$). The discontinuity is significant at the 5% level for speeding ($p = 0.045$) and at the 10% level for drink-driving ($p = 0.079$). A series of Chow tests find no significant differences between the coefficients of the five vignettes in any bilateral comparison (all $p \geq 0.436$).

When we compare the size of the discontinuities in trustworthiness, honesty and altruism in each vignette, we find that the discontinuities in altruism are nearly always smaller than those in honesty and trustworthiness. A series of Chow tests show that these differences are statistically significant in the alcohol to youth vignette (honesty vs altruism, $p = 0.003$; trustworthiness vs altruism, $p = 0.029$) and marginally significant in the drink driving vignette (honesty vs altruism, $p = 0.057$). In the drink driving vignette we also detect a marginally significant difference between trustworthiness and honesty ($p = 0.053$). None of the other differences reach statistical significance.

Table G.1: OLS regressions, Prosocial traits experiment (second-order beliefs)

Panel A: Trustworthiness		(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
		Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$		-0.005 (0.029)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.025)	0.050** (0.022)	-0.026 (0.019)
<i>Illegal</i>		-0.491*** (0.121)	-0.626*** (0.127)	-0.449*** (0.104)	-0.151 (0.100)	-0.237*** (0.077)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$		0.021 (0.044)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.038)	0.086*** (0.028)
<i>Constant</i>		0.015 (0.120)	0.436*** (0.110)	0.209** (0.101)	0.129 (0.094)	0.543*** (0.077)
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²		0.194	0.208	0.235	0.127	0.238
N.		408	391	367	403	415

Panel B: Honesty		(B1)	(B2)	(B3)	(B4)	(B5)
		Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$		-0.014 (0.034)	-0.073* (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)	0.007 (0.030)	0.041 (0.027)
<i>Illegal</i>		-0.539*** (0.120)	-0.814*** (0.153)	-0.514*** (0.135)	-0.425*** (0.110)	-0.375*** (0.107)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$		0.015 (0.044)	0.065 (0.059)	0.060 (0.051)	-0.060 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.040)
<i>Constant</i>		-0.375*** (0.122)	0.282** (0.143)	-0.087 (0.132)	0.071 (0.110)	0.133 (0.101)
Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²		0.201	0.205	0.240	0.102	0.326
N.		408	391	367	403	415

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood that a person taking the behavior described in a vignette is trustworthy (Panel A), honest (Panel B) and altruistic (Panel C). Data are based on second-order beliefs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

Table G.2: OLS regressions, Prosocial traits experiment (first-order beliefs)

Panel A: Trustworthiness		(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
		Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$		0.021 (0.043)	-0.046 (0.047)	0.027 (0.039)	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.046)
<i>Illegal</i>		-0.355* (0.195)	-0.758*** (0.161)	-0.303** (0.150)	-0.214 (0.138)	-0.369*** (0.127)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$		-0.013 (0.077)	-0.017 (0.069)	-0.046 (0.059)	0.043 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.054)
<i>Constant</i>		-0.130 (0.186)	0.458*** (0.147)	0.325** (0.151)	0.306* (0.170)	0.600*** (0.162)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²		0.154	0.280	0.137	0.067	0.198
N.		149	149	156	156	124

Panel B: Honesty		(B1)	(B2)	(B3)	(B4)	(B5)
		Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$		-0.028 (0.053)	-0.201*** (0.070)	0.074 (0.048)	-0.007 (0.053)	0.004 (0.052)
<i>Illegal</i>		-0.538*** (0.186)	-1.263*** (0.192)	-0.427** (0.172)	-0.217 (0.167)	-0.297** (0.149)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$		0.021 (0.073)	0.067 (0.089)	-0.103 (0.066)	0.052 (0.071)	0.023 (0.065)
<i>Constant</i>		-0.311 (0.206)	0.296 (0.193)	-0.011 (0.197)	0.157 (0.194)	0.515*** (0.187)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²		0.193	0.269	0.255	0.093	0.147
N.		149	156	156	168	154

Panel C: Altruism		(C1)	(C2)	(C3)	(C4)	(C5)
		Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$		-0.065 (0.043)	-0.088 (0.055)	0.022 (0.043)	-0.017 (0.047)	0.040 (0.042)
<i>Illegal</i>		-0.529*** (0.168)	-0.603*** (0.169)	-0.366** (0.171)	-0.339** (0.160)	-0.356** (0.147)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$		0.048 (0.065)	0.029 (0.073)	-0.065 (0.071)	0.006 (0.066)	-0.054 (0.056)
<i>Constant</i>		-0.302 (0.188)	-0.101 (0.174)	0.126 (0.166)	-0.304* (0.177)	0.254 (0.160)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²		0.142	0.124	0.160	0.101	0.207
N.		149	156	156	168	154

