Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
AbstractCurrent refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle.
CitationDelacrétaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym. 2023. "Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement." American Economic Review, 113 (10): 2689-2717. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210096
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- J18 Demographic Economics: Public Policy