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  4. September 2002
  5. Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

  • P.-A. Chiappori
  • S. Levitt
  • T. Groseclose
American Economic Review
vol. 92, no. 4, September 2002
(pp. 1138–1151)
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Citation

Chiappori, P.-A., S. Levitt, and T. Groseclose. 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer ." American Economic Review, 92 (4): 1138–1151. DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344678

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • L83 Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism