This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2004
  5. Efficient Patent Pools

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Efficient Patent Pools

  • Josh Lerner
  • Jean Tirole
American Economic Review
vol. 94, no. 3, June 2004
(pp. 691–711)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.

Citation

Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools." American Economic Review, 94 (3): 691–711. DOI: 10.1257/0002828041464641

JEL Classification

  • K11 Property Law
  • O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital