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  3. American Economic Review
  4. September 2016
  5. Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

  • Jonathan Levin
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz
American Economic Review
vol. 106, no. 9, September 2016
(pp. 2528–51)
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Abstract

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.

Citation

Levin, Jonathan, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. 2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction." American Economic Review, 106 (9): 2528–51. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D47 Market Design
  • H82 Governmental Property
  • L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets