This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2012
  5. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Georgy Egorov
  • Konstantin Sonin
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 4, June 2012
(pp. 1446–76)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)

Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2012. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs." American Economic Review, 102 (4): 1446–76. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1446

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • K10 Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)