Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
- (pp. 1136-62)
Abstract
A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low, but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased. (JEL D82, D83)Citation
Li, Wei. 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries." American Economic Review, 100 (3): 1136-62. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1136Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief