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  4. December 2014
  5. Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification

  • Elchanan Ben-Porath
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Barton L. Lipman
American Economic Review
vol. 104, no. 12, December 2014
(pp. 3779–3813)
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Abstract

A principal allocates an object to one of I agents. Each agent values receiving the object and has private information regarding the value to the principal of giving it to him. There are no monetary transfers, but the principal can check an agent's information at a cost. A favored-agent mechanism specifies a value v* and an agent i*. If all agents other than i* report values below v*, then i* receives the good and no one is checked. Otherwise, whoever reports the highest value is checked and receives the good if and only if her report is confirmed. All optimal mechanisms are essentially randomizations over optimal favored-agent mechanisms. (JEL D82)

Citation

Ben-Porath, Elchanan, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman. 2014. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification." American Economic Review, 104 (12): 3779–3813. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3779

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design