How to Control Controlled School Choice
- (pp. 2679-94)
Abstract
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)Citation
Echenique, Federico, and M. Bumin Yenmez. 2015. "How to Control Controlled School Choice." American Economic Review, 105 (8): 2679-94. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130929Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D47 Market Design
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy