American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 1, January 2015
(pp. 67–99)
Abstract
Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master's programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We show that existing matching mechanisms suffer from inefficiency and instability, and propose a mechanism that is better in terms of efficiency, stability, and incentives while respecting the distributional constraints. (JEL C70, D61, D63)Citation
Kamada, Yuichiro, and Fuhito Kojima. 2015. "Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications." American Economic Review 105 (1): 67–99. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20101552Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D61 Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement