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  4. November 2018
  5. Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples

  • Thành Nguyen
  • Rakesh Vohra
American Economic Review
vol. 108, no. 11, November 2018
(pp. 3154–69)
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Abstract

The National Resident Matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With couples, stable matchings need not exist. Nevertheless, for any student preferences, we show that each instance of a matching problem has a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. In this perturbation, aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four. The capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two.

Citation

Nguyen, Thành, and Rakesh Vohra. 2018. "Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples." American Economic Review, 108 (11): 3154–69. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141188

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D47 Market Design
  • I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
  • J41 Labor Contracts
  • J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing