This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
  4. Forthcoming Articles
  5. Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy

ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)

Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

  • Matteo Gamalerio
  • Federico Trombetta
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (Forthcoming)

Abstract

Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected officials, are widely used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules on mayoral candidates’ education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: it may alleviate pork-barrel spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians.

Downloads