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« Back to Results

Barriers to Boardrooms

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Hilton Atlanta, Grand Ballroom D
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Chair: Renee Adams, University of Oxford

The Impact of Role Models on Women's Self-Selection in Competitive Environments

Kristina Meier
,
University of Mannheim
Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
,
University of Mannheim
Stefan Ruenzi
,
University of Mannheim

Abstract

We show that female role models increase women's willingness to compete. As in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we find that women are less willing to enter a tournament than men, although there are no gender differences in performance. However, the gender gap in tournament entry disappears if subjects are exposed to a competitive female role model. Results are stronger for the best performing women who seem to be particularly encouraged by female role models. Female role models also mitigate gender stereotype threats and lead to higher self-confidence among women. By contrast, we find that competitive male role models seem to intimidate female subjects and increase the gender gap in tournament entry even further. Our results have implications for the socio-political debate on how the fraction of women in top management positions can be increased.

The Origins and Real Effects of the Gender Gap: Evidence from CEOs' Formative Years

Ran Duchin
,
University of Washington
Mikhail Simutin
,
University of Toronto
Denis Sosyura
,
Arizona State University

Abstract

CEOs allocate more investment capital to male managers than to female managers in the same divisions. Using data from individual Census records, we find that this gender gap is driven by CEOs who grew up in male-dominated families—those where the father was the only income earner and had more education than the mother. The gender gap also increases for CEOs who attended all-male high schools and grew up in neighborhoods with greater gender inequality. The effect of gender on capital budgeting introduces frictions and erodes investment efficiency. Overall, the gender gap originates in CEO preferences developed during formative years and produces significant real effects.

Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

Daniel Ferreira
,
London School of Economics
Edith Ginglinger
,
Paris Dauphine University
Marie-Aude Laguna
,
Paris Dauphine University
Yasmine Skalli
,
Paris Dauphine University

Abstract

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.
Discussant(s)
Lise Vesterlund
,
University of Pittsburgh
Paola Sapienza
,
Northwestern University
Adriana Lleras-Muney
,
University of California-Los Angeles
JEL Classifications
  • G0 - General