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  3. American Economic Review
  4. October 2012
  5. The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

  • Sandeep Baliga
  • Tomas Sjöström
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 6, October 2012
(pp. 2897–2922)
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Abstract

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

Citation

Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjöström. 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict." American Economic Review, 102 (6): 2897–2922. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.6.2897

JEL Classification

  • D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design