American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
no. 3, August 2023
Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentivization and information. If children have private information, (i) providing attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents—importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children.
de Walque, Damien, and Christine Valente.
"Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Analysis of Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Education: Government Policy
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration