Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics
- (pp. 2410-48)
Abstract
Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision flows through voter behavior and ultimately impacts the distribution of political spending. I test the theory on data from Sierra Leone using decentralization and differential radio coverage to identify information's effects. Estimates suggest that information increases voting across ethnic-party lines and induces a more equitable allocation of campaign spending. (JEL D72, D83, J15, O17, Z13)Citation
Casey, Katherine. 2015. "Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics." American Economic Review, 105 (8): 2410-48. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130397Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification