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  3. 2023
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  5. Criminal Background Checks in the Labor Market
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Criminal Background Checks in the Labor Market

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 6, 2023 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)

Hilton Riverside, Grand Salon B Sec 9
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Natalia Emanuel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record

Zoe Cullen
,
Harvard University
Will Dobbie
,
Harvard University
Mitchell Hoffman
,
University of Toronto

Abstract

State and local policies increasingly restrict employers' access to criminal records, but without addressing the underlying reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. Employers may thus still want to ask about a job applicant's criminal record later in the hiring process or make inaccurate judgments based on an applicant's demographic characteristics. In this paper, we use a field experiment conducted in partnership with a nationwide staffing platform to test policies that more directly address the reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. The experiment asked hiring managers at nearly a thousand U.S. businesses to make incentive-compatible decisions under different randomized conditions. We find that 39% of businesses in our sample are willing to work with individuals with a criminal record at baseline, which rises to over 50% when businesses are offered crime and safety insurance, a single performance review, or a limited background check covering just the past year. Wage subsidies can achieve similar increases but at substantially higher cost. Based on our findings, the staffing platform relaxed the criminal background check requirement and offered crime and safety insurance to interested businesses.

Labor Market Impacts of Reducing Felony Convictions: Evaluating Observational Approaches with Quasi- and Randomized Experiments

Amanda Agan
,
Rutgers University
Andrew Garin
,
University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
Alex Mas
,
Princeton University
Crystal Yang
,
Harvard University
Dmitri Koustas
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

We study the labor market impacts of California’s Proposition 47, which reduced certain nonviolent felony convictions to misdemeanors. We use data from San Joaquin County, where agencies proactively implemented the law without informing affected individuals or requiring them to petition the court themselves, and administrative tax records. To estimate the effects of reductions on employment we use quasi-random ordering of reductions and a field experiment where we notified a subset of individuals about their proactive reduction.

Smudges: Employment Signals in Criminal Background Check

Natalia Emanuel
,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Emma Harrington
,
University of Iowa

Abstract

To what extent do criminal background checks help firms screen for workers with better on-the-job performance? To assess this question, we use administrative records from a national staffing agency that captures both the criminal records of workers and performance calls of their assignments. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that some workers are placed on assignment before their background checks are completed. This practice became especially common when some courthouses closed down at the onset of the pandemic. By comparing the early performance calls of workers who were ultimately disqualified because of their criminal histories to those of workers who were not disqualified, we assess the screening value of criminal background checks.

What’s in a Background Check? Evaluating the Impact of Limiting the Criminal Record Information

Amanda Agan
,
Rutgers University
David Autor
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Emma Rackstraw
,
Harvard University

Abstract

Criminal histories used for employment screening serve as a barrier to employment for a large fraction of males, minorities, and workers without college degrees. To enable "fair chance" hiring, employers may filter which criminal background data are visible to hiring adjudicators, potentially suppressing minor or older charges and convictions. Theory and existing evidence point to potentially ambiguous effects of information suppression on hiring of workers with criminal histories, however, since decision-makers may compensate for the absence of information by using group characteristics to infer it. We have partnered with a background check company to study the effects of policies that alter the set of criminal records available to adjudicators. Using a quasi-experimental approach, we will assess how suppressing a subset of the detailed criminal background data presented to adjudicators affects hiring of workers with and without criminal histories.

Discussant(s)
Conrad Miller
,
University of California-Berkeley
JEL Classifications
  • J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
  • J7 - Labor Discrimination