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood that a person taking the behavior described in a vignette is trustworthy (Panel A), honest (Panel B) and altruistic (Panel C). Data are based on first-order beliefs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. The analysis excludes 49 observations from subjects who, due to an experimental glitch, were presented with the word “appropriate” instead of “likely” in one of the possible responses. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

Robustness analysis. To further probe the robustness of our results, we conduct a placebo analysis where we test for the existence of discontinuities at points to the right or to the left of the actual legal threshold. Specifically, we estimate a series of regression models separately for each vignette and each prosocial trait, using the following specification:

$$s(o_i) = \alpha + \beta_1(T - o_i) + \beta_2 FalseThreshold_i + \beta_3(T - o_i) * FalseThreshold_i + \epsilon_i \quad (\text{a.39})$$

where $s(o_i)$ is subject i 's evaluation of the likelihood that the person taking opportunity o_i is trustworthy, honest or altruistic. The key explanatory variables are:

1. $FalseThreshold_i$, a dummy taking value 1(0) for points to the right(left) of a “placebo” threshold that is always different from the actual legal threshold.
2. $(T - o_i)$, measuring the distance between the placebo threshold and o_i .
3. The interaction between $FalseThreshold_i$ and $(T - o_i)$;

Across specifications, we systematically vary the position of the placebo threshold to span all the feasible values of each vignette’s running variable.¹⁵ The coefficient of interest is β_2 . We expect that the estimate of β_2 in the placebo regressions is small and insignificantly different from zero.

Table G.3 reports the results for second-order beliefs (results for first-order beliefs are very similar). For ease of comparability, in the Table we also report the coefficients of the regressions ran with the actual legal threshold dummy that we already reported in Table G.1.

Across the 60 models with placebo thresholds, in 55 (92%) we do not detect any significant discontinuity at the placebo threshold. The placebo discontinuities are always smaller than the discontinuities at the true legal thresholds, substantially so in many cases. Moreover, while the discontinuities at the true legal thresholds are statistically significant across all three traits in nearly all cases, the discontinuities at the placebo thresholds are never consistently significant across traits. These patterns suggest that the discontinuities at the true legal threshold embody a genuine treatment effect that cannot be reproduced artificially by assigning arbitrary values to the threshold variable, thus corroborating our interpretation of results.

¹⁵Note that for this analysis we need at least two points both to the left and the right of each placebo threshold. Thus, we only run specifications where the position of $FalseThreshold_i$ leaves at least two points to either side of the threshold.

Table G.3: OLS regressions, Prosocial traits experiment (second-order beliefs): Placebo analysis

Age of Consent	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	0.109	0.210	-0.113
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.040	-0.014	-0.027
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.491***	-0.539***	-0.418***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.147	-0.092	-0.141*
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	-0.048	0.014	-0.056
Alcohol to Youth	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	-0.027	-0.063	0.011
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.130	-0.184	-0.073
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.626***	-0.814***	-0.261***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	0.055	-0.218	-0.026
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	-0.035	-0.109	-0.139
Cash at Custom	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	0.094	0.114	0.136
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.197**	-0.077	-0.000
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.449***	-0.514***	-0.371***
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	0.043	0.010	-0.122
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.011	-0.037	0.008
Drink driving	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	-0.148	-0.186	0.049
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.012	-0.094	-0.123
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.151	-0.425***	-0.160*
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	0.081	0.034	0.055
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	0.083	0.034	0.121
Speeding	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 2)</i>	-0.081	-0.247***	-0.045
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal - 1)</i>	-0.110	-0.081	-0.069
<i>Illegal (real threshold)</i>	-0.237***	-0.375***	-0.198**
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 1)</i>	-0.139*	-0.259**	-0.065
<i>FalseThreshold (Illegal + 2)</i>	-0.129	-0.031	-0.067

Note: Coefficients from regressions run either with the true legal threshold (*Illegal* dummy) or with placebo dummies shifting the position of the threshold to the left or to the right of the legal threshold. In the models with *Illegal-2*, the variables are re-coded such that we set the threshold in between the points 2 and 3 spaces to the left of the real legal threshold in the graphs in Figure 1 of the main text, and code all actions to right of this as illegal. Models with *Illegal-1* set the placebo threshold between the points 1 and 2 spaces left of the legal threshold; those with *Illegal + 1* and *Illegal + 2* respectively set the placebo thresholds between the points 1 and 2 spaces right, and 2 and 3 spaces right, of the legal threshold. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in all regressions. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level

H. Alternative mechanism: Meta-norm of legal obedience, a formal model

It has been argued that the expressive power of law may originate from the fact that people obey a meta-norm that prescribes law obedience (or, more generally, rule obedience). We formalize this idea using a model where individuals are characterized by their concern for following rules. Suppose that, whenever an individual breaks the law, he/she incurs an individual specific psychological disutility given by $\tau \geq 0$, distributed on $[\tau_{\min}, \tau_{\max}]$ according to the distribution $f_{\tau}(\cdot)$ with mean μ_{τ} . Individuals also care about being perceived as rule followers: esteem depends on observers' beliefs about τ , and higher τ attracts higher esteem.¹⁶

The net utility from seizing o and thus generating externality o is

$$u(o; \tau) = \begin{cases} t + S(o, 1) - S(o, 0) & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \text{ (legal)} \\ t - pK + S(o, 1) - S(o, 0) - \tau & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \text{ (illegal)} \end{cases}$$

where t , p and K are defined as in the main text, and $S(o, a)$ is the esteem associated with seizing ($a = 1$) or leaving ($a = 0$) opportunity o . Note that since the net utility of seizing a legal opportunity is independent of τ , in any pure strategy equilibrium either all types seize such opportunities or all types leave them. We focus on the most natural case, where legal opportunities are seized by all types in equilibrium. If o is legal, the esteem conferred to the individual upon seizing the opportunity is therefore simply given by $S(o, 1) = \mu_{\tau}$, the prior mean.¹⁷

Consider now an illegal o . The net utility from seizing the opportunity is strictly decreasing in τ . For each o , we can identify the highest value of τ such that the individual seizes the opportunity. Denote this as $\tilde{\tau}_o$. When interior, $\tilde{\tau}_o$ satisfies

$$\tilde{\tau}_o = t - pK - \Delta(\tilde{\tau}_o).$$

Social esteem is

$$S(o, 1) = \begin{cases} \mu_{\tau} & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \\ \mathcal{M}^{-}(\tilde{\tau}_o) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \end{cases} \quad (\text{a.40})$$

where $\mathcal{M}^{-}(\tilde{\tau}_o) \equiv E(\tau \mid \tau < \tilde{\tau}_o)$.

Proposition H1 *The difference in social esteem from seizing a marginally legal and a marginally*

¹⁶For simplicity, we focus on a version of the model where there are only close observers and where individuals do not care about prosociality. It is straightforward to show that the results generalize to the case where distant observers are also present, and to the case where there is an additional individual-specific prosociality parameter in the utility function (as long as this is uncorrelated to τ).

¹⁷This implies that, strictly speaking, $S(o, 0)$ is undefined for legal opportunities, since these are always seized in equilibrium.

illegal opportunity is

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mu_\tau - \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\tau}_{\bar{o}}). \quad (\text{a.41})$$

Proof In text above.

Note that (provided that $\tilde{\tau}_{\bar{o}} < \tau_{\max}$), $S(o, 1)$ exhibits a downward discontinuity at \bar{o} .

Thus, this result shows that a model where individuals care about rule-following can explain the results of our main experiment (downward discontinuities in esteem at the legal threshold). Moreover, this model can also explain the results of our additional experiments about prosocial traits (Section IV.B). In order to achieve this, we need to assume that, when people report their beliefs about a person’s trustworthiness (likelihood he/she keeps a promise), honesty (likelihood he/she returns excess change) and altruism (likelihood he/she volunteers), they are actually using their beliefs about a person’s rule-following propensity. The assumption may not be unreasonable, especially for the cases of promise-breaking and honesty, since these are well-established normative rules and thus breaking promises and being dishonest may be behaviors that signal a person’s rule-following propensity.

Therefore, with this additional assumption, the data presented in Section III, IV.A, IV.B and IV.D are also compatible with a model of rule-following. One common feature of the vignettes used in all these experiments is that we describe situations where there is a law that prohibits taking opportunities that generate a negative externality $o > \bar{o}$. Consider now the case where there is instead a “bad” law that prohibits taking opportunities that generate a *positive* externality equal to o . It is easy to see that the predictions of the model of rule-following sketched above are unchanged: the result that there is a downward discontinuity at the threshold does not depend on whether the externality imposed by seizing the opportunity is negative or positive.

Consider instead our model of Section I. The net utility from seizing opportunity o is now $u(o; \theta) = t + \theta o + S(o, 1) - S(o, 0)$. Taking esteem as given, the net utility from seizing the opportunity is strictly *increasing* in θ . For each o , we can therefore identify the *lowest* value of θ such that the individual seizes the opportunity. Denote this as $\hat{\theta}_o$ for legal opportunities and as $\tilde{\theta}_o$ for illegal opportunities. For simplicity, consider the setup where all observers are close observers. When interior, the equilibrium $\hat{\theta}_o$ satisfies¹⁸

$$t + \hat{\theta}_o o + \Delta(\hat{\theta}_o) = 0. \quad (\text{a.42})$$

while $\tilde{\theta}_o$ satisfies

$$t + \tilde{\theta}_o o + \Delta(\tilde{\theta}_o) - pK = 0. \quad (\text{a.43})$$

Evaluated at $\theta_o = \hat{\theta}_o$, the lefthand side of (a.43) becomes $-pK < 0$. Restricting attention to

¹⁸Since the externality imposed is positive, an interior $\hat{\theta}_o$ requires $t < 0$.

environments where $\hat{\theta}$ is interior and where monotonicity holds, so that $\tilde{\theta}_o$ decreases in o , we then have $\hat{\theta}_o < \tilde{\theta}_o$.¹⁹ Consequently, $\mathcal{M}^+(\hat{\theta}_o) < \mathcal{M}^+(\tilde{\theta}_o)$. In this case, therefore, the model predicts that, in the presence of a bad law, esteem features an *upward* discontinuity at $o = \bar{o}$.²⁰

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [S(\bar{o} - \varepsilon, 1) - S(\bar{o} + \varepsilon, 1)] = \mathcal{M}^+(\hat{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) - \mathcal{M}^+(\tilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) < 0. \quad (\text{a.44})$$

Thus, our model of Section I and the alternative model where individuals care about rule-following can lead to diverging predictions for the case where laws prohibit taking opportunities that generate positive externalities. The experiment we report in Section IV.C rests on this intuition. We describe to subjects a situation where an individual makes a 911 call to prevent an assault. We estimate the esteem conferred to the individual in the cases where making the 911 call is in violation or not of an ordinance that restricts the number of calls that can be made to 911 in a given period without incurring in a penalty (Criminal Activity Nuisance Ordinances).

A model where individuals care about rule-following predicts a downward discontinuity (if at all) in esteem at the legal threshold in this experiment. Our model of Section I (with only close observers) predicts instead a positive discontinuity. The extended model with distant observers makes an ambiguous prediction, as the discontinuity can be both negative or positive, as explained earlier. Our testing strategy in Section IV.C therefore allows us rule out the rule-following model if and only if we observe evidence of positive discontinuities at the legal threshold. The test is instead uninformative if we observe a negative or zero discontinuity at the threshold (since our model of Section I can accommodate negative or zero discontinuities too).²¹

¹⁹This follows since, under monotonicity, $t + \theta_o o + \Delta(\theta_o) - pK$ is increasing in θ_o .

²⁰In the case of both close and distant observers, the prediction is ambiguous. This is because, if an individual is caught seizing an illegal opportunity, he/she incurs a cost (from the material penalty) but also reaps a benefit (from the enhanced esteem obtained from distant observers). Depending on which effect prevails, the resulting discontinuity can be upwards or downwards (or zero).

²¹Because there was a risk of an uninformative test result, in the experiment we elicited esteem associated with being a prosocial type as well as a rule-following type. The logic is as follows: even if we observe a negative/zero discontinuity at the threshold, if we can find differences in the two forms of esteem we can nevertheless conclude that inferences about a person's prosociality are not a simple proxy of the inferences about the person's rule-following propensity, and thus we can still defend our interpretation of the results of the main experiment. Because, as discussed in the main text, we observe positive discontinuities in the perceptions of prosociality, this additional testing strategy proved not to be necessary.

I. “Bad” law experiment, regression results

We formally analyze the results of our bad law experiment (see Section IV.C of the main paper) by running the following regression model, separately for each of the four traits we elicited (trustworthiness, honesty, altruism, rule compliance):

$$s(o_i) = \alpha + \beta_1(T - o_i) + \beta_2Illegal_i + \beta_3(T - o_i) * Illegal_i + \epsilon_i$$

where $s(o_i)$ is subject i 's evaluation of the likelihood that the person taking opportunity o_i is trustworthy, honest, altruistic or rule compliant. The key explanatory variables are:

1. The dummy $Illegal_i$ that takes value 1 if subject i evaluated a version of the vignette that contained behavior in violation of the CANO ordinance, and 0 otherwise;
2. The variable $(T - o_i)$ measuring the distance between the legal threshold T and opportunity o_i ;
3. The interaction between $Illegal_i$ and $(T - o_i)$;

The coefficient of interest is β_2 which captures the discontinuity in the trait perceptions at the legal threshold. The coefficients β_1 and β_3 measure the slope of the relationship between trait perception and the vignette's running variable (number of 911 calls within a 30 day period), allowing for different slopes between legal and illegal actions.

Table I.1 reports the results of OLS regressions run separately for each trait. The regressions use data on second-order beliefs collected using the opinion matching method, since we measured first-order beliefs using only a small sample of subjects with the purpose of incentivizing second-order beliefs, and so we lack power to perform meaningful statistical analysis. Nevertheless, for completeness, we report regressions of first-order beliefs in Table I.2. All regressions also include controls for gender, age and income (not reported in the table).

For all three prosocial traits (Models 1, 2 and 3), the sign of β_2 is positive, indicating the existence of upwards discontinuities at the legal threshold. The coefficient is significantly different from zero for honesty ($p = 0.002$), while it does not reach statistical significance for trustworthiness ($p = 0.227$) and altruism ($p = 0.159$). For rule compliance, the sign of β_2 is negative, but not significantly different from zero ($p = 0.733$). A series of Chow tests indicate that there is a significant difference only between the Illegal coefficients for honesty and rule compliance ($p = 0.062$).²² Similar results obtain for the first-order beliefs regression (Table I.2), except that there we find evidence of significant discontinuities at the legal threshold also for trustworthiness ($p = 0.010$).

²²P-values from Chow tests are adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg FDR procedure, as described in the main text.

Table I.1: OLS regressions, Bad law experiment (second-order beliefs)

	(1) Trustworthiness	(2) Honesty	(3) Altruism	(4) Rule compliance
$(T - o_i)$	-0.033 (0.059)	0.016 (0.083)	-0.118 (0.075)	-0.087 (0.075)
<i>Illegal</i>	0.112 (0.092)	0.361*** (0.118)	0.174 (0.123)	-0.045 (0.131)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	0.026 (0.083)	0.045 (0.107)	0.142 (0.106)	0.078 (0.117)
<i>Constant</i>	0.615*** (0.093)	0.336*** (0.123)	0.289** (0.124)	0.448*** (0.105)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.057	0.096	0.114	0.016
N.	398	398	398	404

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood that a person taking the behavior described in a vignette is trustworthy (Model 1), honest (Model 2), altruistic (Model 3) and rule compliant (Model 4). Data are based on second-order beliefs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

Table I.2: OLS regressions, Bad law experiment (first-order beliefs)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Trustworthiness	Honesty	Altruism	Rule compliance
$(T - o_i)$	0.062 (0.102)	-0.069 (0.124)	-0.073 (0.105)	-0.172 (0.104)
<i>Illegal</i>	0.396** (0.153)	0.396** (0.169)	0.116 (0.158)	-0.049 (0.188)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	0.037 (0.138)	0.208 (0.164)	0.123 (0.144)	0.215 (0.172)
<i>Constant</i>	0.179 (0.147)	0.146 (0.154)	0.060 (0.151)	0.401** (0.160)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.139	0.116	0.031	0.036
N.	201	201	201	199

Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood that a person taking the behavior described in a vignette is trustworthy (Model 1), honest (Model 2), altruistic (Model 3) and rule compliant (Model 4). Data are based on first-order beliefs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. Controls (age, gender, and income) are included in the regressions but not reported in the Table. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

J. Robustness experiment: Weaker rule of law

At the same time as the UK student experiment described in Section II, we also collected data from a second student sample comprised of 248 Chinese students at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. The main interest of this additional experiment was to probe the generalizability of findings by testing the effects of laws on norms in a very different legislative environment, one where the rule of law is relatively weak compared to the UK (for instance, according to the 2016 Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, the UK ranked 10th out of 113 countries while China ranked 80th).

Procedures used in the Chinese experiment were similar to those used in the UK student sample experiment. Instructions were first translated into Chinese and then back-translated in English, as per usual practice. The Chinese vignettes were further slightly adjusted to reflect cross-country differences in the law (although laws regulating the five behavior under study exist in both countries, the cutoff values of the thresholds differ).²³ Incentives were converted using a PPP exchange rate of £1 = 6.2RMB, and the payment rules were the same as those in the UK students experiment.²⁴

Figure J.1 shows the norm functions estimated from the responses of the Chinese students. The figure has the same structure of the previous figures. Table J.1 contains the regression estimates of this data, using the same models shown in equation (7) of the main paper.

In the Chinese sample, we observe that the law also exerts expressive power on norms, albeit again the effect is not uniform across the five situations. In contrast to the UK case, in China the law seems to have its strongest effects on norms in the case of the cash at customs and speeding vignettes. The effect is weaker for the age of consent and alcohol to youth vignettes, and statistically insignificant for the drink driving vignette. A series of Chow tests confirm that the law tends to carry different expressive power in the cash at customs and speeding situations compared to the other three situations.²⁵


Thus, although there are some differences between the UK and Chinese samples, particularly in the type of situations characterized by strong effects of the law, which may reflect inherent dif-

²³Other aspects of the real-world legal frameworks, regulating the actions featuring in the vignettes, may of course also have differed between the two countries. For instance, some laws may carry heavier punishments or be more strongly enforced in one country or the other. Therefore, while we kept all procedural features of the UK and China experiments as close as possible, our aim is not to conduct a fully controlled cross-cultural comparison of the effect of law on norms. Rather, we consider identifying the expressive power of laws in each country to be of independent interest. We can also comment on whether the results are qualitatively similar between the two countries.

²⁴Monetary amounts in the vignettes were also adjusted according to PPP exchange rate (with rounding), except in the cash at customs vignette where the amounts were dictated by different legal thresholds between the UK and China. Conversions, subject to rounding, were also made between imperial and metric units, where relevant.

²⁵Specifically, we find that β_2^{cash} and $\beta_2^{speeding}$ are not significantly different from each other ($p = 0.233$), β_2^{cash} is significantly different from the other three coefficients (all $p \leq 0.027$), and $\beta_2^{speeding}$ is significantly different from $\beta_2^{drink-drive}$ ($p = 0.034$). All other comparisons are statistically insignificant. All p-values are corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method.

Figure J.1: Norms in the five legal threshold situations, China sample



Note: Each panel plots the average social appropriateness of actions at various distance from a legal threshold (1 = very socially appropriate; -1 = very socially inappropriate). The dashed black line indicates the position of the legal threshold in each situation (values of the legal thresholds are reported in the bottom-right box). Actions to the left of the threshold are legal, actions to the right are illegal. Bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Table J.1: OLS regressions, China sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age of consent	Alcohol to youth	Cash at customs	Drink driving	Speeding
$(T - o_i)$	0.050 (0.061)	0.045 (0.049)	-0.023 (0.054)	0.097* (0.053)	0.028 (0.050)
<i>Illegal</i>	-0.495*** (0.156)	-0.410** (0.160)	-1.078*** (0.158)	-0.215 (0.151)	-0.751*** (0.158)
$(T - o_i) * \textit{Illegal}$	-0.006 (0.069)	0.029 (0.066)	0.044 (0.074)	-0.019 (0.069)	-0.006 (0.068)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.243* (0.132)	-0.068 (0.117)	0.690*** (0.105)	-0.161 (0.108)	0.472*** (0.117)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No
R ²	0.301	0.285	0.468	0.212	0.396
N.	248	248	248	248	248

Note: Dependent variable is the evaluation of appropriateness of the behavior described in a vignette. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions with bootstrapped standard errors yield very similar results. *** = 1% significance level; ** = 5% significance level; * = 10% significance level.

ferences in culture as well as in the specifics of the law and law enforcement between the two countries, the main result that the law can have expressive power, but that this varies across situations, carries over to the Chinese sample. It is interesting to note that this data was collected in a very different legislative environment, characterized by markedly weaker rule of law compared to the UK. This shows that the expressive power of law does not require a strong rule of law to take hold.

K. Alternative mechanism: Conformity, a formal model

A simple model of conformity. Consider a setup where individuals derive utility from material gain and conformity with the most common behavior in their society. Moreover, when asked to evaluate the appropriateness of seizing/leaving an opportunity, individuals answer by considering the share of others who seize/leave it. This assumption embodies the idea that the social sanctions/rewards that accrue to an individual are based on what is viewed as “common” or “normal” behavior.

The net utility from seizing an opportunity o is

$$u(o; \zeta) = \begin{cases} t + \zeta(2G_o - 1) & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \text{ (legal)} \\ t + \zeta(2G_o - 1) - pK & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \text{ (illegal)} \end{cases}$$

where t , p and K are defined as in the main text, G_o is the share of types who seize opportunity o , $1 - G_o$ is the share who leave it, and the individual-specific parameter $\zeta \geq 0$ distributed on $[\zeta_{\min}, \zeta_{\max}]$ according to $f_\zeta(\cdot)$ with mean μ_ζ and median M_ζ , characterizes conformity concerns.

Depending on whether G_o is above or below $1/2$, the net utility from seizing the opportunity is increasing or decreasing in ζ . This indicates that there may be multiple equilibria. We now consider the following equilibrium: (i) all agents seize $o \leq \bar{o}$; (ii) when $o > \bar{o}$, the share of agents seizing o is strictly less than 1. In this equilibrium, the share of individuals seizing an opportunity o exhibits a downward discontinuity at $o = \bar{o}$.

For (i) to occur, we require $t + \zeta > 0$ which is always true so long as $\zeta_{\min} > -t$. Consider now (ii). For concreteness, we focus on an equilibrium where the share of individuals seizing an illegal opportunity is minoritarian. This implies that the net utility from seizing the opportunity is strictly decreasing in ζ . Denote by $\tilde{\zeta}$ the highest ζ who seizes the opportunity. We have: $G_o = F_\zeta(\tilde{\zeta})$, where $\tilde{\zeta}$ satisfies (when interior)

$$t + \tilde{\zeta}[2F_\zeta(\tilde{\zeta}) - 1] - pK = 0. \quad (\text{a.45})$$

The equilibrium we have described can arise so long as (a.45) is satisfied for some $\tilde{\zeta} < M_\zeta$. In this equilibrium, the share of types who seize opportunity o is discontinuous at $o = \bar{o}$. Assuming that the social esteem conferred to the individual for seizing an opportunity depends on the share of individuals seizing that opportunity, the social norm functions measured in our experiments also exhibit a downward discontinuity at $o = \bar{o}$.

However, this simple model seems less well-equipped to explain our results of Section IV.B. There we observe downward discontinuities in the perception of an individual’s trustworthiness, honesty and altruism. In the model sketched above, we can generate a discontinuity in the expected

value of ζ of those who seize legal or illegal opportunities:

$$E(\zeta \mid \text{seize } o) = \begin{cases} \mu_\zeta & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \\ \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\zeta}) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \end{cases}$$

where $\mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\zeta}) \equiv E(\zeta \mid \zeta < \tilde{\zeta})$ and $\mu_\zeta > \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\zeta})$. However, it is not clear why inferences about an individual's conformity parameter ζ should correlate with his/her trustworthiness, honesty and altruism. Without further assumptions about the relation between ζ and these prosocial traits, the model cannot explain why we observe discontinuities in these traits.

A model of conformity augmented with prosociality. Alternatively, to reconcile the model of conformity with the data of Section IV.B, we can augment the theory by adding prosociality to the individual's utility function. Consider a setup where, as in our main model, individuals are characterized by different levels of prosociality (they care about the negative externality generated by seizing opportunity o). However, suppose that, as in the model of conformism described above, people also care about conformity with the most common behavior in their society.

The net utility from seizing opportunity o is

$$u(o; \theta) = \begin{cases} t + \bar{\zeta}(2G_o - 1) - \theta o & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \text{ (legal)} \\ t + \bar{\zeta}(2G_o - 1) - \theta o - pK & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \text{ (illegal)} \end{cases}$$

where t , p and K are defined as above, $\theta \in [\theta_{\min}, \theta_{\max}]$, distributed according to $f(\cdot)$, characterizes prosociality concerns and $\bar{\zeta} > 0$ is concern for conformity (which, for simplicity, is assumed to be the same for all individuals).

Since the net utility from seizing an opportunity is strictly decreasing in θ , we can identify, for each o , the highest value of θ such that the individual seizes the opportunity. When o is legal, the threshold type $\hat{\theta}_o$ satisfies (when interior)

$$t + \bar{\zeta}(2F(\hat{\theta}_o) - 1) - \hat{\theta}_o o = 0.$$

When o is illegal, the threshold type $\tilde{\theta}_o$ satisfies (when interior)

$$t + \bar{\zeta}(2F(\tilde{\theta}_o) - 1) - \tilde{\theta}_o o - pK = 0$$

The share of types seizing opportunity o is

$$G_o = \begin{cases} F(\hat{\theta}_o) & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \\ F(\tilde{\theta}_o) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \end{cases} \quad (\text{a.46})$$

while the expected θ conditional on seizing opportunity o is

$$E(\theta \mid \text{seize } o) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{M}^-(\hat{\theta}_o) & \text{if } o \leq \bar{o} \\ \mathcal{M}^-(\tilde{\theta}_o) & \text{if } o > \bar{o} \end{cases} \quad (\text{a.47})$$

Proposition J1 *In equilibrium, we have*

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [G_{\bar{o}-\varepsilon} - G_{\bar{o}+\varepsilon}] = F(\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) - F(\widetilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) \quad (\text{a.48})$$

and

$$\lim_{\varepsilon \rightarrow 0} [E(\theta \mid \text{seize } \bar{o} - \varepsilon) - E(\theta \mid \text{seize } \bar{o} + \varepsilon)] = \mathcal{M}^-(\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}}) - \mathcal{M}^-(\widetilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}). \quad (\text{a.49})$$

Proof In text above.

It is easy to see that if $\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}} > \widetilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}$, then both G_o and $E(\theta \mid \text{seize } o)$ experience a downward discontinuity at $o = \bar{o}$.²⁶

In this augmented model, we can produce a discontinuity *both* in the share of people who seize opportunity o at the legal threshold (which we are assuming characterizes judgments of social appropriateness) *and* in the expected prosociality of those who seize legal and illegal opportunities. This model can therefore explain all data from our experiments.

However, the model also generates counterintuitive implications. To see this, consider a very simple example where θ may only take two values: $\underline{\theta} = 0$ and $\bar{\theta} = 1$. The share of type $\underline{\theta}$ is $\pi > 1/2$. For concreteness, consider an illegal opportunity $o > \bar{o}$. It is straightforward to see that, if $o + pK - \bar{\zeta} > t > \bar{\zeta} + pK$, then in equilibrium the following must apply: type $\underline{\theta}$ seizes the opportunity, while type $\bar{\theta}$ leaves it.²⁷ Given $\pi > 1/2$, and since the social appropriateness associated with a given behavior depends on the share of individuals who adopt that behavior, this implies that seizing the illegal opportunity is considered more socially appropriate than leaving it. At the same time, however, everyone understands that individuals who leave the illegal opportunity are more prosocial than those who seize it. This corresponds to a situation where (mis)behavior is widespread, yet everyone understands that only “bad” types engage in it – and nevertheless people condone it and consider it socially appropriate, therefore rewarding with esteem the “bad” types and punishing with stigma the “good” types.

The reason for this implausible prediction is that in this model of conformity the social appropriateness of seizing an opportunity is conceptually distinct from the prosociality of the individuals who seize it. In our model of Section I the two concepts are instead interconnected and we have a synchronicity between judgments of social appropriateness of taking an opportunity, frequency with which that behavior occurs, and expectations of prosociality of those who engage in it.²⁸

²⁶The sufficient condition for this to be the case is $2\bar{\zeta}f(\theta) < \bar{o} < t/\theta_{\min}$. The first inequality ensures that $t + \bar{\zeta}(2F(\theta) - 1) - \theta o - pK$ is strictly decreasing in θ so that, provided that $\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}} > \theta_{\min}$, we have $\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}} > \widetilde{\theta}_{\bar{o}}$. The second inequality ensures that $\widehat{\theta}_{\bar{o}} > \theta_{\min}$.

²⁷When these conditions hold, the net utility from seizing the opportunity, $t + \bar{\zeta}(2G_o - 1) - \theta o - pK$, is always positive for type $\underline{\theta}$ and is always negative for type $\bar{\theta}$.

²⁸One may tweak the model of conformity and assume that judgments of social appropriateness are based on both the frequency of behavior (G_o) and the perceived prosociality of types engaging in it ($E(\theta \mid \text{seize } o)$). But then this alternative model becomes very similar to our model of Section I, with an added component that captures a conformity motive.