American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment
American Economic Review
vol. 110,
no. 10, October 2020
(pp. 3298–3314)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.Citation
Levine, David K., and Andrea Mattozzi. 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment." American Economic Review, 110 (10): 3298–3314. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170476Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification