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Regulating Conglomerates: Evidence from an Energy Conservation Program in China
Qiaoyi Chen
Zhao Chen
Zhikuo Liu
Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato
Daniel Yi Xu
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)
Abstract
We study a prominent energy regulation affecting large Chinese
manufacturers that are part of broader conglomerates. Using
detailed firm-level data and difference-in-differences research
designs, we show that regulated firms cut output and shifted some
production to unregulated firms within their conglomerate instead
of improving their energy efficiency. To account for conglomerate
and market spillovers, we interpret these results through the
lens of an industry equilibrium model featuring conglomerate
production. The policy raises welfare if the per-ton benefits of
carbon reduction exceed $161. Alternative polices that exploit
public information on business networks can increase aggregate
energy savings by 10%.