American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective
American Economic Review
vol. 93,
no. 5, December 2003
(pp. 1678–1702)
Abstract
Studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing, the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate. It then revisits the "original sin" debate, analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment, international portfolio diversification, domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries' access to international lending. The paper thereby relates a country's level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings, their location, the extent of control rights held by political authorities, and the interests of dominant domestic political forces.Citation
Tirole, Jean. 2003. "Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective." American Economic Review, 93 (5): 1678–1702. DOI: 10.1257/000282803322655491JEL Classification
- F21 International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
- F32 Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- F34 International Lending and Debt Problems