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  3. American Economic Review
  4. January 2017
  5. Beeps

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Beeps

  • Jeffrey C. Ely
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 1, January 2017
(pp. 31–53)
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Abstract

I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.

Citation

Ely, Jeffrey C. 2017. "Beeps." American Economic Review, 107 (1): 31–53. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150218

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness