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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2012
  5. Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Satoru Takahashi
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 3, May 2012
(pp. 319–24)
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Abstract

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.

Citation

Bergemann, Dirk, Stephen Morris, and Satoru Takahashi. 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types." American Economic Review, 102 (3): 319–24. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.3.319

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information